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Abstract 
My thesis is that a recovery of Germain Grisez’s theological ethics in relation to the environment and 
the application of his conservative Catholic methodology to climate change can yield a novel and 
significant contribution to Catholic theological reflection on this central challenge in an age of 
ecological crisis.  
This thesis argues that climate change and the wider ecological crisis are ‘signs of the times’—and 
hence are appropriate issues for Catholic theological reflection—both in principle and on the basis of 
their classification as such within the authoritative teaching of the Church’s magisterium. The 
scientific evidence for the phenomenon of anthropogenic global warming is robust and the UNFCCC 
establishes a collective legal obligation to deliver a greenhouse gas abatement strategy rigorous 
enough to prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the earth’s climatic system’.  
This thesis questions both the assumption of endemic anthropocentricism in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition and the critical-revisionist methodology adopted by a number of ecotheologians in relation 
to Vatican teaching on the basis of this assumption. This thesis proposes an alternative approach to 
reflection on ecological issues employing a conservative Catholic theological method exemplified in 
the work of Germain Grisez.  
This thesis proposes a rereading of Grisez’s natural law through the lens of his creation theology that 
reveals an important and hitherto overlooked resource for environmental ethics. Although Grisez 
himself does not address the climate challenge in his published work, this thesis shows that his 
ecological insights are pertinent to the issue and application of his theological method can 
contribute constructively to the wider project of confronting the climate crisis from a Catholic 
perspective. 
This thesis further argues that Grisez’s reconstruction of natural law is viable, in that it represents 
one philosophically cogent solution to the naturalistic fallacy, and that neither his choice of this 
solution nor his divergence from Classical Thomism compromise the construction of a ‘Grisez School 
environmental ethics’. In addition, his natural law has the virtue of catholicity in its capacity to 
contribute to ecumenical and secular debates necessary to the resolution of the climate crisis. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
General introduction and research question 
Every project in theology begins with a personal story about the set of circumstances in one 
individual’s life that birthed the motivation to reflect on a particular problem. For example, for Alex 
Evans this personal story is of a journey from a loss of faith in the capacity of rational, evidence-
based arguments to persuade governments of the need to take radical action to build a fairer more 
sustainable world, to the belief that a Christian vision of covenant, atonement and renewal might 
have the potential to succeed where our politics appears to be failing us.1 My own intellectual 
journey has some similarities to Evans’s: as a science graduate I was interested in the technical 
aspects of the climate challenge and later—at law school—I was much influenced by John Finnis’s 
Natural Law and Natural Rights and fascinated by what I saw as the implications of leading cases in 
English Tort law2 for global issues like climate change. The need to put these thoughts into 
theological context was brought home to me some years later, when my autistic son Ben—then five 
years old—became distressed about species extinction after watching a David Attenborough 
documentary on climate change. An issue I had been approaching scientifically as a dispassionate 
observer crystalized, as a result of this experience, into something that matters to me spiritually as a 
Christian and personally as a woman and as a mother.  
I had the privilege of presenting a poster on Germain Grisez and climate change at the 2010 
‘Theological Ethics in the World Church’ Conference held at Trento in Italy.3 It was there that I 
realised the extent to which my personal history as an immigrant from Zimbabwe influenced my 
deeply held concerns about this issue. Zimbabwe is ranked amongst the world’s most climate-
vulnerable states, facing serious threats to food production in a largely agricultural-based economy 
as the planet warms, as well as increasingly unpredictable rainfall and extreme weather events. My 
sense of connection with Zimbabwe and empathy with the people there remains undimmed by the 
passing years despite limited opportunities to visit the land of my birth. 
However, last October I was able to visit Action Aid Zimbabwe as part of a project to assist climate 
refugees displaced by flooding near the Tokwe-Mukosi dam in Masvingo. Ben—now grown up and 
training to be a photographer—travelled with us to the Chingwizi area where the displaced people 
are still living in desperate circumstances. We saw first-hand the effects of our changing climate on a 
vulnerable population. One enduring memory which Ben captured on camera is of two small 
children carrying water for many miles across the arid landscape because the boreholes closer to 
home had dried up. We also heard stories of small children braving long walks, through bushland 
inhabited by wild animals, to makeshift schools facing drastic shortages of books and equipment. 
And we witnessed an acute food-security crisis unfolding as political rows over the future of the 
displaced people left them in conditions of prolonged destitution.  
                                                          
1
 Alex Evans, ‘The eternal covenant, atonement and environmental restoration’, Modern Believing, 54.4 
(October 2013), pp. 318–327. 
2
 See especially Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather   http://www.e-
lawresources.co.uk/cases/Cambridge-Water-v-Eastern-Counties-Leather.php  [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
3
 Jacaranda Turvey, ‘Natural Law and Ecological Conversion’, Poster Presentation, Catholic Theological Ethics in 
the World Church Conference, ‘In the Currents of History: From Trent to the Future’, Trento, Italy, 24–27 July 
2010. 
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It would be an understatement to admit that I do not have all the answers to even this one example 
of tragedy currently affecting a group of people profoundly disadvantaged by climate vulnerability. 
But if we are to reflect theologically on climate change we must begin with empathy for those 
vulnerable populations imperilled in a warming world. We need to have the courage to walk 
amongst them and see the world through their eyes. Only then will we be enabled by grace to 
discern the contribution each of us can make to moral theology in the Anthropocene based on our 
personal experience and reflection. 
Aims 
This project begins with the research question ‘how might Germain Grisez’s natural law and creation 
theology contribute to the project of articulating a Roman Catholic response to the climate 
challenge?’ Central to my response to this question is a recovery of Grisez’s thought on the 
environment and a defence of his position in the face of environmentalist and theological critiques. I 
hope to show that the new natural law theory developed by Grisez and his collaborators provides a 
cogent theological framework for environmental engagement and to demonstrate the application of 
this framework to contested issues of climate justice.  
Rationale 
As many scholars have pointed out, climate change is difficult to theorise within the commonly 
utilised moral frameworks: the effects of carbon pollution are indirect and non-localised such that 
those vulnerable to its effects are geographically and culturally distant from those most responsible 
for greenhouse gas stocks in the atmosphere and include generations as yet unborn. The gases 
involved are not ‘toxic’ in the normal sense of the word, yet their cumulative effects are profound. 
Furthermore the consumption of fossil fuels is so imbedded in the lifestyles of industrialised nations 
that its moral dimension is hidden from us in the same way that the human cost of slavery was 
invisible to the inhabitants of societies whose economies depended on slave trading. Discussion of 
the problem has tended to be highly technical and abstract—excluding non-specialists from the 
conversation—and climate politics has been dogged by ‘Giddens’s Paradox’: ‘since the dangers 
posed by global warming aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the course of everyday life, 
however awesome they appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature 
about them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being stirred to serious action 
will, by definition, be too late.’4  
As I shall show, the Catholic Church views climate change not as a purely technical problem—to be 
addressed by experts in science and economics—nor as an amoral but politically partisan issue 
where one might reasonably choose sides based on established political allegiances and worldviews 
without conscientious engagement. Rather, the environmental crisis ‘has reached such proportions 
as to be the moral responsibility of everyone’5—as Pope Saint John Paul II had already discerned 
back in 1990—and climate change is a ‘sign of the times’ requiring urgent reflection and an 
essentially human issue, linked to the security and flourishing of all the families and living 
                                                          
4
 Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 2. 
5
 John Paul II, Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace 1 January 1990, #15 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19891208_xxiii-
world-day-for-peace.html [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
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communities on the earth.6 It is a question of integral ecology, in which respect for the dignity of the 
human person is inseparable from concern for the flourishing of creation. A natural law approach to 
the problem holds out the promise of finding common ground with people of good will beyond the 
Christian community, an approach well suited to addressing a global problem, and flourishing is a 
key concept in Grisez’s natural law theory. Hence my expectation at the commencement of this 
project was that I would find an extensive secondary literature on Grisez’s ecological reflection and 
numerous critiques of his position. It was therefore surprising to find a paucity of material on the 
subject and no literature at all on the possible application of his work to the global climate challenge.  
Grisez is a major figure in Catholic theological ethics; his encyclopaedic work in the field has been 
enormously influential, especially in politically conservative Catholic circles in the United States—a 
demographic that has been notably disengaged from environmental issues in public discourse.7 One 
indication of this disengagement is that Princeton Professor of Law, Robert George—arguably 
Grisez’s most influential disciple—provides no substantial discussion of his mentor’s views on 
environmental ethics in his collection of essays In Defense of Natural Law.8 Jeremy Waldron opines 
that George has ‘done more than anyone else in modern jurisprudence to explore the implications 
of natural law for American constitutional structures and for issues of public policy and public 
morality’ and The New York Times has described him as the country’s most influential conservative 
Christian thinker.9 Clearly there is a lacuna in conservative Catholic thought on the environment and 
it is this gap in the literature that this thesis seeks to address. 
Methodology 
My methodological approach has been to examine key texts in order to present a recovery of 
Grisez’s integral ecology, to defend his position against critiques advanced by environmentalist and 
theological interlocutors and to apply his thought to contested climate justice issues. Database 
searches revealed no primary or secondary literature on the application of Grisez’s natural law to 
problems in climate ethics. I have chosen to concentrate on Grisez’s systematic presentation of his 
thought in the first two volumes of The Way of the Lord Jesus.10 In particular, Chapter 10 of Living a 
Christian Life—on work, subhuman realities and property11—is an essential point of reference for 
Grisez’s environmental ethics and I have found it important to read the chapter carefully in its 
entirety in order to get an overview of the connections between these issues in Grisez’s thought. 
Other scholars who have paid little attention to the sections on work and property have overlooked 
                                                          
6
 Erin Lothes Biviano, David Cloutier, Elaine Padilla, Christiana Z. Peppard, Jame Schaefer, ‘Catholic Moral 
Traditions and Energy Ethics for the Twenty-First Century’, Journal of Moral Theology, 5.2 (2016) pp. 1–36, at 
pp. 6–7. 
7
 According to Erin Lothes Biviano et al. ‘middle and upper-middle class Americans are the single most 
important group of people to “convert” on issues of energy ethics, because—as many contemporary ethicists 
agree—they “probably have much more economic power than the vast majority of people on the planet”’, 
quoting James Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change (New York: Continuum, 2008), p.141; see also Willis 
Jenkins, The Future of Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
8
 Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
9
 David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘The Conservative-Christian Big Thinker’ The New York Times Magazine, 16 December 
2009 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/magazine/20george-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [accessed 
11/6/2015]. 
10
 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume 1: Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald 
Press, 1983); Volume 2, Living a Christian Life (Quincy, Illinois: Franciscan Press, 1993). 
11
 Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10: ‘Work, subhuman realities and property’, pp. 753–834. 
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a valuable resource for ecological ethics. Examination of key texts from Grisez’s oeuvre is 
supplemented as necessary with reference to John Finnis’s slightly different formulation of the 
theory in Natural Law and Natural Rights,12 and the comprehensive restatement of the core of the 
new natural law theory written by Grisez, Finnis and Boyle—Practical Principles, Moral Truth and 
Ultimate Ends13—which Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black recommend as ‘the central point of reference 
for analysing their theory.’14 Biggar and Black’s collection of essays The Revival of Natural Law has 
been another important source,15 presenting a number of valuable contemporary scholarly 
responses to the Finnis-Grisez School. In applying Grisez’s ethics to climate justice issues I have 
attempted to abstract principles relevant to the task and re-examine some central justice questions 
in the light of these principles.  
My thesis is that a recovery of Germain Grisez’s thought on the environment reveals an integral 
ecology that pervades his theological ethics. Application of principles abstracted from Grisez’s 
thought to the climate challenge as a ‘sign of the times’ enables me to construct a Grisez School 
conception of climate justice. Notwithstanding theological critiques of Grisez’s theory—including 
those of prominent Catholic Thomist scholars Jean Porter and Ralph McInerny—I demonstrate that 
the new natural law is a philosophically coherent and theologically cogent ethical system and its 
deployment as an analytical tool in our context of ecological crisis makes a timely and important 
contribution to Catholic ecotheology.  
Argument: 
In order to establish the rationale for this research project, I argue that the scientific evidence for 
the phenomenon of anthropogenic global warming is robust, notwithstanding two apparently 
plausible objections to its validity. Given the scale of the challenge as a technical, economic and 
political undertaking I argue that a large-scale societal engagement with the global low-carbon 
transition project is required, necessitating a paradigm shift in public discourse to reframe the issue 
as a question of fundamental values including religious commitments. I further argue that climate 
change is rightly characterised as a ‘sign of the times’ both in principle and in practice as revealed by 
treatment of the issue by the magisterium and the bishops of the Church within a well-developed 
existing corpus of social teaching on the issue. Hence within this reframing there is a role for faithful 
Roman Catholic reflection, advocacy and community action towards a collective response to the 
crisis. This thesis aims to contribute a new voice to this discussion based on the application of 
Germain Grisez’s theological ethics to the climate challenge. Leading contributors to the debate on 
the ecological crisis within Roman Catholic moral theology have adopted a critical/creative 
methodology; this thesis looks instead to Grisez’s dialectical approach as an alternative 
methodology, seeking to bring the light of faith and insights from the documentary heritage of the 
Church’s teaching authority to bear in analysing the issue and formulating a faithful response. 
 
                                                          
12
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
13
 Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends’, The 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987), pp. 99–151. 
14
 Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black, ‘Preface’ in: The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, theological and ethical 
responses to the Finnis-Grisez School, edited by Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 
xiii–xvii., at p. xvi.  
15
 Biggar and Black, The Revival of Natural Law. 
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This thesis argues for a re-reading of Germain Grisez’s theological ethics through the lens of his 
creation theology. I seek to demonstrate that a careful analysis of Grisez’s thought on the 
interrelation between the ethics of work, nature and property and the connections between the 
nexus of principles behind his treatment of these subjects and his work on mission, vocation and 
Christian moral principles reveals a system constructed on a foundation of integral ecology. I argue 
that the presence of this inherent ecological dimension permeating and underpinning Grisez’s 
theological ethics makes his widely overlooked contribution to environmental ethics a valuable 
resource for the ethical analysis of novel challenges in the Anthropocene era. Prominent critics of 
Grisez’s ethics of nature have—I argue—mischaracterised his position on several important points 
and too quickly dismissed his new natural law theory as a restatement of a destructive form of 
Christian anthropocentrism. Applying Grisez’s theological ethics to climate change, this thesis argues 
that two contested principles of climate justice can be endorsed and a third partially challenged on a 
Grisez School analysis, although political pragmatism may require deficits of justice within the 
greenhouse gas abatement strategy agreement to be compensated for in other aspects of the treaty 
to ensure broad participation and an ecologically acceptable outcome. I further argue that Grisez’s 
trust construction of intergenerational justice and his critiques of unsustainable development and 
unethical investment, together with his assertion of a strict duty to provide food aid to the destitute 
are deeply relevant to a coherent Christian response to the climate challenge. 
 
Critics of Grisez and Finnis have challenged their interpretation of Aquinas, their solution to the 
naturalist fallacy and their restatement of the natural law. It has been argued that the theory does 
not qualify as a species of ‘natural law’ within the Thomist tradition and questions have been raised 
as to whether Grisez School ethics is discredited—as a species of enlightenment universalism—or 
somehow detached from nature in a way that makes it an inappropriate vehicle for environmental 
ethics. This thesis argues that, notwithstanding these critiques, Grisez’s theological ethics provides 
us with a cogent, accessible and widely influential moral system with great potential for engagement 
with issues central to the ecological questions of the Anthropocene.  
 
Overall, my argument is that Germain Grisez’s theological ethics—once the integral ecology that 
underpins and colours its theoretical architecture has been recognised—can contribute a valuable 
ethical framework for the analysis of key issues in environmental ethics, such as climate justice, 
towards the construction of an authentic Catholic response to our ecological challenges.           
Synopsis 
The task of Chapter Two is to build my argument for Catholic engagement with ecological issues, 
especially the climate challenge. This project can only be justified as a vocational commitment if it is 
possible to show that a reasonable person might conclude that anthropogenic global warming is a 
real scientific phenomenon, that it poses a challenge of such magnitude and importance as to 
require societal engagement in the transition to a low-carbon future, and that it constitutes a 
contemporary issue that cries out for theological reflection: a ‘sign of the times’ as this concept is 
employed in Roman Catholic theology. Chapter Two is divided into three subsections. Section One 
will address the scientific evidence base for anthropogenic climate change. Section Two will then 
broaden the discussion beyond the technical sphere to look at the depth and scope of the crisis. 
Section Three will examine the concept of a ‘sign of the times’ to see whether the climate challenge 
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is rightly understood as such a sign in principle and whether in practice it is accepted as such by the 
Roman Catholic Church. 
Having established the overall rationale for pursuing a project in Catholic ecotheology, Chapter 
Three will go on to justify my choice of this particular contribution to the field. Section One will 
examine whether ecotheology is inherently radical and revisionist in character and Section Two will 
critique what I shall call ‘the dominant narrative’: that there has been a progressive ‘greening’ of 
Catholic social teaching as the Church reflects on the ecological crisis as a sign of the times and 
rethinks Catholic doctrine in the light of contemporary challenges. Section Three makes the case for 
the theologically conservative methodology this thesis adopts.  
The aim of Chapter Four is threefold: To develop my argument that Grisez’s theological ethics is 
dependent on an integral ecology, to refute two important critiques of Grisez’s work on the ethics of 
nature and to apply insights gleaned from my study of his ethical system to contested principles of 
climate justice. Section One will provide an exposition of Grisez’s theological ethics in relation to 
work, nature and property followed by analysis of his thought on mission and vocation as well as the 
theoretical sub-structure of the new natural law in order to examine the evidence upon which my 
thesis is based. Section Two aims to present and analyse critiques of Grisez’s work on the 
environment by theologian Michael Northcott and legal scholars Bebhinn Donnelly and Patrick 
Bishop. Building on the work of the previous section, I aim to show that Grisez’s environmentalist 
critics have been too quick to dismiss his work on animals and the environment as an assertion of 
Christian anthropocentricism. Section Three begins the constructive work of applying Grisez’s 
environmental ethics to ecological questions. I shall examine three contested principles of climate 
justice: the concepts of differential burden-sharing and historical emissions responsibility that have 
been central to the international negotiations since their inception and the notion of fair sharing of 
the atmospheric commons that underpins contraction and convergence models of greenhouse gas 
abatement and cap-and-trade emissions trading regimes. In addition I shall explore the implications 
of the traditional doctrine of the ‘universal destination of goods’ and especially Grisez’s assertion of 
a strict duty to provide food aid to the destitute, as well as his trust construction of inter-
generational justice and critiques of unsustainable development and unethical investment, rounding 
out my presentation of a Grisez School response to the climate challenge with an analysis of some 
key principles of climate justice and a short commentary on the new encyclical Laudato Si’. 
Chapter Five will present and analyse some theological responses to Grisez’s natural law, including 
critiques advanced by two of his most prominent Thomist critics, Ralph McInerny and Jean Porter. 
The task of Chapter Five is to establish whether or not Grisez’s theological ethics can stand as a 
philosophically coherent and theologically cogent species of moral realism, despite such critiques. If 
such a defence of Grisez School ethics can be successfully mounted a case can be made—in the light 
of my work in Chapter Four on Grisez’s environmentalist critics—for taking this research project to 
the next level in engaging environmental issues from a Grisez School perspective. 
My final chapter will provide a recapitulation of the achievements of each of the foregoing chapters, 
drawing out and synthesising their conclusions so as to answer my initial research question and 
mapping out the route by which the thesis is established. This will be followed by some proposals for 
future research and a general conclusion to the project. 
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Conclusion 
As we have seen, this project aims to achieve a recovery of Germain Grisez’s environmental ethics, 
to demonstrate that it is robust to the critiques of prominent environmentalist and theological critics 
including Grisez’s Thomist interlocutors, to argue for a reading of his theological ethics that 
recognises the integral ecology that is its bedrock and to begin the task of applying Grisez’s ethics to 
ecological questions by abstracting principles applicable to global climate justice. Having introduced 
the research project, summarised the argument of the thesis and given a chapter-by-chapter 
breakdown of the enterprise before us, we are now in a position to proceed to the task of 
establishing the rationale for the project, which will be the subject of Chapter Two. 
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Chapter 2 
Climate Change as a Sign of the Times 
 
The aims of this chapter 
In Chapter One I presented a general overview of the thesis; within that framework the task of this 
chapter is to build my argument for Catholic engagement with ecological issues and especially with 
the climate challenge. We begin with the research question: ‘How might Germain Grisez’s natural 
law and creation theology contribute to the project of articulating a Roman Catholic response to the 
ecological crisis’? Clearly, then, in order to pose this question at all, I need to establish that such a 
crisis exists, and that addressing the issue would be an appropriate task for a Catholic moral 
theologian. Hence this chapter needs to ask whether there exists such a crisis, that (1) meets the 
criteria for scientific integrity and robustness on the basis of the available evidence and (2) requires 
a rapid abatement strategy, on the basis of ‘state of the art’ scientific, economic and political 
analysis, requiring a broad socio-political engagement in a transition process in which theological 
ethics has a role to play and (3) meets the criteria the Church sets for discerning whether or not an 
issue qualifies as ‘a sign of the times’ and hence constitutes a legitimate topic for Catholic 
theological and ethical reflection. Finally, to demonstrate the need for the approach adopted in this 
thesis—which adopts Germain Grisez’s conservative Catholic methodology of ‘thinking with the 
Church’ and seeks to examine, develop and apply his insights to the climate crisis—I shall need to 
establish, on the evidence of the relevant texts promulgated by the magisterium, that acceptance of 
the issue as ‘a sign of the times’ is an established component of Catholic social teaching, a fact that 
has been widely overlooked both by environmentalists and by committed Catholics in politically 
conservative circles.   
Section One of this chapter seeks to address the technical question concerning the reality of the 
problem and the need to address it. I shall consider the basic physics of the greenhouse effect—the 
heat-trapping behaviour of certain atmospheric gases—and the scientific evidence for the existence 
of a human-enhanced greenhouse effect leading to anthropogenic global warming. I shall consider 
the likely impacts of this ongoing warming and the temporal and geographical distribution of 
anticipated harms. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to document and rebut every argument 
raised in public debate by climate contrarians since that would in itself require more than one thesis.  
Section Two argues for a rapid abatement pathway as a reasonable and proportionate response to 
the climate crisis, essential to avoiding ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the earth’s 
climate system’.16 How we respond—as individuals, as Church communities and as Nation States 
participating in global negotiations—will profoundly affect the wellbeing and security of all our 
children and grandchildren as well as those vulnerable populations who are already suffering the 
                                                          
16
 Article 2, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf 
[accessed 16 December 2015]. 
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impacts of climate change.17 If, as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has said, the climate crisis is 
‘the defining challenge of our age’,18 rising to this challenge will require wide public participation, 
virtuous leadership and steadfast commitment to valuing the unborn and the stranger and to 
protecting the vulnerable. Hence part one of Section Two analyses the current ‘state of the art’ 
evidence as to the scale of the challenge, drawing on the most recent assessment of the science by 
the International Panel on Climate Change, IPCC AR5. Part two challenges the framing of the crisis as 
a purely technical problem best dealt with by scientific and economic experts, arguing that a much 
broader engagement with the issue is necessary to the achievement of tolerable climate outcomes 
and that the major religions are well placed to play a key role in ethical discussions and consensus 
building in the public arena.   
Section Three attempts to answer the theological question as to whether or not the climate crisis 
can be classified as a ‘sign of the times’ as the term is used in Catholic social teaching. This question 
can be parsed into two: (1) does the scientific and socio-political evidence of our climate crisis, as 
presented in the previous two sections, meet the established criteria for its classification as a ‘sign of 
the times’ in principle, and (2) has the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church in fact recognised 
the climate crisis—and the wider ecological question—as a ‘sign of the times’? The first question is 
crucial to making the case for engagement with the issue of climate change from a Roman Catholic 
theological perspective. The second, if it can be answered in the affirmative, will be helpful to my 
argument that a project seeking to recover Grisez’s thought on environmental ethics and to emulate 
his conservative Catholic methodology, applying this to our contemporary ecological challenges, can 
contribute a valuable new perspective to Anthropocene ecotheology.         
Any thesis that aims to contribute to the interdisciplinary collaborative project of constructing a 
Roman Catholic ecotheological response to the climate crisis depends upon establishing both the 
scientific claim that we are facing an ecological challenge of crisis proportions and the ethical claim 
that rising to this challenge requires the commitment of the whole of society, engaging our 
underlying cultural and religious values, and hence in principle the issue is a sign of the times upon 
which Catholic theologians are called to reflect. Most ecotheologians begin with the premise that 
the science of global warming is well established and beyond dispute and that the economic case for 
rapid decarbonisation is similarly robust. Yet it seems to me that ecotheology is inherently an 
interdisciplinary field and the quest for solutions to the climate challenge will require us to venture 
across the artificial boundaries of academic disciplines. Conservative Catholics who are deeply 
committed to following the teachings of the Church appear to have overlooked the clear teaching of 
the magisterium on this issue. Conservative Catholics often dismiss the climate issue for political 
reasons: sometimes due to unexamined party loyalty but more often because they have been 
convinced by ‘sceptic’ arguments that climate change is a hoax or that sober cost-benefit analysis 
reveals that a rapid abatement policy would necessitate extravagant expenditure that would harm 
our fragile economies in ways that we can and should avoid. Arguments that begin with a simple 
denial of Conservative political beliefs rather than making the case for the opposite conclusion tend 
to be polarising and counter-productive. Hence my approach in this chapter will be to attempt to 
                                                          
17
 Chris Huhne, ‘It won’t be long before the victims of climate change make the west pay’, The Guardian, 29 
December 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/29/poorer-countries-climate-
change-case [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
18
 Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Climate Change poses “defining challenge” of our time, Ban says’, UN News Centre, 7 October 
2008.  http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28458#.Up8CcIpFBjo [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
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argue the case for the scientific, economic and ethical claims that are implicit in Catholic 
ecotheology, but hitherto have tended to be assumed rather than articulated.       
The particular project of this thesis depends upon a third claim: that there is no necessary 
connection between engagement with the climate challenge and a radical revisionist approach to 
theology. As we shall see in Chapter Three, much of ecotheology has been politically and 
theologically radical. As Section Three of this chapter will show, Catholic social teaching on 
environmental issues is well developed; yet this point is too often overlooked both by conservative 
Catholics who do not perceive a tension between their loyalty to the Church and their dismissal of 
the ecological agenda, and by radical ecotheologians who do not give due credit to the magisterium 
for existing teaching on ecology and human responsibility. The unfortunate consequence of both 
positions seems to be that laypeople across the political spectrum remain unaware that creation 
care is their duty as Catholics and not a supererogatory choice. Hence there is a pressing need for a 
conservative Catholic analysis of the ecological question. In order to fill this intellectual lacuna—in 
the hope that more Catholics might consider engaging in social enterprise for the benefit of the 
environment and in climate justice advocacy as a result—this project seeks to demonstrate that 
Germain Grisez’s work on environmental ethics is capable of extension, in the spirit of ‘thinking with 
the Church’ that characterises his conservative Catholic theology, to supply this missing perspective.    
In summary: This chapter aims to establish three claims as a necessary foundation for this project:  
(1) there is a robust scientific case for the existence of human-forced climate change and (2) a 
reasonable and proportionate response to the scale of the challenge requires wide public 
participation in the process of transition via a rapid greenhouse gas abatement strategy (3) in 
principle, this crisis merits inclusion on the list of ‘signs of the times’ and in fact the official teaching 
of the Roman Catholic Church unequivocally accepts it as such. With this foundation in place we will 
be in a position to proceed, in the following four chapters, to the main task of the project: to 
establish the thesis that a recovery of Germain Grisez’s theological ethics—read in the light of his 
creation theology—and the deployment of his conservative Catholic theological method in reflection 
on the climate crisis (an issue he does not address in his published work) can be constructive in 
producing a novel and significant contribution to Catholic thought on this defining challenge of the 
Anthropocene era.  
Section 1: The scientific evidence for anthropogenic global warming 
In this section I shall address the question of the scientific reality of human-caused climate change. I 
shall argue—on the basis of the fundamental physics of the greenhouse effect and the accumulated 
evidence of planetary warming and the expected impacts of continuing emissions of known 
greenhouse gases resulting from human activity—that anthropogenic global warming and related 
climatic changes are observable and that these undesirable effects are robustly attributable to 
greenhouse gas pollution caused by human activities. If this case can be made, it will provide the 
first pillar of the argument of this thesis.  
The task of this section is to answer some basic questions about the phenomenon of anthropogenic 
global warming, in order to describe our context of climate crisis and set the scene for the remainder 
of the thesis. It is not the task of this thesis to provide a comprehensive overview of climate science; 
a vast peer-reviewed literature on the subject is periodically reviewed by the International Panel on 
Climate Change, a quasi-judicial United Nations body that produced its fifth report in 2013. John 
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Houghton’s Global Warming: The Complete Briefing19 provides a helpful summary of the basic 
science. However, since theological reflection on this issue as a challenge for ethics and public policy 
requires some grounding in the evidence provided by scientific research as to the origins and 
projected impacts of global warming, it will be helpful to include a brief discussion of the scientific 
evidence base before moving on in Section Two to the most recent conclusions of the IPCC on issues 
relevant to public policy. So by way of background, we need to address some basic questions, such 
as: ‘what is the evidence for global warming?’; ‘what is the greenhouse effect?’; ‘how do we know 
human activities are causing an enhanced greenhouse effect?’ and ‘is global warming necessarily a 
bad thing?’ My central aim here is to establish the connection between greenhouse gas emissions 
and global warming as a matter of observation combined with fundamental theoretical physics.  
The evidence for the phenomenon of global warming 
The evidence that the Earth’s climate is changing comes from multiple independently produced 
datasets comprising observations made by different groups of scientists in different parts of the 
world including direct measurements as well as remote sensing from satellites and other platforms. 
20 We have reliable instrumental data accumulated over the past century in addition to paleoclimate 
reconstructions that extend the record back over millions of years.21  The surface temperature 
records, taken together with measurements of other climate changes, provide a comprehensive 
view of our changing climate.22 The atmosphere has warmed and atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
have increased.23 Sea-level has risen as the oceans have warmed, volumes of snow and ice have 
diminished and ocean acidity has increased;24 glaciers are retreating at unprecedented rates.25 The 
overall evidence for anthropogenic global warming reviewed by the IPCC is, in their professional 
                                                          
19
 John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Fourth 
Edition, 2009). 
20
 ‘The three most highly cited combined land temperature and SST data sets are NOAA's MLOST, NASA's 
GISTEMP, and  the UK's HadCRUT. A new merged land-ocean temperature data set is available from the 
Berkeley Earth group. The University of Delaware and berkeleyearth.org produce global land-only surface 
temperature data sets. HadCRUT also has a land-only version, CRUTEM.’ National Center for Atmospheric 
Research Staff (Eds). Last modified 25 Mar 2014. The Climate Data Guide: Global Temperature Data Sets: 
Overview & Comparison Table.  https://climatedataguide.ucar.edu/climate-data/global-temperature-data-
sets-overview-comparison-table#sthash.gUde0hTb.dpuf  [accessed 13 October 2015].  
21
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Centers for Environmental Information, Climate 
Reconstruction  https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/paleoclimatology-data/datasets/climate-
reconstruction [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
22
 A summary table of key changes over the twentieth century is given in John Houghton, Global Warming: The 
Complete Briefing, pp. 76–77. 
23
 R. B. Bacastow, C. D. Keeling, and T. P. Whorf, ‘Seasonal Amplitude Increase in Atmospheric Concentration at 
Mauna Loa, Hawaii, 1959-1982’, Journal of Geophysical Research, 90: D6, pp. 10529–10540, October 20, 1985 
http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/tsalmas/Biol%20420/Readings/Bacastow%201985.pdf [accessed 13 
October 2015]. 
24
 Renate Schubert et al., ‘The Future Oceans—Warming Up, Rising High, Turning Sour.’ WGBU (German 
Advisory Council on Global Change) Special Report 2006. 
http://cmbc.ucsd.edu/Research/Climate_Change/Future%20Oceans.pdf [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
25
 Tim Radford, ‘Speed of glacier retreat worldwide “historically unprecedented” says report’ The Guardian 4 
August 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/04/speed-glacier-retreat-worldwide-
historically-unprecedented-climate-change [accessed 13 October 2015]; citing Michael Zemp et al., 
‘Historically unprecedented glacier decline in the early 21
st
 Century’, Journal of Glaciology 61.228 (2015). 
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opinion, unequivocal,26 and many of the observed changes in the instrumental record can be shown 
to be unprecedented over decades to millennia, when compared to paleoclimatic reconstructions.27  
The basic physics 
The fundamental physics behind the ‘greenhouse effect’ is well-known and uncontroversial; it was 
first recognised by the famous French mathematician Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier, who tried—in 
1827—to calculate how warm the Earth ought to be, based on its distance from the sun.28 
Discovering that our planet is considerably warmer than such calculations would predict, Fourier 
postulated that the atmosphere might account for this discrepancy and even speculated that carbon 
dioxide might be the culprit.29 However it was not until 1860 that Irish scientist John Tyndall was 
able positively to identify the greenhouse gases responsible for the warming effect by measuring the 
absorption spectra of different gases in his laboratory. Tyndall—a flamboyant character and a gifted 
communicator of science—saw only the benefits of this natural greenhouse effect and waxed lyrical 
in describing the dire consequences were the planet to be robbed of its benign influence: ‘the 
warmth of our fields and gardens would pour itself unrequited into space, and the sun would rise 
upon an island held fast in the iron grip of frost.’30  
In 1896, Svante Arrhenius—a Swedish chemist and Nobel Laureate—was the first to calculate the 
effect of adding further carbon dioxide to the atmosphere: He estimated that doubling the 
concentration of CO2 would increase the average surface temperature by five to six degrees 
Celsius—a value not too far from our present scientific understanding.31 However Arrhenius hugely 
underestimated the scale and pace of industrial development and thought it would take thousands 
of years to produce a measurable effect on the planet. It was British engineer Guy Stewart Callendar, 
in 1940, who first calculated the warming that theoretical physics could already attribute to human 
consumption of fossil fuels, but it was not until 1957 that the extent to which industrialisation 
represented a large-scale geophysical experiment—and one that potentially might have undesirable 
                                                          
26
 Sophie Yeo, ‘IPCC climate report: evidence humans warming planet “unequivocal”’, Climate Change News 14 
January 2015. http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/11/02/ipcc-climate-report-conclusive-evidence-
humans-warming-planet/ [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
27
 Fiona Harvey, ‘IPCC climate report: Human impact is “unequivocal”’, The Guardian, 27 September 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/27/ipcc-climate-report-un-secretary-general [accessed 
13 October 2015]; citing IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science 
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [Stocker, T.F. et al. (eds.)]. (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press). 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_en.pdf [accessed 13 October 
2015], p 2. 
28
 An accessible discussion of Fourier’s work can be found in Andrew Dessler and Edward A. Parson, The 
Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
second edition 2010) pp.10–12. 
29
 John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing, p. 23. 
30
 John Tyndall; quoted in: Gabrielle Walker and Sir David King, The Hot Topic: How to tackle global warming 
and still keep the lights on (London: Bloomsbury, 2008) p. 16. 
31
 The Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity is defined as the change in global mean temperature that results when 
the climate system, or a climate model, attains a new equilibrium resulting from a doubling of the atmospheric 
CO2 concentration. Dana Nuccitelli, ‘What you need to know about climate sensitivity’ The Guardian, 10 May 
2013. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2013/may/10/climate-
change-warming-sensitivity [accessed 13 October, 2015]; citing  Rohling, E. J. et al., ‘Making sense of 
paleoclimate sensitivity’ Nature 491, 29 November 2012, pp. 683–691.  
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consequences—was raised by Roger Revelle and Hans Suess of the Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography in California. Revelle recruited Charles David Keeling who began to keep a record of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, making regular measurements from his observatory on 
Mauna Lao in Hawaii,32 a site chosen for its remoteness from industrial sources that might otherwise 
bias his results. 
The famous saw-toothed ‘Keeling curve’ charts the inexorable rise in CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere.33 In the light of this we would expect to see rapid global warming over the same time-
period and indeed the global temperature record confirms this expectation, providing robust and 
statistically significant evidence of multi-decadal warming. Taken together with multiple sets of 
proxy data that allow paleoclimatologists to estimate historical climatic conditions, the temperature 
record indicates an unprecedented rate of warming since the advent of industrialisation.34 As Burton 
Richter says, ‘Nothing in the past 1200 years is like the sharp spike in temperature that began in the 
nineteenth century coinciding with the increase in the use of fossil fuels. Natural processes do not 
normally change the global average temperature this fast. The most likely cause is human activity.’35   
Computer simulations can combine the calculated contribution of anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions with known natural climate drivers like solar activity, ocean oscillations and volcanic 
eruptions.36 Whilst any model, by definition, over-simplifies the complexities of the earth’s climatic 
system, and no one has built a sufficiently sophisticated model to predict exactly how temperatures 
will change over short time-periods—over which natural climate drivers dominate the observed 
changes—climate modelling studies have been very successful in predicting the long-term warming 
trend and correlating this with theoretical calculations of the warming expected on the basis of 
known human contributions to the stocks of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As Sir David King 
former chief scientific advisor to the Blair government put it: 
There is no way to explain the warming of the past few decades unless you include the rise in 
greenhouse gases, but when you do put the gases in you see exactly what happened in the real world 
[…] The recent heating up of planet Earth has carbon dioxide’s fingerprints all over it […] Human activity 
is to blame for the rise in temperature over recent decades, and will be responsible for more changes in 
the future. There are plenty of areas for debate in the global warming story but this is not one of 
them.
37 
                                                          
32
 ‘The Keeling Curve’ demonstrates a steady rise in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Because there is more 
land in the Northern Hemisphere than in the Southern, the curve has an annual cycle, with levels dropping 
slightly during the Northern summer: see Walker and King, The Hot Topic, p. 22 and p. 278, n. 21, which should 
read ‘and each Northern winter levels rise again as the plants slow down or die off.’ 
33
Scripps CO2 Program, Scripps Institute of Oceanography, Keeling Curve Lessons. 
http://scrippsco2.ucsd.edu/program_history/keeling_curve_lessons.html [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
34
 US National Research Council, Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the last 2000 years (Washington DC: 
National Academy Press, 2006) http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11676 [accessed 13 October 
2015]. 
35
 Burton Richter, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Climate Change and Energy in the 21
st
 Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 33.  
36
 Grant Foster and Stefan Rahmstorf, ‘Global temperature evolution 1979–2010’, Environmental Research 
Letters 6 (6 December 2011), pp. 1–8. http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/6/4/044022 [accessed 13 October 
2015]. 
37
 Walker and King, The Hot Topic, pp. 31, 36, 37. 
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Climate sceptic and Chemistry graduate Peter Forster, Bishop of Chester, in his introduction to a 
paper for the Global Warming Policy Foundation, of which he is a trustee, concedes: ‘It should be 
acknowledged, of course, that the case for increasing carbon dioxide concentrations having a forcing 
effect upon global temperatures is very strong.’38   
Robert Henson points out that, if some previously unknown factor were to be discovered that could 
account for the observed global warming without factoring in human activities, it would beg a rather 
difficult question: why are carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not producing the warming 
effect that fundamental physics predicts they should?39 As Eric Posner and David Weisbach 
comment: ‘By analogy, if we find the butler standing in front of the victim with a smoking gun, it is 
possible that someone else is the criminal, but we would have to be able to find that someone else 
and explain the gun and the smoke. This is a tall order.’40 
Impacts of climate change 
As Tyndall famously observed, there are advantages as well as disadvantages to global warming; 
without the natural heat-trapping properties of greenhouse gases our planet would be a great deal 
colder and less hospitable. As Bjørn Lomborg correctly notes, in some European countries where 
winter deaths due to cold greatly exceed summer deaths from heat stress, the net impact of 
moderate global warming would be expected to be fewer temperature-related deaths.41 However, 
there are two obvious problems with his argument.42 Firstly there is the geographical distribution of 
advantages and disadvantages of human fossil-fuel use—from the African point of view the prospect 
of fewer cold-related deaths in wealthy industrialised countries may not seem adequate 
compensation for increased numbers of African heat-related deaths, especially in view of the huge 
disparity between Europe and Africa in terms of their historical emissions responsibility. Secondly 
Lomborg’s central thesis—that greenhouse gas abatement measures are too expensive and 
estimates of impacts are alarmist—appears to be built on the assumption that temperature 
increases can be limited to 2.6oC without any abatement action being taken. There is no basis for 
this assumption.43  
Without a serious global abatement strategy, emissions and stocks of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere—and hence the temperature of the planet—will continue to rise. Furthermore, delaying 
the implementation of abatement measures will necessitate a steeper decline thereafter to achieve 
the same climate outcome. But transitioning our complex global economy and modern forms of 
agriculture cannot be achieved overnight; in principle it must take a finite amount of time to shut 
down fossil-fuel dependent activities and switch to sustainable energy sources. Let us assume that 
                                                          
38
 Peter Lee, Ethics and Climate Change Policy (with a foreword by Dr Peter Forster, Bishop of Chester), The 
Global Warming Policy Foundation Essay 2, 16 December 2014, p. iv. 
http://www.thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2014/12/Lee-Ethics-climate-change.pdf [accessed 13 October2015] 
39
 Robert Henson, The Rough Guide to Climate Change (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 10. 
40
 Eric A. Posner & David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2010), p. 16. 
41
 Bjørn Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming (London: Marshall 
Cavendish, 2007), p. 18. 
42
 A more philosophical problem that Catholic theologians might like to add is that the idea that advantages to 
some and disadvantages to others can be aggregated in this way makes utilitarian assumptions that are 
incompatible with the concept of the dignity of every person as imago Dei.    
43
 Lomborg, Cool It, p. 13. 
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future governments can be relied upon to muster the political resolve—although current 
governments evidently cannot—to prioritise the transition project at some future point, after our 
inaction has ratcheted up the level of the challenge. In addition to the issue of unfairly burdening the 
next generation with our pollution problems, there is a technical issue concerning the achievable 
transition rate. At some point, theoretically, the rate of emissions reduction required to remain 
within the available carbon budget could cross a threshold at which the slope of the required 
abatement curve is steeper than the rate of transition that is technically feasible. Clearly we ought to 
take steps to avoid this outcome. In order to do so we need to know how much more of the heat-
trapping gases we can add to the atmosphere before the level of warming that we all agree it would 
be desirable to avoid will already be in the pipeline and hence inevitable.  
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the impacts of climate change on our own species is the 
only morally relevant question: we need to ask ‘what level of additional warming due to human 
activities would be reasonably benign, or—put differently—at what level would increasing stocks of 
atmospheric greenhouse gases pose a threat to human interests comparable to the costs of 
abatement action?’ A scientific conference held in Exeter in 200544 at the invitation of the then 
prime minister Tony Blair, is generally credited with defining a 2oC rise in global average temperature 
as the threshold above which impacts are likely to be ‘dangerous’ and hence the level below which 
signatories are legally required to keep temperature rise to comply with article 2 of the UNFCCC.45 
This became the generally accepted guardrail for global temperature rise at the Copenhagen climate 
conference COP 15 in 2009, with signatories to the Copenhagen Accord expressing the shared 
ambition to limit anthropogenic global warming to 2oC. 46 
Many leading participants in the international negotiations do not now believe this is a politically 
achievable goal.47 Others have questioned whether or not it is practically achievable even given the 
political will to take the necessary action; Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, writing in 2010, 
commented that ‘unless you make the most optimistic assumptions about the sensitivity of the 
climate to CO2 changes this threshold is basically already passed.’
48 On the basis of improved 
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 DEFRA, Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change: Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases 1–3 
February 2005, Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom. 
http://www.mtnforum.org/sites/default/files/publication/files/1901.pdf [accessed 13 October 2015] 
45
 ‘The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the 
Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’ Article 2 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 1992. 
46
 ‘We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global 
temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on 
the basis of equity.’ Copenhagen Accord, 18 December 2009 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf [accessed 13 October 2015]. 
47
 Damian Carrington, ‘Paris summit pledges won’t avoid dangerous warming—UK and UN’ The Guardian 16 
September 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/16/paris-climate-summit-pledges-
wont-avoid-dangerous-warming-say-uk-and-un [accessed 13 October 2015] 
48
 Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the 
Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 5. 
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understanding of climate sensitivity and the carbon budget approach in the most recent IPCC report, 
as we shall see, we may have reason to be a little more optimistic on this point than Newell and 
Paterson. However their assessment that ‘if you make less optimistic assumptions about climate 
sensitivity and demanding but plausible emissions scenarios then it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that we are likely to be headed for more like 4oC or even more’ is consistent with current 
understanding of climate science.49 
Unfortunately—as the scientists at the Exeter conference quite clearly indicated—it is also extremely 
misleading to suggest that warming below this threshold would be universally benign: significant 
harmful ecological consequences are to be expected even for a 1oC rise in global average surface 
temperature, and dangerous impacts on the most vulnerable populations in Africa, Asia and a 
number of small island states are already happening and more are inevitable on the basis of historic 
emissions, the full effect of which is yet to be felt.50   
There is a vast literature on the expected impacts of global warming. Economic cost-benefit 
analyses, as Posner and Weisbach point out, are extremely speculative and likely to underestimate 
the full costs of impacts—for example those on ecosystem services51 security and displacement of 
vulnerable populations52—that are not easily reduced to market values. The Center for International 
Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University produced a set of graphic 
representations of impacts by country, estimating climate change vulnerabilities on the basis of pre-
existing indices of susceptibility to environmental stresses. They found that of the fifteen most 
vulnerable states, fourteen were in Africa, with Bangladesh the only non-African country on that 
list.53 A study by William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer54 gives a slightly different estimate of the 
geographical spread of exposure to climate change, with China appearing less vulnerable than in the 
Columbia University study. Both studies agree however that Africa and Asia suffer the most extreme 
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 Newell and Paterson, Climate Capitalism, p. 5. 
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 ‘All the evidence suggests that the world will experience significant and potentially highly dangerous 
changes in climate over the next few decades no matter what we do now. That’s because the ocean has a 
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 17 
vulnerability. On Nordhaus and Boyer’s account, most regions of the world suffer a net loss of GDP 
for warming over 2.5oC, with Russia the only net beneficiary at this level of warming.55 
To sum up: a reliable evidence base of instrumental data attests to the fact of global warming 
alongside atmospheric increase in carbon dioxide levels. The greenhouse effect, whereby 
atmospheric gases absorb and trap some of the heat energy from the sun is well established and 
uncontroversial. We know that human activities including fossil fuel consumption, agriculture and 
cement production are adding carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere and 
we can estimate the expected anthropogenic warming effect from the known quantities of these 
gases generated in human activities and their measured absorption spectra. Although the sensitivity 
of the climate to increased stocks of greenhouse gases is not yet determined with precision, we can 
estimate the probable range of temperature increase associated with a given ‘carbon budget’. This is 
the anthropogenic enhanced greenhouse effect: the extent to which global temperatures are 
increased due to human activities.  It remains for my next two sections to attempt to answer some 
questions that go beyond the purely scientific evidence for the phenomenon of anthropogenic 
global warming. The final section of this chapter will consider the case for a theological engagement 
with the climate crisis. However before we move on to the enterprise of Catholic ecotheology of 
which this thesis is a subsidiary project, we need to question the characterisation of the issue as a 
‘crisis’: perhaps there is a technical solution that can be implemented without a pressing need to 
engage non-specialists in public debate concerning greenhouse gas abatement policy? The proper 
characterisation of climate change including its immediacy and the scope of the expected 
ramifications of climate inaction for the security and prosperity of ordinary citizens is the topic of my 
next section.  
Section 2: The case for rapid decarbonisation and religious engagement 
Having made the scientific case for the existence of the phenomenon of anthropogenic global 
warming in Section One, the aim of this section is to establish that the nature and seriousness of the 
ecological crisis are such that there is a need for a paradigm shift in the way the public debate is 
currently framed, to allow a much wider participation in and commitment to the process of 
decarbonising the global economy. The assertion that the climate challenge is in principle a moral 
concern that requires the engagement of our deepest cultural heritage of philosophical and religious 
values constitutes the second pillar of my argument for the approach adopted in this research 
project. 
The task of this section is to address the question of whether this challenge is a technical problem 
best left to those with the relevant expertise to solve, or a crisis of such magnitude that it will 
require much broader societal participation to negotiate safe passage to a sustainable future. Part 
one of this section draws on the fifth report of the International Panel on Climate Change, IPCC 
AR5—newly published at the time of writing—in order to give a snapshot of the current scientific 
advice being given to policymakers. Part two leaves behind the technical framing of the issue and 
ventures into the thickets of climate politics, ethics and economics in order to gauge the scope and 
complexity of the challenge ahead, and to make the case for a rapid transition of our energy 
systems.  
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As a chemistry graduate in the nineteen eighties, I recall trying to reassure a child who was worried 
about the hole in the ozone layer; I pointed out that there were lots of clever scientists and 
policymakers working on this and good prospects for an international agreement that would ban the 
chemicals responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion. I remember thinking then that the issue of 
climate change, which was just beginning to dawn on public consciousness, is inherently a much 
more difficult problem to resolve. A treaty that would create the framework within which a solution 
can be implemented requires unprecedented international cooperation and the economic 
ramifications of the necessary changes are vastly bigger that those involved in halting the emission 
of gases that damage the ozone layer, since almost the entire global economy depends on fossil-fuel 
consumption.  
For many years the climate justice movement has worked to raise awareness of the climate crisis as 
an issue affecting the most vulnerable of the global poor, seeking to engage Christians and others in 
advocating on behalf of today’s climate victims for stringent abatement policies and the 
commitment of resources to ease their plight—as a matter of compensatory justice as well as basic 
humanity and compassion. Most environmental activists would agree that the climate justice 
movement has comprehensively failed to provoke a public response in industrialised societies that is 
proportionate to the scale of the global challenge or the extent of the suffering and human rights 
violation entailed by the delays and persistent deadlock that have characterised the ongoing 
international negotiations. Indeed it is possible that the focus of climate justice advocacy on the 
plight of the poor in developing countries has, in some contexts, even added to the prevailing 
complacency with respect to potential climate impacts closer to home, especially the threat of rising 
sea-levels on vulnerable populations inhabiting coastal cities in comparatively wealthy industrialised 
countries like the United States. 
In order to argue that a much wider and more substantial public involvement in mitigation and 
transition is reasonably required, I shall need to adduce evidence that such a response in 
proportionate to the challenge. In addition to grasping the dimensions of the challenge on the basis 
of the available scientific evidence—the subject of part one of this section—we shall need to 
consider—in part two—the history and ethics of climate change as a challenge for public 
policymakers, the construction of the concept of climate justice, the geographical distribution of 
vulnerability to and historical culpability for the negative impacts of the phenomenon and issues 
concerning development rights, proposed loss and damage mechanisms and intergenerational 
equity.  
Part 1: What is new in IPCC AR5?  
The International Panel on Climate Change published a draft report of the results of their fifth review 
of the scientific basis of climate change (IPCC AR5, working group 1) in September 2013. The report 
states that the warming of the climate system since 1850 is unequivocal and unprecedented over 
decades to millennia. Overall, combined land and ocean surface temperatures show warming of 
about 0.85oC over the period between 1880—2012. Having reviewed the available evidence, the 
authors conclude that it is extremely likely56 that more than half of the observed increase in global 
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average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by human activities; the best estimate 
of the human contribution to warming over this period is similar to the level of warming actually 
observed.57 The long-term climate model simulations give an estimation of the underlying trend that 
agrees with observations over the same period. The main differences between the scientific 
understanding in the new report compared to the fourth report published in 2007 are in the 
estimation of the magnitude of expected sea-level rises, the range given for the Equilibrium Climate 
Sensitivity (ECS), the estimates of the radiative forcing or warming potentials of different gases—
which now include feedback effects that are better understood—and the adoption of the climate 
budget approach to understanding the scale of the global challenge and apportioning abatement 
responsibility. 
Expected sea level rises  
The estimation of likely sea-level rises by the end of the twenty-first century are considerably higher 
than those given in IPCC AR4 (26 to 82cms compared to 18 to 59cms) although the figures are not 
directly comparable as they are derived from different scenarios. The fifth report adopts a series of 
four new representative concentration pathways (RCPs) based on different mitigation policy 
scenarios. Under all the RCPs—which cover outcomes from stringent abatement (RCP 2.6) to very 
high emissions which do not peak before the end of the century (RCP 8.5)58—the rate of sea-level 
rise by 2100 is very likely to exceed the observed rate between 1971 and 2010 due to increased 
ocean warming and increased loss of mass from glaciers and ice-sheets.59 Confidence in projections 
of global mean sea level rise has increased since the fourth report because of improved physical 
understanding of the components of sea-level, the improved agreement of process-based models 
with observations and the inclusion of ice-sheet dynamical changes.60  
At the time of writing, the IPCC have not yet published their revised estimates of impacts and 
vulnerabilities—the task of Working Group II. However, on the basis of the increases to projected 
sea-level rises, it seems reasonable to expect that estimates of the number of people exposed to 
risks of flooding and storm damage will increase dramatically, as will the projected costs of sea-
defences and other adaptation measures. We should also expect to see changes in the map of 
climate vulnerability, with countries like Bangladesh and Mozambique and cities on the Eastern 
seaboard of the United States, amongst others, seeing increased exposure.  
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Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity 
The ‘likely’ range of the equilibrium climate sensitivity in AR5 is given as 1.5oC to 4.5oC. According to 
Venkatachalam Ramaswarmy, director of the NOAA’s Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory and 
one of the report’s co-authors, this represents a slight increase in uncertainty rather than a new 
concrete target for warming. The range is the same as that given in the first three IPCC reports; in 
the fourth assessment it narrowed to 2 to 4.5oC and now it has reverted to previous estimates.61 
Oddly, however, the fifth report does not quote a ‘best estimate’ figure for the climate sensitivity as 
previous reports have done. 
Radiative forcing of different greenhouse gases 
The warming potential of different atmospheric pollutants is given by its RF value (radiative forcing). 
In the most recent report, feedback effects which are now better understood have been included to 
give a better indication of the temperature response due to the gaseous drivers of climate change. 
The effective radiative forcing of methane (CH4) is much larger
62 than the concentration-based 
estimate used in AR4, which excluded changes in the concentration of ozone and stratospheric 
water vapour caused by additional methane in the atmosphere and the feedback effects of other 
emissions on methane concentrations. This new insight into the effect of methane on the climate is 
of interest because it is crucial to the calculation of the carbon footprint of agriculture and food 
consumption, especially rice and meat production, and to the calculation of the relative merits of 
natural gas as a less polluting alternative to coal and oil and hence as a possible bridging-fuel to a 
low-carbon economy. Estimates of fugitive methane emissions during unconventional gas 
production vary enormously, with some estimates high enough to give a footprint comparable to 
that of coal.63 Clearly such calculations depend crucially on the estimated warming potential of 
methane and will need to be revised on the basis of the improved scientific understanding of the 
impact of methane on the atmosphere as reported in the latest IPCC report.   
The hiatus in surface temperature measurements 
Whilst it is clear from measurements of ice-volume depletion, sea-level rise, glacial retreat and other 
datasets that the earth is continuing to warm, much has been made of a recent hiatus period in the 
surface temperature record over the past decade or 15 years depending on whether you look at the 
NASA GISS or the HadCRUT4 data compilation. There is some ongoing dispute within the climate 
modelling community with one school of thought attributing the current surface temperature hiatus 
to reduced radiative forcing caused by increased stratospheric water-vapour,64 the rapid increase in 
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stratospheric and tropospheric aerosols65 and the 2009 solar minimum,66 whilst another school 
considers the hiatus to be part of natural variability, especially influenced by a La-Nina-like cooling in 
the tropical Pacific,67 and a third group postulates that the geographical distribution of sampling 
stations underestimates the warming trend—a bias that can be corrected with statistical 
interpolation methods.68 The research in this area is very recent, with some of the key papers 
published after the cut-off point for inclusion in the IPCC’s 5th review of the science of global 
warming. The IPCC were put under pressure to address the issue in their report because it had 
become the focus of claims that global warming had ‘reached a plateau’ or had ‘paused’ made in the 
run-up to publication of the report by prominent climate sceptics. In the end, the agreed wording of 
the summary for policymakers included two paragraphs on the hiatus—here is the first: 
In addition to robust multi-decadal warming, global mean surface temperature exhibits substantial 
decadal and inter-annual variability. Due to natural variability, trends based on short records are very 
sensitive to the beginning and end dates and do not reflect the long-term trends. As one example, the 
rate of warming over the past 15 years (1998—2012; 0.05 [-0.05 to +0.15]
o
C per decade) which begins 
with a strong El Niño is smaller than the rate calculated since 1951 (1951—2012; 0.12 [0.08 to 0.14]
o
C 
per decade). Trends for 15-year periods starting in 1995, 1996 and 1997 are 0.13 [0.02 to 0.24], 0.14 
[0.03 to 0.24], 0.07 [-0.02 to 0.18]
o
C per decade, respectively.  
This was not helpful in bringing clarity to the public debate following the publication of IPCC AR5. 
Essentially they are making two points in relation to the claim that there has been no global warming 
over the past fifteen years. Firstly, in order to get a meaningful value for the underlying trend you 
need to look at a wider time-window. This is because there are natural cycles and forcing events 
superimposed on the anthropogenic upward slope, which dominate the picture over time-intervals 
comparable to the periodicity of the natural cycles. Secondly, 1998—the start date for the 15 year 
period focused on by climate sceptics—was an unusually warm year as a result of a strong El Niño 
effect. To get an accurate picture of the underlying human-forced temperature trend one would 
need to subtract the influence of natural factors—including solar cycles and volcanic eruptions as 
well as ocean oscillations such as ENSO—from the raw data. The values given for 15 year trends with 
different start dates is given to illustrate the point that you can’t get a meaningful figure for the 
underlying gradient of the greenhouse gas-driven component of warming unless you look at a longer 
time-period.  
It is inaccurate to claim that anthropogenic global warming has reached a ‘plateau’ since there is no 
scientific reason to expect the hiatus to be permanent or to deny the reality of an underlying upward 
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trend. It is to be expected that the superimposing of competing factors will occasionally give rise to 
hiatus periods in the raw data, even if the estimated gradient of the underlying anthropogenic 
contribution to the temperature remains unchanged. It is easy to see why this might be the case if 
one thinks of a given fifteen year period as a see-saw pivoting on the central year. There are known 
natural variations that can tilt the see-saw in either direction, and occasionally for a given period it is 
possible that natural effects might exert a net upward force on the earlier data and a net downward 
force on the later measurements, causing the see-saw to appear level. Any parent who has played 
with children on a see-saw will grasp at once that by leaning on the end on which the lighter child is 
seated or lifting the end with the heavier child one can force the see-saw to a level position against 
its natural tendency to elevate the lighter child. One would not conclude from this observation that 
the normal laws of physics had been suspended. Similarly, it is inaccurate to speak of a ‘pause’ in 
global warming, although some climate scientists have used this unhelpful terminology,69 since the 
layperson associates the word ‘pause’ with everyday experiences such as the operation of the 
‘pause-button’ on the television remote-control, and hence naturally but quite wrongly understands 
this to mean that climate change has temporarily stopped, concluding—understandably—that 
business as usual can be sustained without the adverse consequences predicted by environmental 
alarmists. In reality there is good reason to expect an abrupt end to the ‘hiatus’ as soon as the next 
el Nino event occurs in the Pacific Ocean. 
The second paragraph in the IPCC AR5 summary for policymakers relating to the surface 
temperature hiatus comes in the section on the evaluation of climate models: 
The long-term climate model simulations show a trend in global mean surface temperature from 1951 
to 2012 that agrees with the observed trend (very high confidence). There are, however, differences 
between simulated and observed trends over periods as short as 10 to 15 years (e.g. 1998 to 2012) The 
observed reduction in the surface warming trend over the period 1998—2012 as compared to the 
period 1951—2012, is due in roughly equal measure to a reduced trend in radiative forcing and a 
cooling contribution from internal variability, which includes a possible redistribution of heat within the 
ocean (medium confidence). The reduced trend in radiative forcing is primarily due to volcanic eruptions 
and the timing of the downward phase of the 11-year solar cycle. However there is low confidence in 
quantifying the role of changes in radiative forcing in causing the reduced warming trend. There is 
medium confidence that internal decadal variability causes to a substantial degree the difference 
between observations and the simulations; the latter are not expected to reproduce the timing of 
internal variability. There may also be a contribution from forcing inadequacies and, in some models, an 
overestimate of the response to increasing greenhouse gas and other anthropogenic forcing 
(dominated by the effects of aerosols).
70
  
The total radiative forcing or planetary energy imbalance is made up of the effects of greenhouse 
gases, anthropogenic and natural (volcanic) aerosols and solar irradiance. Several small eruptions 
were responsible for a cooling effect in the period 2008—2011 about twice as strong as that 
between 1999 and 2002. Looking at the fifteen years from 1998 to 2013, the net effect has been to 
depress temperatures in the second half of this period. Climate models do not include volcanic 
eruptions, which are inherently unpredictable although their effects can be accounted for 
                                                          
69
 Met Office, The recent pause in global warming (2) what are the likely causes? (July 2013). 
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/media/pdf/q/0/Paper2_recent_pause_in_global_warming.PDF [accessed 15 
October 2015]. 
70
 Stocker et al., Summary for Policymakers, p. 13. 
 23 
retrospectively. Although models do include known solar cycles, the solar minimum in 2008 was 
lower than the previous two such minima and hence underestimated in the models. Ocean 
oscillations such as ENSO are also cyclical, but their exact timing remains difficult to predict and 
simulations are not expected to reproduce the resulting internal variability superimposed on the 
underlying temperature trend. On the basis of the scientific evidence put before the international 
panel—which as we have seen did not include some of the more recent studies published after the 
cut-off date for inclusion in the review—the authors of IPCC AR5 could not confidently assert that 
the underlying anthropogenic forcing had not been overestimated in some of the models. This 
probably accounts for the slight downward adjustment they made to the lower limit of the ‘likely 
range’ of the climate sensitivity figure compared to AR4.        
On my analysis of the most recent report of the IPCC on the physical science basis of global warming, 
the central principle is the carbon budget approach: it is the total amount of carbon pollution for a 
given storyline rather than the height of the peak that correlates with the expected temperature 
rise. The physical constraints within which any solution must be designed include both the total 
carbon budget compatible with an acceptable probability of remaining under the temperature 
threshold and the maximum feasible rate of decarbonisation. Other relevant issues are the increased 
estimates of sea-level rise compared to the previous report and the increase in the effective 
radiative forcing of methane in the light of better understanding of feedback effects, which is 
relevant to calculations of the footprint of natural gas. The return to the level of uncertainty over the 
equilibrium climate sensitivity given in earlier reports, which had been narrowed down in AR4 seems 
to reflect ongoing academic controversy over the causes of the surface temperature hiatus, but does 
not warrant a relaxation of the carbon budget constraints for the achievement of a given 
temperature outcome.  
Thus far we have construed the climate challenge as a technical scientific problem, in order to 
establish the scientific reality of anthropogenic global warming. Lord Nicholas Stern, author of the 
Stern Review71 on the economics of climate change sums up this case as follows: 
The basic scientific conclusions on climate change are very robust and for very good reason. The 
greenhouse effect is simple and sound science: greenhouse gases trap heat, and humans are emitting 
ever more greenhouse gases. There will be oscillations, there will be uncertainties. But the logic of the 
greenhouse effect is rock solid and the long-term trends associated with the effects of human emissions 
are clear in the data. The arguments from those who would deny the science look more and more like 
those who denied the association between HIV and AIDS or smoking and cancer. Science and policy-
making thrive on challenge and questioning; they are vital to the health of enquiry and democracy. But 
at some point it makes sense to move on to the challenge of policymaking and accept that the evidence 
is overwhelming. We are way past that point.
72
 
The majority of theologians writing on this issue have taken the scientific evidence for 
anthropogenic global warming as entirely beyond dispute, beginning with this assumption rather 
than attempting to explain the scientific foundation for their theological projects. Similarly, 
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documents for bishops’ conferences tend to begin with a disclaimer as to the scientific credentials of 
their authors. This approach displays appropriate academic humility in conversations where 
specialist knowledge of climate science or mathematical modelling is required, but such specialised 
knowledge is not essential to understanding the basic phenomenon of anthropogenic global 
warming. Public educational objectives are not enabled by persistent media-framing of the issue as a 
debate between technical experts. In order to shift this paradigm and allow currently excluded 
voices to contribute their creativity and moral intuitions to the debate on abatement policy, I 
suggest it could be socially constructive if more theological ethicists were conversant with the 
fundamental science of climate change and equipped both to scrutinise and to defend it. This is 
necessary in a Catholic context in order to play our part in implementing the call from the Church’s 
magisterium to facilitate ecological conversion, to disengage from sinful social structures and to 
build a counter-culture of sustainable lifestyles. Transcending the artificial boundaries of 
contemporary academic faculties is fundamental to the theological task of reflecting on the signs of 
the times in the light of faith, and theologians with scientific backgrounds may be well positioned to 
promote clarity in public debate by articulating the relevant scientific concepts and presenting the 
evidence in an accessible form to enable more informed theological and socio-political engagement 
with the process of transition. 
However before we take Lord Stern’s advice and move on from the scientific evidence to the 
policymaking challenge, it will be helpful in order to fully appreciate the scale of the challenge ahead 
to summarise and explain the science behind the carbon budget approach to analysing the climate 
problem and designing appropriate evidence-based policy. Although in practice this approach has 
been known to policymakers since before COP-15 in Copenhagen, forming the basis of both the 
German WBGU proposal73 for global burden-sharing at that conference and of advice from the UK-
CCC to the UK Government on the implementation of the Climate Change Act 2008,74 AR5 is the first 
IPCC report to summarise the science in terms of this methodology, which has major advantages 
over previous analytical methods in terms of the scientific robustness of policy recommendations 
and simplicity of application to the problem.   
The Carbon Budget Approach 
As Professor David MacKay—chief scientific advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change—has stressed,75 the key message of AR5 is that the human-forced contribution to global 
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temperature change depends upon our cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases. This insight is 
generally attributed to Professor Myles Allen’s group at Oxford University who published an 
important paper on this in the prestigious journal Nature in 2009.76 Up until that point, controversy 
had raged over the stabilisation level of atmospheric CO2 that was compatible with a particular 
temperature target, and targets for pollution reduction by 2050 that would be required for climate 
stabilisation at that level. Climate justice campaigns like 350.org77 were organised around the idea 
that we should not allow concentrations to rise beyond 350ppm of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. (In May 2013 the concentration measured at Mauna Lao exceeded 400ppm for the first 
time.78) Myles Allen’s crucial insight was that the amount of CO2 we add to the atmosphere for a 
given abatement pathway depends on the overall shape of the curve, rather than its height. 
Intuitively, this makes sense because the amount of pollutants produced overall will depend not only 
on the level they reach before we manage to start reducing emissions, but also on the lag-time—
how long it takes before we succeed in reversing the current trend—and on the slope of the 
abatement curve: how rapidly we manage to reduce them thereafter. A measure of the amount of 
carbon pollution we add to the atmosphere is given by the area under the abatement curve, and the 
temperature increase we cause in so doing will be proportional to this amount. Rational climate 
policy should therefore seek to limit the ‘cumulative emissions’—the total additional amount of 
carbon pollution—to less than the amount that corresponds to the temperature threshold the policy 
is designed to avoid, referred to as the total available ‘carbon budget’.  
This should be clear if we visualise several different storylines or scenarios about possible policy 
responses to climate change. Anyone can invent scenarios; we could speculate much more wildly 
than the IPCC and create more interesting ‘possible futures’: One (highly implausible) scenario—that 
favoured by technological optimists—is that we take no action now, relying on scientists to discover 
a novel mechanism to suck pollution out of the atmosphere at some point in the future. This 
storyline involves increasing emissions up to the point where the technological solution can be 
implemented—let’s say 2050—followed by rapidly falling CO2 concentrations thereafter. The 
political optimist’s preferred scenario would be one under which an aggressive abatement pathway 
is agreed by all parties at COP-21 in Paris in 2015 and speedily implemented; this would give a curve 
that peaks around 2020 and declines comparatively gently thereafter (although not as comfortably 
as it might have had world leaders managed to reach this agreement at COP-15 in Copenhagen or at 
any of the intervening conferences of the parties). Lastly, one could conjure up an Armageddon 
scenario in which no one is prepared to agree on anything other than that it really is just too difficult 
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not to have a war,79 which then completely wipes out industrialised civilisation. Following this 
storyline emissions keep climbing until Armageddon day, and the rest is silence. So here we have 
three different abatement curves which differ as to the height of the peak, the time-lag before 
emissions start to drop and how steeply they decline. But let’s say the area under the three curves is 
the same in each case (which is easily arranged as all three are imaginary). Then—as Myles Allen has 
shown in principle—the equilibrium temperature outcome would also be the same.80  So a more 
useful number for policymakers than the height or timing of the peak or the rate at which emissions 
then decline is the total stock of atmospheric pollutants represented by any particular storyline. This 
quantity—which scientists call ‘the scenario’s cumulative emissions’—can be determined by 
calculating the area under the abatement curve, and it tells us what temperature increase to expect 
if we follow that storyline. Or at least it would do if we knew exactly how sensitive the climate is to 
the addition of each unit of pollution: which, unfortunately, we don’t.     
It would be really useful to those designing public policy if climate scientists were able to give a 
precise estimate of how much temperature change we should expect per unit of additional carbon 
dioxide released into the atmosphere. This would make it simple to calculate exactly what quantity 
of fossil-fuels we can burn and still achieve a given temperature target. In lieu of this still elusive 
number, as we have seen, IPCC AR5 gives an estimated range—1.5oC to 4.5oC—within which the 
climate sensitivity is likely to lie according to calculations made by the relevant experts. This does 
not completely exclude the possibility that the actual climate sensitivity might be lower or higher 
than the expected range, but the probability of it being much lower or higher is thought to be very 
low.  
The fifth report does not specify a ‘best estimate’ for the climate sensitivity—the mode of the 
probability curve over the likely range—which AR4 puts at 3oC. Instead they calculate the total global 
carbon budget that would give us a 33%, 50% and 66% chance of avoiding warming of more than 
2oC. Comparing this to the odds in a game of Russian roulette, that would be four bullets, three 
bullets and two bullets respectively in the cartridge of your six-shooter rather than just one. It works 
out that we can theoretically burn about a trillion tonnes of carbon (1000 GtC) in total over the 
whole of human fossil-fuel consuming history to have a 66% chance of staying below the two degree 
threshold and we have collectively consumed more than half that budget already since the onset of 
industrialisation. IPCC AR5 then adds some important caveats: this calculation takes no account of 
other greenhouse gases, reductions in aerosols or the potential release of methane gas from melting 
permafrost, all of which would result in a lower overall fossil-fuel burning budget.  
Part 2: The nature and framing of the problem 
The challenge for policymakers—which in a democratic society includes all of us—is to translate 
climate science into decarbonisation strategy. To comply with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) strategies must follow the ‘precautionary principle’ and be 
designed to stabilise greenhouse gas levels in the earth’s atmosphere at a level consistent with ‘the 
prevention of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the earth’s climate system’. Legitimate 
strategies need to be ‘in accordance with science’ and ‘on the basis of equity’. It should be clear 
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from the foregoing that designing policy in accordance with our current scientific knowledge that 
gives even a rather poor probability of avoiding dangerous warming is already a tall order. In my 
judgement the clause in the UNFCCC that calls for observance of ‘the precautionary principle’ 
requires no further discussion: we are a long way past the point at which it might have been possible 
to leave a comfortable margin of error in the design of greenhouse gas abatement policy. However, 
although most governments now accept the fact of climate change—even in countries where public 
opinion remains sceptical—and defer to the IPCC as the body charged with assessing the now 
enormous volume of relevant scientific research, persistent deadlock has continued to be a feature 
of the international negotiations.  The annual Conferences of the Parties—of which the latest at the 
time of writing is the upcoming COP-21 in Paris—have stalled over the question of ‘climate justice’: 
what exactly constitutes ‘equity’ under the UNFCCC has been an apple of discord between 
vulnerable states and key polluters.  
What is ‘climate justice’? 
There are two central injustices of unabated climate change. The first is that many of the most 
vulnerable countries are currently low emitters of greenhouse gas pollution whereas it is the 
industrialised countries that are currently high emitters—and historically have been responsible for 
the lion’s share of the accumulated stocks of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere—that have low 
exposure and well developed adaptive capacity. The second is that our generation has the power to 
compel future generations to accept the adverse consequences of our unjust and intemperate 
consumption of fossil fuels, both in terms of resource depletion and in terms of adverse 
consequences of the atmospheric accumulation of the resultant pollution. There is a huge and 
burgeoning literature on climate justice issues and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a 
systematic review of the field. My purpose here is merely to sketch the main concepts insofar as 
they contribute to the case for rapid global decarbonisation, and hence also pertain to the case for 
action to secure much wider and better informed participation in the transition process than would 
be necessary if the problem were isolated or of limited impact rather than systemic, intractable and 
potentially catastrophic.  
If, as I have argued, the scientific evidence alone shows that we are past the point at which we have 
the luxury of being able to guarantee the avoidance of dangerous outcomes with a comfortable 
margin of error, demonstrating that a significant body of professional opinion amongst economists 
and legal scholars as well as scientists favours fast and deep cuts in carbon emissions—a project that 
can only be achieved with sustained and substantial cross-partisan support—will suffice to answer 
the second of the three questions we have identified as crucial to my argument for the approach of 
this thesis. Issues central to the climate justice debate, and hence key to making my case for a 
religious value-led societal engagement with the ecological crisis, include vulnerability, historical 
responsibility, development rights and intergenerational justice.     
Vulnerability to the negative impacts of climate change depends on a combination of exposure and 
capacity to adapt. Exposure is a question of natural and human geography—proximity of population 
centres to widening flood zones as sea levels rise, how much of the national economy depends on 
production of staple crops that are more at risk as temperatures rise and droughts become more 
common, to what extent citizens’ water-supply is dependent on disappearing glaciers. Adaptive 
capacity is roughly proportional to the wealth of the nation, although in reality it depends on 
networks of communication and logistics, levels of government corruption, respect for the rights and 
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welfare of citizens and other indicators of resilience. A central irony of climate change is that wealth 
creation in the industrial era has been proportional to the generation of carbon-dioxide pollution 
through the burning of fossil-fuels and hence—to a first approximation—those least responsible for 
the problem also have the lowest adaptive capacity. Some of the poorest countries, by virtue of their 
geography are also highly exposed to the earliest and ultimately the worst impacts of unabated 
climate change. Unsurprisingly, in the international negotiating arena, such nations have tended to 
prioritise the construction of a compensation mechanism to compel the industrialised nations to 
take responsibility for negative climate impacts as a matter of justice.  
The UNFCCC requires nation states to accept costs of adaptation and abatement proportionate to 
their ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and 
economic conditions.’81 The language of the Framework Convention clearly requires the 
industrialised countries to accept a heavier overall cost burden to reflect differences in historical 
responsibility for the stocks of polluting gases in the atmosphere as well as their consequent 
advantages in adaptive capacity and level of development. The Convention is however open to 
different interpretations: an equitable outcome could have been achieved for example by the 
industrialised countries ‘taking the lead’ in making substantial cuts in emissions whilst developing 
countries were allowed a certain amount of ‘headroom’ to address development priorities crucial to 
the welfare of their vulnerable populations: this was the thinking behind the Kyoto Protocol, which 
placed early abatement responsibilities on the shoulders of an Annex I list of the world’s wealthiest 
nations. However, given that the Protocol was never ratified by the US Senate, it proved impossible 
to make meaningful progress towards global decarbonisation during the Kyoto period. This leaves us 
in a situation in which the only mechanism still open for compliance with the Framework Convention 
is a treaty under which all parties simultaneously embark upon an aggressive and immediate 
programme of abatement action, and agree on some form of ‘loss and damage mechanism’ through 
which the differentiated responsibilities and disparities in wealth and adaptive capacity 
acknowledged in the UNFCCC are recognised and compensated for.     
In their book Climate Change Justice, American scholars Eric Posner and David Weisbach argue that 
issues of redistributive and compensatory justice should be set aside, and this was the stance 
adopted by US negotiator Todd Stern at the Warsaw conference of the parties, COP-19. Posner and 
Weisbach argue that the best and possibly even the only hope of securing an international 
agreement is a ‘forward looking’ agreement (which is to say one that ignores historical emissions 
responsibility) that can be endorsed by every party individually as in accord with its own interests. As 
they put it: ‘we need to think about how to solve the climate problem in a way that even selfish 
states would agree to.’82 Selfishness, on their view, is not a moral failing when applied to 
negotiations between nation states, it is both an unavoidable feature of political reality and—as they 
seem to imply—compatible with international justice. They flatly state that ‘no climate change 
agreement will be feasible if it amounts to a massive transfer of resources from wealthy nations to 
China and India’83 and that schemes with wealth redistributive consequences cannot secure 
American assent since they involve trusting ‘corrupt governments to manage vast resources—
billions of dollars of permits, for example—and to enforce rules against their wealthy cronies, such 
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as the owners of greenhouse gas emitting factories.’84 Of course the problem of corrupt government 
is not one peculiar to developing countries. 
The ‘welfarist’ paradigm proposed by Posner and Weisbach—as I have argued elsewhere85—
oversimplifies the justice issues and ignores the human rights dimension of unabated climate change 
as well as the clear and unambiguous implications of the Framework Convention, to which the USA is 
a party. Posner and Weisbach argue that ‘the climate change problem poorly fits the corrective 
justice model’86 and—commenting on the issue of culpable negligence by the Bush administration—
they appear to accept the findings of the Congressional investigation,87 yet offer the following 
justification: 
A more reasonable and serious criticism of American policy until very recently is that the US 
government did not take seriously the risk of climate change, may have deliberately downplayed the 
risks when government officials knew better, and did not try to use its diplomatic power to advance 
climate treaty negotiations an much as it should have. Maybe; but a reasonable alternative hypothesis 
is that the United States was just trying to exercise its bargaining power so that any eventual treaty 
would be more favourable to its interests than otherwise. It is farfetched to say that such common state 
behaviour is negligent.
88
 
Yet on the basis of the evidence of systematic and deliberate interference with the EPA, suppression 
of climate science and alteration of testimony before Congress documented by Wood,89 it does not 
seem at all farfetched to say that the US government behaved in a manner that was both 
negligent—even culpably reckless—towards all those amongst the global poor whose vital and 
immediate interests are imperilled by the climate emergency, and a clear case of abuse of power 
that favoured the economic interests of partisan lobbying groups over the security, lives and 
livelihoods of ordinary Americans, many of whom live in coastal cities that are acutely vulnerable to 
rising sea-levels90 along with increased frequency and intensity of storms in a warming world. Far 
from making any eventual treaty likely to be more favourable to US interests than it might otherwise 
have been, this behaviour is likely to have heightened hostility towards America and her allies and 
                                                          
84
 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, p. 177. 
85
Jacaranda Turvey, Book Review: Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton; 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), Studies in Christian Ethics 23 (November 2010), 464-468.  
http://sce.sagepub.com/content/23/4/464.citation?patientinform-links=yes&legid=spsce;23/4/464 [accessed 
15 October 2015]. 
86
 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, p. 103. 
87
 United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110
th
 
Congressional Report: Political Interference with Climate Science Under the Bush Administration (18 
December, 2007) http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/reports/house-of-representative-2007-
majority-report-on-climate-change-science.pdf [accessed 14 October 2015]; quoted in Mary Christina Wood, 
Nature’s Trust: Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 
25 n. 20.  
88
 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, p. 114. 
89
 Wood, Nature’s Trust, p. 25. 
90
‘Scientists have spent decades examining all the factors that can influence the rise of the seas, and their 
research is finally leading to answers. And the more the scientists learn, the more they perceive an enormous 
risk for the United States.’ Justin Gillis, ‘The Flood Next Time’ New York Times, 13 January 2014 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/science/earth/grappling-with-sea-level-rise-sooner-not-
later.html?hpw&rref=science&_r=1 [accessed 15 October 2015] 
 30 
impacted negatively on global security. At the very least, it obstructed the process of international 
climate negotiations, delaying the achievement of a global abatement agreement.     
On the issue of intergenerational justice Posner and Weisbach make a compelling argument for a 
principle of intergenerational neutrality that values present and future people equally and hence, in 
economic cost-benefit analysis of carbon abatement projects, future benefits should be discounted 
at a rate that reflects only the expected market return on investment. On this basis they judge Lord 
Stern’s discounting rate of 1.4% to be approximately correct (although they arrive at a similar 
number for entirely different reasons) and  regard William Nordhaus’s larger discounting rate as 
‘implausible given the mathematics of averaging over uncertainty.’91 Lord Stern famously argued for 
aggressive greenhouse gas abatement on the basis of economic cost-benefit analysis; Posner and 
Weisbach similarly conclude that ‘global emissions reductions at a fairly stringent level likely pass a 
cost-benefit test’92 and ‘unfortunately we may need fast and deep cuts in emissions.’93   
Indeed, grasping the scale of the problem—which can be quantified reasonably clearly using the 
carbon budget approach as discussed earlier—suggests two possibilities. The first is that the climate 
challenge can be met if we are able to mobilise and engage the general public to grasp the 
opportunity—in collaboration with others in the global community—to embark on a voyage of 
transition to the safe haven of a sustainable future. On this view, the issue is inadequately framed as 
a technical challenge to be addressed by experts with the relevant competencies: it presents a much 
broader and more fundamental crisis with inescapable and potentially perilous implications for all 
citizens and families, communities and Nation States, although not all are equally the cause of the 
problem and some will suffer earlier and worse consequences of a collective failure to address it.  
The second possibility which needs to be confronted is that the window of opportunity for 
implementing a solution has already closed and there are no realistic routes to sub-catastrophic 
outcomes. As can be seen when the climate challenge is analysed using Allen’s carbon budget 
methodology, there is nothing unduly alarmist about raising this possibility. Scientists convene 
conferences specifically dedicated to unpacking the implications of just such a prognosis.94 Scientists 
are trained to privilege reason over emotion and to adopt an attitude of detachment towards their 
subject matter. Those who are temperamentally inclined towards careers in science tend to cluster 
towards the introverted end of the personality spectrum and to exhibit lower than average levels of 
expressed emotion. Alarmism does not come naturally to such individuals. There is something rather 
surreal about passionless scientific debates that take seriously the possibility of a collective human 
failure to address the climate crisis and speculate over whether or not the window of opportunity 
for action to avert unthinkable catastrophe may already have closed.  
If the climate problem is inherently intractable and tragic outcomes are unavoidable (as some have 
argued) is there any point to further analysis of the merits of different pathways to energy systems 
transition? During the Bali conference Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter and veteran commentator on 
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the climate crisis Ross Gelbspan articulated the ‘reasonable despair’ experienced by many informed 
observers of the international negotiations: 
We have failed to meet Nature’s deadline. In the next few years the world will experience progressively 
more ominous and destabilising changes. These will happen either incrementally—or in sudden abrupt 
jumps….There is no body of expertise, no authoritative answers for this one. We are crossing a 
threshold into uncharted territory. And since there is no precedent to guide us, we are left with only 
our own hearts to consult, whatever courage we can muster, our instinctive dedication to a human 
future—and the intellectual integrity to look reality in the eye.
95
 
Continuing the quest for climate solutions depends upon resolving this question in favour of the 
former possibility: that the challenge—although daunting—is not yet beyond all hope of 
containment. However the latter possibility should not be dismissed too glibly. The remaining 
uncertainties as to the exact value of the climate sensitivity and the proximity of tipping points make 
the question at once reasonable and rationally underdetermined on the basis of the existing 
evidence. Intellectual integrity requires us to face up to the possibility of failure and the catastrophic 
consequence this would entail. The phenomenon of ‘rational despair’ is known amongst 
environmental activists as ‘the second glass of wine perspective’ in honour of Chris Goodall’s 
description of the disparity between the relentlessly positive public presentations of climate 
specialists compared to their somewhat less inhibited analysis of the problem over drinks 
afterwards: 
When speaking in public, almost all specialists engaged in the climate change debate offer a positive 
and hopeful view of the world’s ability to tackle climate change. They know that if they say that the 
situation is too awful and frightening they will lose the sympathy of the audience. Speakers have to be 
relentlessly upbeat, stressing the capacity of the world to reduce its use of fossil-fuels whilst still 
improving prosperity around the globe. With a few exceptions, the public stance of climate change 
experts is that global warming is within our control, at least for the next few years.  
There is often a reception after the speech and the scientist or politician speaker will stay to chat with 
the people who came to the talk. Glasses of indifferent wine are passed around and the conversation 
moves to the actions the world needs to undertake to avert the potential for unmitigated catastrophe. I 
have been to many of these events, and I have noticed the same thing happen on almost every 
occasion. Winding down after the talk, the speaker sips the first glass and continues to say that the 
climate problem is within the capacity of the world to solve. But as he or she reaches for a second glass, 
and the alcohol starts to loosen inhibitions, the speaker begins to offer a less cheerful view. The slow 
pace of change in attitudes among the world’s political elite is witheringly dissected. (I would use the 
word ‘glacial’ to describe the rate of progress, but since the Greenland glaciers now move several 
kilometres a year this adjective is far too generous.) The speaker notes the mounting evidence that the 
relatively small increases in average temperature we have already seen are having some surprisingly 
dramatic effects.  The Arctic will probably have ice-free summers within a decade, major Asian rivers 
are likely to dry up for several months a year, biodiversity is declining at an accelerating rate, and 
increases in crop yields are slowing as drought, rising salinity and increasing temperatures affect 
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vulnerable plants. The speaker now says what he or she really believes: the world is not ready to make 
the adjustments necessary to control climate change.
96
 
Goodall is a technological optimist who is upbeat about the prospects for unproven carbon 
sequestration projects—without which the UK strategy to decarbonise the grid would fail to add up, 
since it relies on switching from coal to gas in the short-term with the potential to retro-fit gas 
power-plants with carbon capture and storage facilities in the future—and his book enthuses over 
the possibilities inherent in an array of different technological innovations that hold out hope of 
steering a course to a sustainable future. Clearly, in his view we have not ‘failed to meet Nature’s 
deadline’ as Gelbspan laments. Yet Goodall admits that when he gives talks on climate change he 
always refuses the second drink after the speech, for fear of letting his own worries show.97 There 
may be wisdom in this approach, although it runs the risk of preaching hope to complacency. The 
fear of collective failure to rise to this challenge is not irrational or alarmist; admitting to it is not 
cowardice, delusion or superstition. Of the numerous possibilities open to human civilisation for self-
destruction, simply failing to grasp what opportunity remains to transition to sustainable energy 
technologies may yet be the possibility that inexorably plays out, as this generation struts and frets 
its hour upon the stage, heedless of the needs of the vulnerable or of unborn generations. But there 
is nothing to be gained by dwelling on this outcome as though it were inevitable since—if it is not—
one risks allowing the idea to become self-fulfilling and—if it is—nothing is lost in the attempt to 
avoid it that is not in any case already lost.       
Greenpeace campaign strategist Chris Rose has argued that the framing of climate change as a 
scientific phenomenon has been unhelpful in building a civil society movement to advocate for 
change, and the stratospheric political level at which it has been tackled—through a process of 
negotiations between governments at a series of international ‘conferences of the parties’—has 
obstructed the kind of public ‘ownership’ of the issue that is a hallmark of successful campaigns.98 As 
I have argued earlier in this chapter, framing the issue in terms of welfarist economic assumptions 
seriously misconstrues the nature of the justice issues involved, and hence a deeper engagement 
with the climate challenge from ethicists and theologians would be helpful especially in advocating 
the cause of those vulnerable populations most exposed to the impacts of unabated global warming. 
For Roman Catholic moral theologians, a central principle of faith is the need to put into practice an 
option for the poor in the light of Our Lord’s instruction that we should work and live with and for 
the most vulnerable, enabling them to advocate on their own behalf and pleading their cause where 
their voices would otherwise go unheard. Whilst both Protestant and Catholic scholars have 
produced valuable work on climate change, and religious NGOs such as CAFOD and Christian Aid as 
well as environmental groups have been active in the climate justice movement, it remains the case 
that the public debate is dominated by technical issues: mainly over the credibility of climate science 
and economic cost-benefit analysis of policy proposals. As Wood argues:99 
Religion offers multifaceted contributions to the environmental movement of the new millennium. 
Passionate preachers and spiritual leaders can activate entire congregations behind policy agendas in a 
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way that impersonal email appeals from advocacy groups may not be able to. Moreover, Gottlieb 
contends that, because the present ecological crisis reflects fundamentally a crisis of spiritualism, 
religion stands uniquely positioned to prompt change in personal attitudes and behaviour. Today’s 
problems, he points out, cannot be resolved by political, economic or technical fixes alone, as they 
manifest a ‘profound and wide-ranging failing of virtually every aspect of modern society.’ 
The moral vision of religion, Gottlieb suggests, can urge a fundamental shift in basic values from 
overconsumption to a simple needs-based lifestyle—both by rejecting the former as unethical and by 
embracing the latter as spiritual. Perhaps singularly, religion can inspire personal change despite 
cognitive recognition that individual action counts little in relation to the problem as a whole. Gottlieb 
writes: ‘The willingness to resist requires a kind of faith that one’s actions make a difference, even if it is 
hard to see what that difference is. We [find God in] a faith that reflects a passionate choice rather than 
a reasoned account of current social forces and trends.’ As a practical matter, too, religious 
communities offer a welcoming annex in which families and individuals can practice new lifestyles, 
some of the communally supported; church kitchens and gardens can build support for local, organic 
food; congregations can aggregate their individual change to produce significant cumulative results on a 
path of carbon reduction. Finally, as Gottlieb points out, religion can overcome the personal 
hopelessness that shadows daunting global economic predicaments. Religious life, he asserts, equips a 
believer to deal with the full range of emotions that inevitably pour forth in the wake of environmental 
collapse—a range that will doubtless include shame, despair, fear, grief, anger and denial. He writes: ‘It 
is the job of religion to lend a hand precisely when things seem darkest.’
100
  
Notwithstanding the efforts and enthusiasm of the Transition Towns Movement, polls continue to 
show scant public appetite for behaviour change101 and politicians treat this as an inflexible 
constraint on policy options. It is a common observation within the Green Party of England and 
Wales that public support for rational environmental policy is found to be weak unless it is framed in 
terms of job-creation and other short-term benefits, and candidates are often caricatured as 
environmental extremists with a poor grasp of ‘economic realities’. This is interesting because it 
indicates the extent to which the nature of the climate crisis as an issue crucially concerning the 
future prospects—including the economic interests, security and welfare—of individuals and 
families can be obscured by the technical framing of the public debate. A paradigm shift in public 
awareness is needed to reframe the issue as a project that ordinary people have both a right and a 
duty to play their part in bringing to fruition for the common good. 
As we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, any solution to the global climate challenge 
that respects the obligation to stabilise temperatures below some accepted threshold between 
tolerable and dangerous interference with the planetary climate will need to conform to science-
based requirements: The total global use of fossil-fuels to drive economic growth must respect the 
maximum carbon budget compatible with the temperature threshold. In addition, the slope of the 
abatement curve—which indicates the rate at which fossil-fuel use declines—must not exceed the 
maximum feasible rate at which a complex global economy can be transitioned to sustainable 
energy alternatives. Any proposed solution that transgresses these boundary conditions necessarily 
risks all its eggs in the basket of science-fiction solutions involving removal of carbon dioxide from 
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the atmosphere or other forms of geo-engineering.102 Far from sharing the enthusiasm of advocates 
for such solutions,103 I am inclined to agree with Lawrence Summers that geo-engineering 
necessarily involves ‘the kind of intrusion into a highly complex ecosystem that we should all fear 
most.’104 The UN framework convention on climate change commits signatories to avoiding 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the planetary climate system, not experimenting with 
other forms of high-risk interference. 
The mismatch between a science-based description of the climate challenge and the understanding 
of ‘economic realists’ is clearly seen in the following extract from a paper by Harvard Professor of 
International Economics, Richard N. Cooper, in which he argues against a science-based abatement 
regime proposed by Axel Michaelowa: 
Michaelowa explicitly rejects a benefit-cost approach to public policy in dealing with global climate 
change in favour of an absolute (indicative) ceiling to atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, 
mainly but not exclusively carbon-dioxide. This approach implies an extreme degree of risk aversion 
with respect to climate change—any cost to avoiding it is worth the price—about which every 
economist should be sceptical. Moreover, ordinary citizens will in practice reject this approach—they 
will not be willing to bear any cost to reduce emissions enough to stabilise concentrations. Policy 
analysts should acknowledge this from the outset. The price citizens will be prepared to pay will initially 
be modest; it may grow as hard evidence of the costs of climate change accumulate, but even then it 
will not become infinite, not least because those who will be expected to bear the brunt of the cost of 
reducing emissions may not be those who will incur the greatest damage from climate change. This 
approach implicitly places climate change above all other social objectives, and it implies a degree of 
global communitarianism that does not exist today and is unlikely to come into being within the next 
decade, when a post-Kyoto Protocol regime must be negotiated.
105
  
One might agree with the overall case Cooper makes for carbon taxation—as a policy alternative 
with some advantages over a cap-and-trade mechanism for greenhouse gas abatement—and 
concede that rational public policy requires some form of cost-benefit analysis of the economic and 
ecosystemic impacts of climate change compared to the costs of abatement (logically an assessment 
of this kind must underpin our characterisation of it as ‘dangerous’ and motivate our desire to avoid 
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it)106 yet at the same time find this paragraph troubling. On the one hand this could be seen as a 
restatement of Giddens’s paradox: ‘since the dangers posed by global warming aren’t tangible, 
immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they appear, many will sit 
on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about them. Yet waiting until they become 
visible and acute before being stirred to serious action will, by definition, be too late.’107 Policy 
analysts certainly need to recognise this as a potential problem. On the other hand, the statement 
appears to disregard the scientific reality that setting some absolute ceiling on carbon emissions is—
logically—the only way to prevent catastrophic climate change, which we might define (to 
distinguish our use of it from mere environmental doom-mongering) as ‘that level of global warming 
theoretically sufficient to overwhelm the pursuit of any other development objective’. This is 
because if carbon emissions are not capped the stocks of pollutants in the atmosphere will continue 
to rise and the planet will continue to warm. It cannot be said to be ‘alarmist’ to conclude that if this 
continues indefinitely temperatures will necessarily eventually reach a critical point—there is some 
authority for estimating this at 4oC—beyond which further warming is reasonably expected to have 
overwhelmingly destructive consequences, and not merely for those vulnerable populations who are 
most exposed to earlier impacts.108  
In view of this, it seems reasonable to make an estimate of the total global emissions budget that is 
compatible with a very high probability of avoiding 4oC and to regard this as an absolute limit with 
which any proposed solution must comply.109 The cost of building a ‘safe’ future is the cost of 
limiting fossil-fuel consumption to at most that budget that results in 2oC of warming. The cost of 
building any future at all is the cost of limiting fossil-fuel consumption to the 4oC carbon budget. 
Constructing the challenge in this way demonstrates the key point that this section seeks to 
establish: that what we are facing is not merely a technical problem to be addressed by experts, but 
an ecological emergency with which every citizen has both the right and the responsibility to engage. 
It is a moral problem, to which our religious worldviews and value systems are acutely relevant, 
because of the intergenerational and international justice issues raised by every proposed solution, 
and because of the existential threat inherent in a collective failure to act. A great deal more is 
potentially at stake than ‘climate justice’. This is not to suggest that a just outcome is not something 
                                                          
106
 Nicholas Stern makes the case that rapid decarbonisation of the global economy such as to comply with the 
2
o
C threshold is economically rational on the basis of cost-benefit analysis: Stern, The Economics of Climate 
Change; Stern, Blueprint. Posner and Weisbach note that ‘almost all studies indicate that at least a modest 
reduction in emissions is cost-beneficial and a number of studies indicate that fast and deep emissions 
reductions are needed.’ Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, p. 21. This analysis is disputed by other 
economists, notably Richard Tol, William Nordhaus and Nigel Lawson. 
107
 Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, p. 2. 
108
 ‘The immediacy and scale of the reductions necessary to avoid anything below 4°C, and indeed the human 
and ecosystem implications of living with 4°C, are beyond anything we have been prepared to countenance. 
Understanding the implications of 4°C and higher temperatures is essential if global society is to make 
informed choices about the balance between "extreme" rates of mitigation and "extreme" impacts and 
adaptation costs.’ 4 Degrees and Beyond: International Climate Conference. 
109
 The pre-Copenhagen approach taken by the UK Climate Change Committee in 2009, in calculating the UK’s 
contribution to global emissions reductions was based on a carbon budget that would give only a 50% chance 
of keeping temperature rises below 2
o
C, but ensured a 99% probability of not exceeding 4
o
C on the basis of 
the state of scientific understanding at the time: Committee on Climate Change, Progress Report to Parliament 
October 2009, ‘Meeting Carbon Budgets—The Need for a Step Change’, p. 35. 
http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/21667%20CCC%20Report%20AW%20WEB.pdf  [accessed 15 October 2015] 
 36 
to which we should aspire, but merely a way of spelling out the ultimate bottom line: some potential 
outcomes are merely undesirable—and hence worth avoiding if this can be done at a cost 
proportionate to the loss they represent—other outcomes are unfair to others, but beyond a certain 
point the expected consequences of further warming are such that even absolutely Herculean 
efforts to keep within that boundary are warranted. 
The technical challenge involved in transitioning global energy systems to sustainable sources is 
enormous in itself, as David MacKay has shown.110 As we have seen, according to David Hone111 the 
current pace of decarbonisation is about half that which would be required to follow the IPCC AR5 
‘worst case scenario’—RCP 8.5—to a 4oC outcome. Analysis by Price-Waterhouse Cooper calculates 
that at the current rate of decarbonisation of 0.7% per annum the carbon budget for a 2oC outcome 
represented by RCP 2.6 will have been consumed by 2034, just two decades from now.112 In addition 
there is the political challenge involved in creating the framework within which a technical solution 
can be constructed. This requires a level of public support for abatement action that can be 
sustained through changes in government and in economic climate, to ensure an on-going 
democratic mandate and a reliable investment framework for energy alternatives. Clearly within 
different cultural contexts and political systems the challenge is not identical, but at least within 
Western democracies—which remain amongst the highest per-capita polluters as well as having the 
largest historical responsibility for existing stocks of pollutants—it seems reasonable to suggest that 
any solution that gives us confidence of avoiding 4oC will require more stability for investors in 
renewable energy and more reliable public support for the required energy transition than exists 
currently in the UK or the USA.  On David Hone’s analysis a tenfold increase in the current rate of 
decarbonisation is required for a safe passage and more than a twofold increase to ensure a sub-
catastrophic outcome. There is a long list of options for improving on current performance including 
removing incentives that artificially bias the market towards further exploitation of fossil-fuels, 
creating incentives for renewables, building infrastructure to support electric mobility and safe 
cycling to name just a few. But the political challenge is immense and our governments do not—thus 
far—seem capable of rising to it. 
For these reasons I would conclude that constructing a solution to ensure even a minimally 
acceptable climate outcome is, to say the least, a truly epic challenge. The technical problems 
involved in designing and constructing sustainable energy systems are non-trivial but in principle 
solvable. The social challenge of creating the necessary framework for the decommissioning of fossil-
technology at a rate compatible with a reasonably benign future climate may present a bigger 
hurdle. Achievements over the past two decades have been slow, superficial and largely symbolic;113 
over the next two decades we will need to achieve rapid and systemic changes. Given the thermal 
inertia of the global climate system, any proposed solution that delays the onset of serious action 
and relies on making more rapid changes later is not likely to be technically feasible or compatible 
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with avoiding dangerous global warming and the window of opportunity for avoiding catastrophic 
outcomes is by no means comfortably wide. 
To sum up the argument of this section: my aim has been to argue for theological engagement with 
the climate crisis, in the hope of wresting the issue from the exclusive grasp of technical specialists 
and political elites and to reconstruct the challenge of climate stabilisation as an historic opportunity 
to be part of a collaborative project for the global common good. As we have seen, this challenge 
has moral and existential dimensions and needs to engage and maintain citizen participation on the 
basis of deeply held cultural loyalties and value-systems. Framed as such the ecological challenge 
requires a new approach beyond the limitations of the current combination of academic reports, 
high level conferences and expert testimony as drivers—thus far very inadequate drivers—of 
systemic social and economic change.114 This needs to include widespread grass-roots reflection 
from different religious perspectives linked to effective communication strategies and concrete 
proposals for action, to change the paradigm that has hitherto dominated the public debate and 
manifestly failed to motivate change on a scale proportionate to the size of the challenge. 
Ecotheology—once seen as a specialist academic niche for a rare breed of theologians from scientific 
backgrounds—needs to play a less marginalised and taciturn role. Reflecting theologically on this 
crucial issue and applying the deepest wisdom of our cultures to the social task of addressing it 
needs to become a mainstream collective endeavour for theologians. This thesis proposes a novel 
contribution to this global project, based on confrontation of the problem from within the 
conservative Catholic worldview and value-system constructed by Germain Grisez.  
Section 3: Is the climate crisis a ‘sign of the times’?  
As we have seen in Section One, a robust scientific case can be made for decommissioning fossil-fuel 
energy infrastructure in order to limit anthropogenic global warming. Section Two established that 
rapid decarbonisation of the global economy is essential to avoid ‘dangerous’ interference with the 
earth’s climate system, as required under article 2 of the UNFCCC, with a 2oC rise in global average 
surface temperature as the internationally accepted threshold we are required to avoid. In order to 
achieve this Herculean task within the available timeframe—if this remains possible at all—I have 
argued that the transition project needs to be construed as a societal moral enterprise rather than 
framed as the exclusive domain of technical experts and high-level government negotiators. There is 
a need to engage ordinary citizens in a transition process that crucially affects the interests of 
individuals and their families. Having made this overall case in the previous two sections, my aim 
here is to answer two questions that pertain specifically to projects within the field of Roman 
Catholic ecotheology: (1) whether the climate crisis should—in principle—be regarded as a ‘sign of 
the times’ and (2) whether the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church has—in fact—construed it 
as such. It is crucial to the whole enterprise of Catholic theological engagement with the climate 
issue that the first of these two questions can be answered in the affirmative. If I can—in answer to 
the second question—establish on the documentary evidence that not only left-leaning 
ecotheologians but also the official teaching authority of the Church have accepted the ecological 
question generally and the climate crisis in particular as a ‘sign of the times’, I shall be in a position 
to conclude that the articulation of a conservative Catholic ecotheology consistent with Grisez 
School methodology—the task of this thesis—can make an important contribution to the field.    
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Meeting the criteria for classification 
For Jame Schaefer—Associate Professor of Systematic Theology and Ethics at Marquette University 
in the United States and convenor of the Catholic Theological Society of America’s Interest Group on 
Global Warming—and for other members of the collaborative project under her direction which 
aims to research and articulate a Catholic theological response to the climate crisis,115  a calling by 
God to be responsive to contemporary moral issues and ‘signs of the times’ is inherent in our 
vocation as theologians.116 In order to establish that the climate crisis is an issue upon which we 
have a mandate as Catholic theologians to reflect in the light of the truths of faith, we first need to 
ask whether the ecological crisis generally—and the global warming phenomenon as a subsidiary 
challenge—qualifies as a ‘sign of the times’ as this phrase is understood in Catholic social teaching. 
The phrase ‘sign of the times’ originates from Matthew’s Gospel which criticises those who ‘know 
how to interpret the appearance of the sky’ but ‘cannot interpret the signs of the times.’117  
According to Thomas Nairn,118 it was first used in Vatican social teaching by Pope John XXIII in his 
Christmas message of 1961 and became an organising principle of his encyclical Pacem in Terris,119  
in which each chapter closes with a reflection on the characteristics of present day circumstances 
which can be classified as ‘signs of the times.’ Gaudium et spes (The Pastoral Constitution on the 
Church in the Modern World)120 —the final document issued by the Second Vatican Council—called 
for the Church to scrutinise the signs of the times and then to interpret them in the light of the 
gospel. This has been interpreted as a major methodological shift,121  even a ‘bombshell’122  to those 
accustomed to the Catholic vision of nature and society expressed in abstract traditional natural law 
categories; Nairn argues that it moves Catholic social teaching towards an approach based on human 
interdependence beginning with the empirical data of human experience. The Council’s vision 
stresses the central dignity of the human person, interpreted through an incarnationalist Trinitarian 
theology, bringing the Church into the heart of human life where Christians—individually and 
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collectively—are called to live out our commitments in service ‘to real people in the concrete 
circumstances of human history.’123 As Nairn explains: 
By means of the language of the ‘signs of the times’ the constitution challenges the Church to see the 
deep connection between the actual events of the world, both good and bad, and the Word of God. 
Taking its prompting from the eighth chapter of St Paul’s Letter to the Romans, the council summons all 
believers to see that the World is groaning as in the pangs of childbirth, awaiting its fulfillment in Christ 
[…] most basically, the driving force behind such language was the belief that the Holy Spirit is speaking 
in the day-to-day events of people’s lives. The human person is always a being in the world, and 
therefore history itself must be part of what it means to be human. Once history enters into Christian 
reflection, the faithful are invited to analyse the changes around them and see how they affect the 
human condition itself.  The events of the World therefore have a major importance for the Church: the 
‘times’ themselves are able to teach the Church.
124
     
According to Vanhengel and Peters, to qualify as ‘a sign of the times’ as the phrase is used in Catholic 
social teaching, and to avoid trivialising the concept, a problem must be substantiated by an 
accumulation of facts pointing to the same conclusions and this must be widely acknowledged by 
the public.125 For Cathy Mabry McMullen the current overall ecological crisis is an unequivocal 
example of such a sign: 
The current scientific consensus on the declining state of the environment satisfies the criteria spelled 
out by Vatican II concerning what constitutes a sign of the times. It is hard to overstate how completely 
the science of ecology has embraced human impact as the global ‘environmental crisis.’ This consensus 
is reflected in how thoroughly the academic study of ecology is shaped by the paradigm of studying the 
underlying mechanisms of the crisis and the desire to provide a scientific basis for mitigating human 
impacts on Earth’s systems.
126
  
As regards the climate crisis as one specific driver of current and future ecological degradation, I 
have sought to establish in the previous section of this chapter that there is a robust scientific case 
for the phenomenon of anthropogenic global warming and for seeking to avert ecological 
catastrophe through embarking on a global collaborative project of decommissioning carbon-
intensive energy infrastructure and building sustainable alternatives. There is a very high degree of 
collective confidence in the scientific community that this case has been unequivocally established: 
the overwhelming majority—97% of climate scientists—now agree that the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere as a result of human activities is causing global warming.127  
Whilst the existence of such a consensus is strictly speaking irrelevant to the truth or falsity of a 
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scientific theory,128 which is inferred from its capacity to account for observational data and predict 
future developments, it is a crucial argument in favour of categorising the climate crisis as 
constituting a sign of the times upon which Catholic moral theologians are called to reflect in the 
light of the truths of faith. The criteria for so categorising an issue, as we have seen, include both an 
accumulation of evidence and its public acknowledgement. It would seem that, in principle, the 
climate crisis meets these criteria.  
The climate crisis as a ‘sign of the times’ in Catholic social teaching 
Having established that anthropogenic global warming is an issue that ought in principle to be 
regarded as a ‘sign of the times’, it remains to establish that a conservative moral methodology as 
exemplified by Germain Grisez is adequate to the task of reflecting theologically on this issue. If, as I 
shall seek to demonstrate, existing Catholic social teaching specifically acknowledges the climate 
crisis as ‘a sign of the times’ this recognition endows our theological task with institutional legitimacy 
in addition to its theoretical justification on the basis of our scientific and socioeconomic 
understanding of the nature and gravity of the challenge, and it begs the question as to why a Grisez 
School analysis of the climate crisis is nowhere articulated in the literature, an intellectual lacuna this 
thesis seeks to address.  
As Celia Deane-Drummond has shown, the Church’s magisterium has concerned itself with ecology 
since the early days of the environmental movement, a fact that she suggests ‘may come as 
something of a surprise’ to her readers.129 Likewise—and perhaps even more unexpectedly to those 
who are not familiar with Catholic social teaching on the environment—the climate crisis was 
specifically acknowledged by Pope John Paul II as early as 1987130 and has been a major driver of 
calls by the late pope and his successor Benedict XVI for ‘ecological conversion.’131  Integrating this 
contemporary evidence with the Church’s long-standing and consistent teaching on human 
responsibilities to the environment, the Church authorities have sought both to articulate an 
inherent Catholic environmentalism and to initiate efforts to express this in concrete programs and 
initiatives.132  
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I shall discuss contemporary Church teaching on the environment in more detail in Chapter Three in 
which I review the ecotheology literature relevant to this project and defend its choice of 
methodology.  My aim here is to demonstrate that a general problem of environmental 
irresponsibility and exploitation has long been acknowledged at the highest level in the Church. As I 
hope to show in this section, a progression towards formal recognition by the Church of the 
ecological crisis as one of the ‘signs of the times’ that Catholics should reflect upon and integrate 
into our understanding of our individual and collective calling is discernible within the official 
teachings of the magisterium, with the climate crisis explicitly recognised as such since at least the 
turn of the millennium. As Deane-Drummond notes, far from being an afterthought in Roman 
Catholic social teaching,133 the awareness of the need for environmental responsibility has been 
there from the beginning of the emergence of ecotheology.134  
In 1971, writing on the eightieth anniversary of Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum novarum (Rights and 
Duties of Capital and Labour)135 Paul VI pointed out that ‘by an ill-considered exploitation of nature 
[humankind] risks destroying it and becoming in his turn the victim of this degradation.’ He alluded 
to problems of pollution, new diseases and ‘absolute destructive capacity’ concluding that ‘the 
human framework is no longer under man’s control, thus creating an environment for tomorrow 
which may well be intolerable. This is a wide-ranging social problem which concerns the whole 
human family.’136  For John Paul II—writing in 1987—the rise of ecological concern was to be 
counted ‘among the positive signs’, in an age characterised by increasing inequality and loss of 
confidence in ‘progress’ and ‘development’ through industrialisation as a route out of poverty for 
the disadvantaged peoples of the world. He discerned a ‘greater realization of the limits of available 
resources, and of the need to respect the integrity and the cycles of nature and to take them into 
account when planning for development, rather than sacrificing them to certain demagogic ideas 
about the latter.’137  
In the United States, the Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), in a statement entitled Renewing 
the Earth138 published in 1991, clearly identified the ecological crisis as a ‘sign of the times’, and 
specifically mentioned global problems associated with ‘greenhouse gases and chlorofluorocarbons’ 
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that ‘affect the earth's atmosphere for many decades,139 regardless of where they are produced or 
used.’  At a conference organised by the Vatican’s Council for Justice and Peace in 2007, Bishop 
Bernd Uhl of Freiburg, Germany spelled out the Church’s recognition of the climate crisis to 
scientists, environment ministers and leaders of various religions from twenty countries who had 
gathered in Vatican City: ‘Climate Change is one of the signs of the times affecting the Catholic 
Church as a global organisation. The Catholic Church must take a stand on this present day and 
urgent question.’140 Benedict XVI, in his message for the 2010 World Day of Peace entitled ‘If you 
want to cultivate peace, protect Creation’, discerned ‘signs of a growing crisis, which it would be 
irresponsible not to take seriously’, listing climate change as one of these signs, in the face of which 
the Church cannot remain indifferent.141 Although, as Christopher Vogt comments, Catholic social 
teaching ‘is only beginning to integrate environmental ethics into its vision of a just society’,142 there 
are clear indications of a long-standing recognition of and concern over ecological problems and the 
climate crisis within the magisterium. Whilst a few politicians and economists continue to pour scorn 
on climate science and argue against action to mitigate global warming, there can be no doubt that 
for the Catholic Church, as for the scientific community, the accumulated evidence of anthropogenic 
climate forcing is unequivocal and greenhouse gas pollution has the status of a ‘sign of the times’ 
that Catholic theologians and lay-people are exhorted by the Church to reflect upon and integrate 
into their Christian faith and witness. 
In Renewing the Earth, the US bishops specifically called upon biblical scholars, theologians and 
ethicists to ‘help explore, deepen and advance the insights of our Catholic tradition and its relation 
to the environment’ and especially ‘the relationship between this tradition’s emphasis upon the 
dignity of the human person and our responsibility to care for all God’s creation’143 For Schaefer, the 
role of Catholic theologians seeking to be faithful to this calling is to use ‘our skills to identify, explain 
and demonstrate various theological perspectives from which to think about the human person in 
relation to one another and to other species, ecological systems and the biosphere of our planet that 
are imperilled now and will be imperilled into the future by our climate disruptive activities’.144 To 
aid us in this endeavour, Schaefer notes, Catholic theologians ‘have much upon which to draw when 
addressing the damage that humans are causing to one another, other species and our planetary 
home.’ 
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The data upon which we can rely span the Bible (the primary texts of our tradition), teachings over the 
centuries by eminent theologians who are revered in the Catholic tradition, documents issued by the 
Church magisterium, a growing array of theological reflections informed by scientific findings and 
discussions of ethical imperatives pertaining to the natural environment. When read through an 
ecological lens, this rich combination of sources can be helpful and meaningful for addressing ecological 
degradation generally and human-forced climate change specifically.’
145
  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude: this chapter has laid the foundation of my thesis, arguing that climate change is a sign 
of the times with which Catholics need to engage theologically. Section One has demonstrated that 
robust evidence exists to substantiate the existence of anthropogenic global warming which—as we 
have seen in Section Two—constitutes a global ecological emergency requiring the reconstruction of 
our energy infrastructure, giving rise to the need to draw on all the resources of our worldviews and 
value-systems to describe and address this challenge. As Section Three has shown, the magnitude of 
the challenge and the huge expected consequences of collective failure to address it strongly 
suggest that the climate crisis meets the criteria for recognition by the Church as a ‘sign of the 
times’. Furthermore, documentary evidence of its longstanding official acceptance as such within 
Roman Catholic social teaching suggests that the methodological approach adopted in this project 
can make an important contribution to Catholic ecotheology. Having made this argument we can 
now proceed to the main theological work of the thesis. My next chapter argues that Grisez’s 
methodology closely tracks the likely trajectory of future Catholic social teaching on the 
environment, such that his thought on ecological issues—the subject of Chapter Four—provides 
useful insight into likely future doctrinal developments. 
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Chapter 3: The Greening of the Papacy? 
Introduction 
Aims 
This thesis proposes a recovery of Germain Grisez’s orthodox Catholic environmental ethics and 
shows how applying his dialectical method to the climate crisis as a sign of the times allows us to 
extend his thought to the novel and pressing ethical questions of the Anthropocene. This chapter 
contributes to the larger aims of the project a defence of its choice of methodology and an attempt 
to contextualise this approach to the ecological crisis, both within the broader field of ecotheology 
and in relation to current Catholic social teaching on ecological questions.   
Argument 
The argument of this chapter is that the dialectical method in moral theology espoused by Germain 
Grisez, in which faith seeks understanding, can be a fruitful approach to reflection on the ecological 
crisis and to the formulation of strategies to address it that are appropriate within the Roman 
Catholic context. 
I shall argue on the one hand that scholars who construe ecotheology as a threat to Catholic 
orthodoxy direct their critiques against a straw man: whilst some individual ecotheologians have 
proposed theologically radical approaches, others have sought to construct an environmental ethics 
from within the tradition. As we shall see in Chapter Four, Germain Grisez provides an exemplar of 
this approach. Furthermore, one cannot consistently object to the dissenting views of radical 
ecotheologians whilst overlooking the authoritative teaching of the Church on ecological questions 
including the climate crisis. 
On the other hand, I shall argue that the frustration of some prominent ecotheologians with what 
they see as ecologically damaging anthropocentrism in current Catholic social teaching is in fact 
unwarranted. The Vatican position, if it can be said to be anthropocentric, is sufficiently nuanced to 
support extensive ecological values and principles. The primary problem that theologians need to 
address, I shall argue, is not the ecological inadequacy of Papal thought so much as a collective 
failure by the Catholic community to translate existing doctrine into strategies and initiatives to 
enable Catholics to live consistently with Church teaching on the environment. 
For these reasons, this thesis proposes the adoption of a dialectical methodology, reflecting on our 
environmental challenges from with the living truths of faith, in search of authentic Catholic 
responses to the ecological crisis which—in Chapter Two—we have established as a scientific reality 
and a ‘sign of the times’. Having thus established the gap in the literature that a Grisez School 
perspective on the ecological crisis is required to fill, we will be in a position to proceed to an 
examination of Germain Grisez’s environmental ethics—the fruit of his conscientious application of 
this methodology—to propose a rereading of his integral humanism in the light of this research and 
to suggest how we might extend his insights and approach to the climate crisis: this will be the task 
of Chapter Four.  
Grisez’s Methodology 
Germain Grisez defines theology as ‘talk about God and about everything else insofar as it is related 
to God.’ Positive theology reflects on the authoritative sources of the tradition in order to better 
 45 
understand the truths of faith, whilst systematic theology comprises contemplative theology which 
reflects on truth from other disciplines in the light of the truths of faith to achieve a larger synthesis, 
and moral theology which seeks to establish how a person of faith should live in response to 
salvation. For Grisez, theology is always subordinate and never superior to the normative 
expressions of the Church’s faith. He holds to the inerrancy of Holy Scripture146 and the infallibility of 
the teaching office of the Church as heir to the apostolic tradition.147 
The methodology Grisez adopts and espouses in moral theology he describes as ‘dialectical’. He 
defines ‘dialectic’ in the sense in which he employs the term as:  
A method of enquiry, distinct from the scientific method—in either the Aristotelian sense, the 
rationalist sense or the modern, empirical sense. Dialectic proceeds by revising the propositions one 
thinks true in the light of the whole set of truths one accepts. This is the appropriate method for 
theology; but here, unlike other forms of dialectic, the truths of faith are taken as fixed and 
unrevisable.148 
For Grisez it is characteristic of Catholic theologians to think with the Church, to conform their 
judgements to the doctrine of faith and to treat as erroneous every opinion which the Church 
condemns as such.149 The Grisez scholar’s task is to seek moral truth without compromising either 
fidelity to the Church or his or her own intellectual integrity. 
As Grisez describes it, the historical backdrop against which the Second Vatican Council called for 
renewal in moral theology was one in which the discipline had been infected with a spirit of 
rationalism, becoming too legalistic, and the balance between our human nature and our spiritual 
reality as adoptive children of God had been lost. In his view, contemporary moral theology has 
tended to over-react against the other-worldly tendencies in classical moral theology, resulting in an 
over-emphasis on the temporal at the expense of the eternal. Since his aim is to correct this and 
restore the balance between nature and grace, it seems unlikely that he would commend 
ecotheologies, such as that proposed by Sallie McFague, that call for more emphasis on the 
embodied and the immanent dimension of faith.150 Yet as I shall show in my next chapter, Grisez 
does not reject ecotheology as such; he carefully sifts through the Church’s teaching on the subject 
and seeks to construct an environmental ethics in the light of the received truths of his faith.  
Germain Grisez likens contemporary moral theology to a construction site, in which the building is 
only partly completed, while within there is an accumulation of material for use in the structure, as 
theologians step up to the task set by the Second Vatican Council.151 He agrees with Josef Fuchs that 
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‘no real tradition of the ideal moral theology contemplated by the Council exists today’152 and offers 
his project ‘The Way of the Lord Jesus’ in response to the recommendation of the Congregation for 
Catholic Education that up-to-date text books be provided to equip scholars and seminarians with 
the tools to further this constructive task.153 
The congregation cautions against various fashionable theologies, which are ‘one-sided, partial and 
sometimes unfounded’ and that inevitably arise and gain ground in this chaotic and fragmentary 
state of moral theology, in which order and completeness are lacking and the central truths of faith 
are easily lost to sight.154 Faced with an ecological crisis with the potential to overwhelm the capacity 
of our civilisation to adapt, there is a temptation to construct makeshift theologies rather than 
playing our small part in the painstaking project of renewal that is required. This thesis suggests that 
the ecological crisis is driven by the moral and spiritual crises of our times and we will need to bring 
back to full consciousness the founding values of Christendom in order to face up to the ecological 
challenge. Grisez’s methodology of ‘thinking with the Church’ is profoundly attractive as a means to 
intellectual penetration of Catholic tradition; for this reason I have chosen to centre this project on 
the recovery of Grisez’s environmentalism and its application to the climate challenge. It is clear 
from the paucity of literature on Grisez School ecology that this project addresses an important 
intellectual lacuna. This chapter seeks to contextualise the thesis within the diverse field of Catholic 
ecotheology, taking forward my overall argument for a recovery of Grisez’s environmentalism and 
application of his thought and his methodology to our ecological challenges.  
Section One: Critiques of Radical Green Spirituality 
The aim of this section is to examine some critiques of ‘radical green spirituality’ in order to 
demonstrate that the core objectives of environmentalism are fully compatible with Roman Catholic 
theological and moral orthodoxy. 
This section argues that scholars who construe ecotheology as a threat to Catholic faith and moral 
teaching paint a diverse field with a single brush: whilst some individual ecotheologians have 
proposed theologically radical approaches, others have sought to construct an environmental ethics 
from within the tradition. Furthermore, for consistency, conservative Catholic scholars who object to 
the dissenting views of radical theologians need to engage with the Church’s teaching on ecological 
questions including the climate crisis. 
How is ecotheology seen as a threat to orthodoxy? 
Introduction 
The alleged anthropocentrism of the Christian tradition is seen by many scholars as an impediment 
to ecological inclusivity but their calls for the Vatican to move beyond this human-centeredness are 
resisted by conservative theologians. As Donal Dorr notes, there are two interrelated objections to 
the adoption of a ‘geocentric’ position: firstly a concern that it denies or plays down the 
transcendence of God and secondly a concern that it denies the uniqueness of the human person. 
The former threatens the content of faith by calling into question the nature of God, whilst the latter 
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deconstructs traditional theological ethics built on the central concept of inalienable human dignity. 
Dorr himself advocates a ‘theological conversion’ corresponding to the ‘ecological conversion’ called 
for by Pope John Paul II: a rethinking of Catholic social teaching in the light of an ecological 
paradigm.155 In an article156 discussing early indications of a significant shift in emphasis towards 
ecology since the election of Pope Francis to the chair of St Peter, Dorr agrees with Paul Vallely157 
that on environmental issues the new pontiff ‘looks set to move the Church on to a more radical 
political agenda.’ His frustration with the intractable anthropocentrism of Vatican teaching under 
Benedict XVI is clear: 
My major regret about the teaching of Pope Benedict on the issue of ecology is that he, who is so 
committed on environmental issues, did not locate everything he had to say about human responsibility 
and business activity in this time of economic crisis within the broader context of the ecological crisis of 
our time. His teaching emerges from an older anthropocentric paradigm where ecological issues are 
related almost entirely in terms of present-day human concerns. What is needed today however is a 
kind of Copernican revolution leading to a major paradigm shift. We need to locate all our human 
concerns—and especially our approach to economics—within the far wider context of an ecological and 
cosmic vision. Nothing would be lost and much would be gained if what the Pope has written in Caritas 
in veritate and elsewhere about economics and ecology were framed within this wider vision.
158
  
In section two of this chapter we will examine the question of whether Catholic social teaching is 
accurately characterised as anthropocentric and to what extent this is problematic for Catholic 
ecological engagement. Before turning to this question, let us examine the two concerns Dorr 
identifies as crucial determinants of papal reluctance to ‘take the small extra step of moving from a 
nuanced anthropocentric approach to one that is more geocentric’: the alleged twin threats of 
pantheism and diminishment of human dignity.  
Is Ecotheology Pantheistic? 
The case for the prosecution 
In articulating the Church’s position on the status of nature, it is clear that the Vatican is concerned 
to chart a course between the Scylla of pantheism and the Charybdis of exploitative materialism. In 
Caritas in Veritate, Benedict XVI stresses that: 
It is contrary to authentic development to view nature as something more important than the human 
person. This position leads to attitudes of neo-paganism or a new pantheism—human salvation cannot 
come from nature alone, understood in a purely naturalistic sense. This having been said, it is also 
necessary to reject the opposite position, which aims at total technical domination over nature, 
because the natural environment is more than raw material to be manipulated at our pleasure.
159
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Germain Grisez suggests that the experience of awe and wonder aroused by the beauty and order of 
nature can lead to nature worship amongst those who deny or are forgetful of the creator God. 
Problematic ideologies and policies he sees as attributable to this theological error include the desire 
to preserve pristine ‘sacred’ tracts of nature from any human development, radical proposals to limit 
or reduce human population and a failure to take into account the burdens of environmental 
policies on the working poor.160 
For Robert Whelan the essential question for Christians concerning Green values and practices is: 
how compatible are they with orthodox Christian teaching? He detects in some rather bizarre 
examples of US environmental policy (such as the rule that only man-made fires should be 
extinguished in Yellowstone park ‘in the interests of returning the park’s ecology, as much as 
possible, to its natural state’) a ‘modern variant on Manichaeism which sees everything man-made 
as evil and everything natural as good.’ Whelan quotes passages from Lynn White’s argument that 
Judeo-Christian anthropocentrism is responsible for the exploitation and destruction of nature, 
concluding that:  
On almost every key point he was absolutely right. Christianity affords man [sic] a uniquely exalted 
position amongst the world’s religions. Not only is man made in the image and likeness of God, but God 
sent his only son to redeem us from sin and win us for eternal life. This has not been vouchsafed to any 
animal or plant species. Furthermore, Christianity has always been implacably opposed to all forms of 
animism and pantheism which characterised other ancient religions. For the Christian, there is certainly 
no need to ask permission of rivers to dam them or of mountains to mine them.
161
 
Whelan of course disagrees with White’s central aim: the point of White’s thesis—that the main 
impediment to the progress of environmental awareness in post-Christian Western cultures is the 
still pervasive Christian attitude towards the techno-scientific exploitation of nature—is to propose a 
reconstruction of Christian theology. For White: ‘more science and more technology are not going to 
get us out of the present ecological crisis until we find a new religion or rethink our old one.’162 
Whelan is using White’s argument to critique the theological radicalism he sees in the historical 
roots of the environmental movement: 
As Stephen Fox has shown in his history of environmentalism, White is only making public a strong anti-
Christian bias, which had existed in the environmentalist movement since its earliest days in the 
previous century. Fox shows that John Muir, who later founded the Sierra Club, Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Henry David Thoreau, who were all seminal figures in the development of environmentalism in 
North America, shared a strong pantheistic faith.
163
 
Whelan attributes the rise in New Age pantheistic environmentalism to a decline in support for 
Christianity leading to a search for some other deity to fulfil the basic human need to worship or at 
least to have ‘something to believe in.’164 Although he concedes that to present the whole of the 
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Green movement as the political wing of New Age ideology would be a ‘gross oversimplification’ he 
nevertheless argues that: 
It is only against the background of the New Age mysticism which informs the environmental 
movement that we can understand the motivation for the campaigns. Many of the goals 
which are being pursued in the name of the environment will not only curtail economic 
growth, but would also represent ever tightening restrictions on the liberty of the individual. 
Some of the most important are, at best, unnecessary and at worst a real threat to human 
well-being, such as energy taxes and laws which favour destructive animals and even vermin 
over human beings under the guise of preserving endangered species. To get people into the 
frame of mind to take such unpleasant medicine a formidable threat is required: everything 
hinges on the prospect of imminent ecological collapse.165  
On Whelan’s analysis, the environmental crisis—and especially the phenomenon of global 
warming—is not backed by compelling scientific evidence. He suggests that underlying anti-Christian 
religious heresy and ideological commitment to political outcomes such as ‘one world government, a 
single currency, universal taxation, the redistribution of wealth through a New World economic 
order and the allocation of food and other resources through global agencies’166 as well as a ‘halt to 
economic growth, an end of market economies and industrial development and an abandoning of 
the notion of ‘progress’ understood as improving the quality of life for human beings’167 are the real 
drivers behind the environmental movement, with the myth of impending ecological collapse a mere 
pretext for the pursuit of these political goals. He further asserts that: 
Fear of an environmental crisis has been used to introduce into Christian churches forms of worship 
which the Bible condemns, including the worship of other gods and liturgies celebrating inanimate 
nature. The acceptance of New Age teaching and rituals by many who describe themselves as 
Christians, and even by ministers of the Gospel, is also often due to concern for the environment.
168
 
Whelan insists that he is not arguing that Christians should not be concerned about the state of the 
environment. He argues that everything in the universe is God’s good creation, that we can learn to 
know God through the beauty and wonder of creation, and that we ‘can in some measure respond 
to his love for us by caring for it.’ For Whelan, the Christian approach to environmental problems 
must be based on the insights of the Christian faith, and must not mimic or repeat attitudes and 
beliefs which clearly come from a different spiritual perspective. But—in quoting with approval the 
view of Presbyterian pastor Peter Leithart—he seems to conclude that human sin is related only 
indirectly to environmental devastation, which is brought about by a wrathful God in response to 
idolatry, sexual immorality and other neopagan practices that have been allowed to pollute the 
sanctuary of Christian worship.169 
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The Defence 
Ecotheologians should concede the undeniable fact that there are pantheistic and Manichean 
elements within the environmental movement; Grisez correctly identifies environmental policy 
outcomes incompatible with Catholic social teaching that may be a direct result of constructing 
nature as sacred and all human intrusion as wrong and ecologically injurious. Whelan, however, 
begins with the assertion that the ecological crisis is a myth and goes on to suggest—without citing 
evidence to substantiate this claim—that environmental scare stories have been fabricated as a 
pretext for the pursuit of a ‘Liberal’ political agenda he rejects. His purpose in documenting 
pantheistic and neopagan strands in the thought of leading environmentalists—from John Muir and 
Ralph Waldo Emerson to Al Gore and Bill McKibben—appears to be the construction of a ‘straw 
man’—a caricature of ‘environmentalism’ that he seeks to discredit not through persuasive 
philosophical argument but through rhetorical moves intended to associate the Green movement 
with heresy and left-wing politics and Nazi ideology.170 On his own account he has ‘attempted to set 
out some of the reasons for which Christians might want to give the Green movement a wide berth’, 
yet if ordinary environmentalists are really the lost souls—misled by deceitful leaders into living in 
groundless fear of ecological collapse and desperately searching for something to believe in—that 
Whelan imagines, surely the Christian response should be to attempt to share ‘the hope that is in us’ 
and ‘the love that drives out fear’ with these people? In fact, as we shall see in the next section, 
Whelan is inconsistent on this point: in the conclusion to his essay on Green anti-humanism he 
declares: 
It is right that Christians should concern themselves with environmental problems. Making the physical 
world a better place to live in is one of the ways in which we can be the salt of the earth. However 
Christians are now being called upon to exercise a special ministry to the environmental movement, 
and that is to inject into it the values and priorities of the Bible.
171
  
Whelan’s worldview is at once politically and theologically conservative, but he does not distinguish 
between ‘the values and priorities of the Bible’ and the values and objectives of political 
conservativism, and hence does not seem to recognise the possibility that—under the broad banner 
of the environmental movement—individuals and groups might exist who share his orthodox 
Christianity but do not share his political loyalties, or even a species of environmentalist that shares 
both his theological and his political worldview, but is rationally persuaded by the scientific case for 
anthropogenic global warming and the pressing imperative of greenhouse gas abatement action. Yet 
examples of such individuals abound: Margaret Thatcher—who shared Whelan’s political 
commitment to free market Capitalism and economic growth and his scepticism of ‘big government’ 
solutions to environmental problems and resource distribution yet understood anthropogenic global 
warming as a real problem that we have a duty to address—being the most obvious example. This 
phenomenon may be more common in Europe than in the US,172 but even across the pond Mother 
Nature Network is able to identify seven leading Republicans who ‘get climate change’, beginning 
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with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.173 Rod Dreher calls such individuals ‘Crunchy 
Cons’.174 Roger Scruton’s carefully argued philosophical treatment of environmental issues, Green 
Philosophy, argues that conservativism is better suited to tackling environmental problems than 
either socialism or liberalism. On his view: 
The likelihood of global warming does not serve to lift environmental problems out of the spheres 
where the conservativism that I advocate gains a foothold: the spheres of inherited affections, national 
sovereignty, free enterprise and civic initiatives. Let us assume that it is true that man-made [sic] 
greenhouse gases pose a near and present danger to humanity, by threatening to create conditions to 
which we cannot adapt. Then we must learn to live in another way, so as to produce less gas; failing 
that we must follow the path of geo-engineering, and look for ways to counteract our emissions by 
cooling the planet, meanwhile striving to adapt to whatever change is unavoidable. The first of these 
ways involves sacrifice; the second involves research and determination, and a large element of risk […] 
either way, change, adaptation and remedial efforts will be the work of self-identifying nation states, 
and in particular of those nation states in which public spirit, enterprise and economic activity are all 
strong enough to bear a burden that might be at least as great as that involved in fighting a defensive 
war.
175
 
To sum up: Whelan’s critique of radical green spirituality, whilst it correctly identifies pantheistic 
tendencies in the writings of some of the founding fathers of American environmentalism an in the 
rhetoric of some prominent figures in ecotheology and in the environmental movement today, does 
not establish either that the movement as a whole is anti-Christian or that its rank and file have been 
misled by—or are in collusion with—leaders who have fabricated the idea of an ecological crisis as 
pretext for a left-wing policy agenda. Whelan does not engage seriously with the arguments of 
conservative Christian environmentalists, and the two papers he contributes to The Cross and the 
Rainforest contribute more to the unnecessary polarisation of debate than to the enterprise of 
authentic Christian ecotheology.  
Returning to Donal Dorr’s response to Vatican concerns about the divination of nature that ‘can 
readily be seen in certain ecological movements’176 with which we opened this section: Dorr 
complains that ‘it is unfair to assume that ecotheologians agree with those who divinise nature or 
adopt a pantheistic position.’177 However this seems to go too far in the opposite direction: whilst it 
may be unfair to assume this of all ecotheologians, there undoubtedly are numerous examples of 
scholars working in this field who have embraced the divination of Gaia,178 advocated neopagan 
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animism179 or broadened the scope of the incarnation’s significance to the point of blurring the 
distinction between God and creation.180 On the other hand, as Dorr points out, there are deeply 
committed ecotheologians like Denis Edwards—who argues in favour of a ‘biblical theocentric 
vision’181—and John Feehan, who grounds his concept of ethical kinship and consanguinity between 
all God’s creatures in Thomas Aquinas’s argument that nature is not intended primarily for us, but 
was created for God’s own pleasure.182  
So, on the question of whether ecotheology is necessarily a threat to Christian orthodoxy, I would 
conclude that it is not: whilst the field has historically been tolerant of radical, feminist and 
revisionist ecotheologies and inclusive of perspectives from other faiths including pagan and 
pantheist contributions, this has been in a spirit of working together with other people of faith and 
goodwill to address a complex global problem, as Catholics are mandated to do. The tasks of 
articulating an ecotheology that takes global warming seriously, from within the lived authenticity of 
Catholic—and of course also Protestant—traditional theologies is ongoing and involves numerous 
scholars around the world. It is my hope that this thesis will contribute a ‘Grisez School’ ecotheology 
to this larger endeavour. The task of Section Two of this chapter is to situate this project within the 
field of Catholic ecotheology—establishing the novelty of the approach adopted in this thesis. Before 
we turn to this task, however, we need to address the second nexus of concerns Dorr identifies as 
possible threats to Catholic orthodoxy associated with ecotheology: Is the rejection of 
anthropocentrism necessary to an adequate and effective environmental ethics and what impact 
would this proposed elimination ‘of the ontological and axiological difference between men [sic] and 
other living beings’ have on legal and theological concepts like inalienable human rights and the 
dignity of the human person as imago Dei?     
Does Biocentrism threaten the ascription of dignity to the human person? 
According to the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church: 
The Magisterium finds the motivation for its opposition to a concept of the environment based on 
ecocentrism and on biocentrism in the fact that ‘it is being proposed that the ontological and axiological 
difference between men and other living things be eliminated, since the biosphere is considered a 
                                                          
179
 Mark Wallace purports to rediscover the pagan roots of Christianity, taking—as Celia Deane-Drummond 
puts it—a ‘bold turning towards uncharted territory’. See Deane-Drummond, Ecotheology, pp. 134–138; 
quoting Mark Wallace, Fragments of the Spirit: Nature, Violence and the Renewal of Creation (Harrisburg; 
Trinity Press International, 2002). See also Mark Wallace, Finding God in the Singing River, (Minneapolis; 
Fortress Press, 2005); and Mark Wallace, Green Christianity: Five Ways to a Sustainable Future (Minneapolis; 
Fortress Press, 2010). 
180
 Celia Deane-Drummond is critical of this tendency which she sees in the work of Sallie McFague: Deane-
Drummond, Ecotheology, pp. 212–213, n. 5, quoting Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology 
(Minneapolis; Fortress Press, 1993). 
181
 Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith: The Change of Heart that leads to a New Way of Living on 
Earth (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006); quoted in Dorr, Option for the Poor and for the Earth, p. 433. 
182
 John Feehan, The Singing Heart of the World: Creation, Evolution and Faith (Dublin; Columba Press and 
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2012); quoted in Dorr, Option for the Poor and for the Earth, p. 433. 
 53 
biotic unity of undifferentiated value. Thus man’s superior responsibility can be eliminated in favour of 
an egalitarian consideration of the ‘dignity’ of all living beings.’
183
  
Germain Grisez argues that human rights depend entirely on the theological assertion of unique 
‘human dignity’, and he takes the view that ascription of rights to animals threatens the traditional 
respect for the sanctity of human life enshrined in Catholic social teaching which is implacably 
opposed to the social trend towards permissive legislation on issues such as abortion, euthanasia 
and assisted suicide. It is worth looking at his argument in full, as it throws light on some of the 
reasons behind the Vatican reluctance to jettison anthropocentricism altogether that Dorr and other 
ecotheologians favouring a paradigm shift to biocentric ethics find so frustrating: 
Some philosophers argue that animals have rights just as people do. As it is most commonly explained, 
the position is that humans have rights because they have interests which others’ actions can fulfil 
(leading to satisfaction) or frustrate (leading to pain); but animals in various degrees—higher animals 
more, lower ones less—also have interests whose fulfilment or frustration causes them pleasure or 
pain; so, animals too have rights. Ascribing rights to animals leads directly to showing them deference 
even to the detriment of humans, for instance, some proponents of animal rights have interfered with 
the use of animals in medical and pharmaceutical research. Perhaps even more important, the theory 
of rights presupposed by most animal rights proponents implies that, while any mature and normal 
mammal has some rights, unborn and newborn human individuals have none whatsoever. Since the 
theory of animal rights has such implications, it is useful to explain why animals have no rights.
184
 
Grisez goes on to argue that proponents of animal rights reject the Christian view of persons and 
cannot account for moral obligation. On his view, a sound account of moral obligation excludes 
animal rights, although this account—as I shall show in chapter four of this thesis—is entirely 
compatible, for Grisez, with the assertion of human duties to refrain from cruelty to animals and 
even to treat them with positive kindness and to respect their inherent value as God’s good 
creatures. My purpose here however is to examine the question as to whether, if the Vatican were 
to take the ‘short step’ Dorr and others advocate—from a nuanced anthropocentrism to affirmation 
of inherent value in nature—this would, as many writers including Grisez have argued, involve the 
simultaneous jeopardising of central tenets of the traditional sanctity of life position? Is 
anthropocentrism an essential ingredient of an authentic Catholic pro-life ethics?  
As we shall see in Section Two of this chapter, there is actually some interesting dispute between 
contemporary Catholic scholars as to whether or not CST is appropriately characterised as 
anthropocentric and whether—if it is—this has the implications for applied ethics that 
ecotheologians calling for a ‘Copernican revolution’ towards an earth-centred moral theology 
suppose. In chapter four I shall argue that Grisez’s own environmental ethics is a very long way from 
being ‘anthropocentric’ in the pernicious, destructive sense attributed to our Judeo-Christian 
heritage generally by Lynn White and others. The debate seems to me to be much more subtle than 
most scholars appreciate: the choice is not simply between a destructive anthropocentrism and an 
anti-humanist biocentrism. Other intermediate positions are possible: anthropocentric ethics may be 
more or less nuanced and ecocentric positions more or less pro-life and respectful of human dignity. 
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This thesis argues for a Catholic ‘ecological humanism’ as a possibility for the development of CST in 
the future, based on my analysis of Grisez’s environmental ethics which—on my reading—goes 
beyond the current Vatican position but is wholly compatible with other strands of the traditional 
teaching.  
However, returning to the task at hand, since it is clear that the impact of ecocentric ethics on the 
rights of vulnerable human persons is central to Grisez’s rejection of the possibility of ‘animal rights’, 
it is worth examining his argument to see whether in fact a position respectful of both human and 
animal rights might be compatible with Catholic teaching. An example of one attempt to bridge this 
divide is the work of contemporary Catholic moral theologian Charles Camosy who advocates what 
he calls a ‘consistent pro-life ethics.’ Camosy is open to the idea of animal rights and argues for the 
inclusion of animals within the circle of beings to which we owe moral consideration as a matter of 
justice (which is not quite the same thing, as we shall see).185  
Donal Dorr sums up Vatican objections to ‘ecological egalitarianism’ and animal rights activism: 
There is no doubt that there are some who have adopted an extreme position. Outraged about “factory 
farming,” overfishing, irresponsible genetic modification of animals and plants, and other instances of 
human exploitation of other species, they adopt a position of “ecological egalitarianism” and maintain 
that other species have just the same rights as human beings. Indeed some of them seem, at times, to 
be more concerned about cats or dogs or lions than about humans.  In insisting on the priority of 
“human ecology,” John Paul and Benedict are reacting against this view that would reject or play down 
the distinctiveness of humans, claiming that the “rights” of animals and plants are equal to those of 
humans—if not in fact superior to them.
186
 
Robert Whelan reports a string of anti-human comments from proponents of animal rights, from 
Oscar Wilde’s satirical comment that ‘those who live on lentils and artichokes are always calling for 
the gore of the aristocracy and for the severed heads of Kings’187 to Ingrid Newkirk of PeTA who 
declares: ‘Animal liberationists do not separate out the human animal, so there is no rational basis 
for saying that a human being has special rights […] I don’t believe that human beings have “the right 
to life” […] this “right to human life” I believe is another perversion’188 and the truly appalling view 
expressed by Dave Foreman of ‘Earth First!’ on famine relief work in Africa, that: ‘The worst thing we 
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could do in Ethiopia is to give aid—the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, to 
let the people there just starve.’189 
It is possible that a number of different factors influence the undeniable phenomenon of anti-
humanist elements in the environmental movement. One factor seems to be the attribution of 
ecological degradation not to human sin but to human existence, or at least—it is argued—to our 
unsustainable population explosion. This leads to the kind of rhetoric in which human beings are 
categorised as a ‘plague’ or a ‘cancer’ in relation to a healthy ecosystem. Another factor that might 
be operative is that animal rights activists, having read and agreed with Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation, sometimes go on to read his work on medical ethics and—especially if they have already 
rejected the religious worldview of their upbringing or have no personal experience of religion that 
commands their loyalty—find his philosophical arguments in favour of abortion, euthanasia and 
assisted suicide persuasive. Certainly Singer’s work has been immensely influential and widely read 
by the general public as well as by students of philosophy. In addition to his well-known defence of 
animal liberation (contrary to popular perception he does not in fact himself argue for ‘animal 
rights’) Singer sees himself as leading a moral revolution, clearing away the last irrational vestiges of 
our essentially religious ‘sanctity of life’ ethic: 
The patching could go on, but it is hard to see a long and beneficial future for an ethic as paradoxical, 
incoherent and dependent on pretence as our conventional sanctity of life ethic has become […] it is 
time for another Copernican revolution. It will be, once again, a revolution against a set of ideas we 
have inherited from the period in which the intellectual world was dominated by a religious outlook.
190
 
It is perhaps not surprising then, if the Catholic Church—hearing the simultaneous clamour for a 
paradigm shift or Copernican revolution in our traditional ethics from ecotheologians and from 
opponents of our sanctity of life ethic (especially if some of those calling for a shift towards 
biocentric ethics are in fact the same people who are advocating for abortion, euthanasia and 
population control)—might be concerned that conceding to one would in effect amount to 
embracing both these agendas. However the question we need to pose is whether or not such a 
connection inevitably exists at a philosophical level? If it does, it will be clear that worries that the 
taint of biocentrism in the hypothetical development of Vatican teaching in that direction in fact 
threatens other areas of traditional ethics in a way that Catholics would wish to avoid. 
Scholars have developed a whole range of different philosophical constructions of the ethical 
question of human relationship to other animals and to the natural world more generally; it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to give a complete account of the vast literature on this subject. 
However, in answer to Grisez’s concern that proponents of animal rights reject the Christian view of 
persons; this is clearly true of Singer who, as we have seen, describes himself as spearheading a 
revolution to purge the last vestiges of an irrational Judeo-Christian sanctity of life ethic from our 
legal system. It is less clear whether or not Tom Regan, author of a quite different and extremely 
influential account of animal rights, can reasonably be said to advocate the diminishment of moral 
and legal protection of vulnerable human persons. Grisez argues that Regan’s view is dependent 
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on—since it is developed by dialectic with—the more common, utilitarian view, of which he treats 
Singer’s articulation as typical. As Grisez notes, Regan argues for vegetarianism and the cessation of 
experiments on mature mammals, but considers the rights of unborn and newborn human beings ‘a 
special problem to which he offers only a tentative solution.’191 Regan’s argument on this point 
repays closer attention: he begins by setting up as a possible objection to the animal rights view he 
himself advocates—one that is remarkably similar to the objection that Grisez himself raises—which 
he then proceeds to deconstruct. This objection, Regan explains: 
contests the rights view because of its alleged implications concerning abortion and infanticide. Since 
individuals who are not subjects-of-a-life are not recognised as having rights, according to the rights 
view, and since neither human foetuses nor newborn infants are subjects-of-a-life, it follows, so it is 
alleged, that the rights view implies that we may do anything we please to human foetuses and infants. 
Since no moral theory can be adequate if it has this implication, however, the rights view is not the 
adequate theory its advocates suppose.
192
  
Regan replies to this anticipated objection that the rights view he advocates advances the subject-of-
a-life criterion as a sufficient condition for possessing inherent value and by implication basic moral 
rights, but does not assert that this is a necessary condition for a being to be ascribed rights. This is 
an important distinction: an animal is a subject-of-a-life, on Regan’s view, if it is possessed of the 
intelligence and introspection to perceive itself as an entity that has an anticipated future and would 
therefore be wronged, if killed and thereby deprived of the realisation of this anticipation, in a way 
that a sentient being lacking in such self-awareness would not; but Regan does not assert that beings 
who do not fulfil the subject-of-a-life criterion therefore cannot or should not be ascribed any rights. 
In fact even Singer’s preference utilitarianism does not require the conclusion that we are free to do 
‘anything we please’—to borrow Regan’s phrase—to sentient beings lacking the capacity for self-
awareness. Regan—who makes an animal rights case for vegetarianism—would allow such beings a 
‘right’ not to be killed and eaten. It is hard to imagine how this position could be consistent with 
proposals that society should allow sentient beings such as comatose patients or unborn children to 
be killed. Singer, who is himself a vegetarian but nevertheless argues that humanely killing and 
eating certain categories of sentient being cannot be said to ‘wrong them,’ does not argue that there 
are no ethical boundaries on the types of treatment to which they should normally be subjected. Of 
course, for Singer, it seems that the overall weighing of utility does imply that in cases where there is 
a conflict between the interests of the individual and the overall maximisation of utility, the normal 
rules may be overridden; Regan’s theory, by contrast, would seem to imply that ‘rights’ are not 
vulnerable to any overriding consequentialist calculation.  
Regan further argues that the rights view does not assert that human foetuses and infants fail to 
satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion. He explains: 
The status of human infants and foetuses in this regard is controversial. It is not obviously true that the 
newly born or soon-to-be-born have beliefs, desires and the like, and neither is it obviously true that 
they lack these mental attributes. Whether or not they do, in short, is an open and much debated 
question. Though it is beyond the scope of the present work to enter into this debate, it should be clear 
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that the rights view leaves the question central to this debate an open question. And that is a virtue, 
not a vice, of this view.
193
 
Furthermore, Regan argues, even if we assert that human foetuses and infants do not satisfy the 
subject-of-a-life criterion, and that they lack any rights—neither of which he himself asserts—it 
would not follow that we are at liberty to do whatever we please with them. 
The rights view advocates taking steps that foster the creation of a moral climate where the rights of 
the individual are taken very seriously indeed. Better then, to adopt a policy that errs on the side of 
caution when the recognition of moral rights is at issue. Precisely because it is unclear where we should 
draw the line between those humans who are, and those who are not, subjects-of-a-life, and in view of 
our profound ignorance about the comparative mental sophistication of newly born and soon-to-be-
born human beings, the rights view would advocate giving infants and viable human foetuses the 
benefit of the doubt, viewing them as if they were subjects-of-a-life, as if they have basic moral rights, 
even while conceding that, in viewing them in these ways, we may be giving them more than is their 
due […] it is the importance of fostering an environment in which individual rights are respected […] 
that underpins the serious moral protection extended to newly-born and soon-to-be-born human 
beings.
194
 
It seems then that the moral protection of human foetuses and infants is not necessarily 
incompatible with the ascription of rights to animals and a nuanced biocentrism that does not 
require that even animals—leaving aside the contested moral status of other biological entities—
should be accorded either some moral rights or full moral equivalence with human beings would 
seem to be a theoretical possibility. Defending his version of Catholic animal rights against 
Christopher Tollefsen’s view that non-human animals—as a sub-set of God’s creation—are ‘in some 
sense, created as a gift for human beings’ and that membership of the justice community depends 
upon moral equivalence between human beings and prospective new members, Charles Camosy 
argues that: 
Tollefsen represents a generation of pro-lifers who grew up believing that those concerned with moral 
treatment of animals were the enemy. They had good reason to think this: Peter Singer and others in 
the early animal rights movement explicitly connected concern for animals with disregard for the value 
of human life, and especially the lives of prenatal children. But this is no longer the case of [sic] the pro-
life movement of the contemporary era, especially as more and more young defenders of human life 
are also convinced that they must live lives consistent with serious moral concern for animals. This 
should not be surprising. The fundamental moral orientation of pro-lifers concerns itself with protecting 
vulnerable populations—especially victims of horrific violence. Pro-lifers are particularly sensitive to the 
marginalization of the voiceless whose dignity is inconvenient to those who have power over them. 
That more pro-lifers are now becoming a voice for just treatment of both animals and prenatal children 
does not imply a false moral equivalence between these two concerns. Rather, it demonstrates that—
when stripped of the political baggage that characterized the relationship in the 1970s and ’80s—the 
pro-life and pro-animal movements share much of their moral orientation in common.
195
  
To sum up, I have argued in this section that the twin threats Dorr identifies as associated with 
biocentric ethics and, in his view, responsible for the persistent anthropocentric focus of Vatican 
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teaching: namely the taint of pantheism and the connection between the ascription of rights to 
animals and the removal of protection for the rights of pre-natal and neo-natal children are not 
necessarily entailed by a sufficiently nuanced biocentrism. I would conclude that it is theoretically 
possible to construct an authentic Catholic ecotheology without radically reconstructing traditional 
doctrines concerning the nature of God or the nature of justice requirements within the human 
community. In doing so there are two already well-articulated options: One could argue for a scaled 
biocentrism, as Camosy does, based on a concept of species-appropriate dignity grounding a 
hierarchical assignment of rights to other animals and biological entities, or alternatively one could 
argue—as Grisez does, as I shall show in my next chapter—for unique human dignity and rights 
coupled with a concept of inherent value in nature. 
For Dorr, it seems that recognition of inherent value in nature196 is a central part of the development 
towards biocentrism he hopes the present pontiff will signal in his forthcoming encyclical on the 
environment. On Dorr’s interpretation, the current stance of Catholic social teaching does not go 
quite that far in accommodating the agenda of the ecotheologians, although he sees Benedict XVI’s 
notion of nature’s grammar as a helpful development that brought him tantalisingly close to taking 
the final ‘short step’ towards actually endorsing the notion that each of the elements of nature has 
its own inherent value. This is interesting, since it should be clear that Grisez’s theological 
methodology requires him to think and reflect with the Church not in opposition to it and he clearly 
would not construe his own environmental ethics as a theological innovation or a radical departure 
from received moral doctrine. Likewise, Camosy clearly sees his role as a moral theologian as the 
faithful articulation of the Catholic tradition in our contemporary context and the attempt to live 
consistently with Catholic principles. Again, he does not share with the majority of ecotheologians 
the desire for a radical restructuring of Catholic theological ethics.  
So as we can see there is an interesting scholarly debate over the actual content and correct 
interpretation of Catholic social teaching on this issue. In order to adjudicate this debate, in the 
interests of gaining a clearer understanding of the Church’s current position and to speculate as to 
how this might develop under Francis’s pontificate, in the light of the climate challenge and the 
increasing urgency of ethical questions pertaining to the relationship of our species to animals and 
other aspects of creation, it will be necessary to look more closely at Dorr’s thesis that CST currently 
articulates an ecologically damaging anthropocentrism. Hence the aim of my next section is to 
examine the extent to which recent papal teaching can be said to be anthropocentric but 
undergoing a progressive ‘greening’ and to what extent what Dorr refers to as a ‘highly nuanced 
anthropocentrism’ in fact frustrates the objectives of the environmental movement.  
Section Two: Critiques of CST on Ecology 
In this section, I shall argue that the frustration of some prominent ecotheologians with what they 
see as ecologically damaging anthropocentrism in current Catholic social teaching is in fact 
unwarranted. Vatican anthropocentrism is highly nuanced and capable of supporting extensive 
ecological values and principles. The primary problem that theologians need to address, I shall 
argue, is not the ecological inadequacy of Papal thought so much as a collective failure by the 
Catholic community to translate existing doctrine into strategies and initiatives to enable Catholics 
to live consistently with Church teaching on the environment.  
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This section will address the question: ‘has there been a “greening” of Catholic social teaching in 
response to the ecological crisis?’ This is the crux of Dorr’s thesis in chapter eighteen of his Option 
for the Poor and for the Earth as we have seen in the previous section. Yet Charles Camosy’s Catholic 
animal rights ecotheology and Germain Grisez’s endorsement of inherent value in nature suggest 
the possibility of an alternative construction of recent Church history: that green values are in fact 
deeply embedded in the Catholic tradition, such that the context of increased ecological concerns 
and reflection on these ‘signs of the times’ has led to a recovery of environmentalism from within 
the Church’s own inherent resources rather than a progressive reconstruction of Catholic moral 
theology towards accommodating the agenda of radical ecotheology. So my first question will be: 
does this dominant narrative of a ‘greening of the papacy’ accurately describe the evolution of 
Vatican thought on ecology? As we shall see, this question is much more complex than we might 
initially suppose. We need to ask whether the Catholic tradition is correctly characterised as 
anthropocentric—as many ecotheologians uncritically presuppose—and if so, whether this 
perspective is necessarily opposed to ecological values of stewardship and sustainability. If a closer 
analysis reveals that the tradition is not anthropocentric, this would raise interesting theoretical 
questions concerning the possibilities open to Pope Francis as he reflects upon our deepening 
ecological crisis. It would also beg the question as to whether a shift in emphasis towards designing 
more effective strategies and initiatives through which CST might be put into practice by faithful 
Catholic congregations might be a more fruitful direction for ecotheology than further advocacy for 
a radical paradigm shift in moral theology that—I would suggest—contributes to an unhelpful 
perception of the field as inherently revolutionary and associated with unsound moral philosophy 
and theological heresy.       
The dominant narrative—derived from the work of a number of influential scholars—has been one 
of a progressive development of recent papal thought towards an ecological reconstruction of the 
central principles of the common good tradition. This historical construction suggests a critical-
creative methodology as an appropriate theological approach to the perceived ecological 
shortcomings endemic within social Catholicism. On the other hand, if—as I shall argue—the 
premise of this narrative is at least not unassailable, it opens up the possibility that an alternative 
methodology—one that seeks to illuminate the ecological crisis with the unchanging light of moral 
truth whilst respecting the integrity and coherence of the doctrinal corpus197—might be appropriate 
and potentially fruitful. Having thus explained the rational for this project’s choice of methodology, 
and situated the contribution of this thesis to the field of Catholic ecotheology, we shall proceed—in 
chapter four—to an in-depth examination of the environmental ethics of one very eminent and 
influential American conservative Catholic theologian Germain Grisez.    
The Dominant Narrative: The Greening of the Papacy 
My aim in this section is to examine the perceived evolution of some key conceptual elements of 
Catholic social teaching within the work of a selection of Catholic ecotheologians. One might begin 
                                                          
197
‘[T]here is a single teaching, consistent and at the same time ever new. It is one thing to draw attention to 
the particular characteristics of one Encyclical or another, of the teaching of one Pope or another, but quite 
another to lose sight of the coherence of the overall doctrinal corpus. Coherence does not mean a closed 
system: on the contrary, it means dynamic faithfulness to a light received. The Church's social doctrine 
illuminates with an unchanging light the new problems that are constantly emerging. This safeguards the 
permanent and historical character of the doctrinal “patrimony” which, with its specific characteristics, is part 
and parcel of the Church's ever-living Tradition’ Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate #12. 
 60 
by offering an account of this evolutionary process as it is expounded by each of these scholars 
individually. The advantage of this approach would be to highlight their differences in the nuances of 
analysis and recommendation for doctrinal revision. I have eschewed this approach here. Instead I 
have chosen to organise this chapter conceptually, separately discussing the pertinent principles of 
the Catholic tradition that are said to be evolving in response to heightened ecological concern. This 
serves to emphasise the underlying narrative of a ‘greening of the papacy’ which—I shall argue—is 
common to the work of these otherwise quite diverse scholars. In order to paint this bigger picture, 
my treatment of individual ecotheologians will necessarily be somewhat impressionistic; my hope is 
that this will not be at the expense of over-simplification. Firstly, I shall consider the idea of an 
ecological expansion of the preferential option for the poor—drawing mainly on the work of Donal 
Dorr and Jame Schaefer—and secondly, I shall examine the evidence for an evolution in the central 
tenets of the common good tradition—solidarity and subsidiarity—and the expansion of the scope of 
the concept of the common good itself as constructed within this dominant narrative of a ‘greening’ 
of Vatican teaching.  
The Preferential Option for the Poor 
The first edition of Donal Dorr’s Option for the Poor surveyed one hundred years of Vatican social 
teaching; in 2012 the book, having been extensively revised, was reissued under the title Option for 
the Poor and for the Earth. As the author explains: ‘it has become much clearer in the intervening 
years that there is an inseparable link between an option for the poor and an option for the earth; 
so, I have greatly expanded my treatment of the ecological issue […] chapter 18 is an extended 
examination of the issue of ecology as it has been treated in documents from the Vatican for over 
half a century.’198 Dorr charts the history of environmentalism in recent Catholic social teaching, 
critiquing what he sees as its recalcitrant anthropocentricism, the insufficient urgency of Papal calls 
to respond to the crisis and the failure to integrate the ecological dimension as the context within 
which all our human concerns—and especially our approach to economics—now need to be located. 
Dorr calls for a theological conversion corresponding to John Paul II’s call for ‘ecological conversion’, 
namely ‘the rethinking of Catholic social teaching in the light of an ecological paradigm.’199  
The idea of an ‘option’200 or ‘preference’ for the poor—for Dorr the central organising principle of 
Catholic social teaching—has deep roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition. As Jame Schaefer explains: 
‘admonitions to attend to the poor and vulnerable permeate the prophetic books of the Hebrew 
Bible and the teachings and life of Jesus’201 Drawing on this scriptural foundation ‘the bishops of the 
Roman Catholic Church have consistently taught that the basic test of a society from a Christian 
perspective is how its most vulnerable people are faring and they instruct the faithful to put the 
needs of the poor and vulnerable first when making and carrying out decisions individually and in 
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association with others at all levels of governance.’202  As the US Catholic Bishops have expressed 
this principle: 
From the scriptures and church teaching we learn that the justice of a society is tested by the treatment 
of the poor. The justice that was a sign of God’s covenant with Israel was measured by how the poor 
and unprotected—the widow, the orphan and the stranger were treated. The kingdom that Jesus 
proclaimed in his word and ministry excludes no one. Throughout Israel’s history and in early 
Christianity, the poor are agents of God’s transforming power. ‘The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, 
therefore he has anointed me. He has sent me to bring glad tidings to the poor (Luke 4:18). This was 
Jesus’s first public utterance. Jesus takes the side of those most in need. In the Last Judgement, so 
dramatically described in St Matthew’s Gospel, we are told that we will be judged according to how we 
respond to the hungry, the thirsty, the naked, the stranger. As followers of Christ, we are challenged to 
make a fundamental option for the poor—to speak for the voiceless, to defend the defenceless, to 
assess life-styles, policies and social institutions in terms of their impact on the poor.
203
 
Since the first great social encyclical, Rerum novarum, in which Leo XIII protested the miserable 
condition of the working poor in emerging industrial economies, the Roman Catholic Church has 
consistently stressed the importance of giving preference to the needs of the poor, the suffering and 
the vulnerable in our moral deliberations and in Christian social action. This principle is closely 
associated with the doctrine of ‘the universal destination of goods’: as the Fathers and Doctors of 
the Church taught, and the second Vatican Council reaffirmed,204 there is an obligation to come to 
the relief of the poor and that this principle overrides the duty to respect private property in cases of 
destitution.205 As Jame Schaefer points out, however, the ‘preference for the poor’ in Catholic social 
teaching is not an adversarial slogan206 that pits one group or against another in a Marxist class 
struggle. Although the phrase ‘option for the poor’ originates from Latin American liberation 
theology, Dorr comments—correctly in my judgement—that Benedict XVI’s use of the term: 
does not link it to a clear choice to be on the side of those who resist oppression and who are willing 
not only to struggle for justice but to do so by sharp contestation with those who oppress them. There 
is no indication that Benedict himself experiences such contestation and struggle as intrinsic to his own 
spirituality […] a better way to describe the stance of Benedict is to say that it involves not so much an 
option for the poor in the sense in which the term is properly understood; for him it is more of a matter 
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of having a preferential concern for the poor, linked to a deep and well-grounded commitment to 
justice in the world.
207
  
For Dorr the notion of an option for the poor ‘retains its full meaning, its implications and its 
challenge only as part of a spirituality that values and emphasises the concept of liberation, with its 
background of social analysis and its overtones of contestation and struggle.’208 Be this as it may, it is 
clear—as Dorr acknowledges—that this is not the sense in which the term is used in Vatican 
teaching. 
The fruits of this principle, when applied consistently with Catholic social teaching, far from fuelling 
class divisions in society, should be the enabling of disadvantaged people not only to meet their own 
consumption needs but to become active participants in the life of society, contributing to and 
sharing in the common good. The deprivation and powerlessness of the poor wounds the whole 
community; the extent of their suffering is a measure of how far we are from being a true 
community of persons whose inalienable dignity is respected and whose capacity for flourishing is 
not structurally impeded by exclusion or injustice in our society.  
Within liberation theology, the preferential option for the poor is closely connected with the 
‘epistemological privilege of the poor’. The poor—in their struggle against the alienation and despair 
of poverty—tend to be more dependent on God and spiritually closer to him than those who are 
confident of being able to rely on their own resources. They live in the place—poverty—where God 
has taken preferred root in order to support and comfort the afflicted.209 God chose the weak to 
shame the strong210 and makes them his privileged instruments in reading the signs of the times and 
sharing in Christ’s saving work. Thus, in the project of alleviating poverty and creating a just social 
order, the knowledge and experience of the poor themselves is a valuable resource; the project 
requires their socio-political empowerment so that they are enabled to be drivers of the social 
justice agenda not mere recipients of relief or patronage.   
For Dorr, the option for the poor is actualised through commitment by individual Catholics and the 
Church actively to engage at every level in a struggle to overcome the social injustices that mar our 
world. To be genuine it must not perpetuate the powerlessness and dependency of disadvantaged 
people, instead it should arise out of a genuine experience and expression of solidarity as we share 
in the lives, ‘the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially 
those who are poor or in any way afflicted’. In order for the whole Church to embody her operant 
theology in authentic practice and reflection—and to function as the matrix from which official 
teaching emerges211—it is therefore crucial for individual Catholics to live and work amongst the 
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vulnerable and marginalised and to share in their struggle for social justice, since in so doing we are 
enabled to share in what Dorr calls ‘the view from below’, a perspective to which those cocooned by 
wealth and status are infrequently exposed.  
An Option for the Earth as an Emerging Principle of CST 
As we have seen, for Dorr, the option for the poor in Catholic social thought is not just one amongst 
several guiding principles, rather, it functions as the central motif of authentic Catholicism tying 
together and colouring our perception of other elements of Church teaching such as property rights, 
solidarity, subsidiarity, participation and human rights.212Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that 
Dorr introduces the growing awareness within the Church of our looming ecological crisis with an 
impassioned plea for climate justice, which he advocates on behalf of voiceless future generations 
and those most vulnerable to—and least able to adapt to—devastating changes that are already 
causing huge problems for disadvantaged people. Noting, as specific examples, the effects of sea-
level rise on the inhabitants of Pacific atolls and river deltas in countries like Bangladesh, as well as 
glacial depletion in the Himalayas—which threatens fresh water supplies for millions of people—and 
droughts in eastern and southern Africa caused by changes to rainfall patterns, Dorr insists that ‘the 
question of “eco-justice” must now be treated as an overriding issue of the social justice agenda, the 
background against which all international and national planning decisions about economics need to 
be taken. The problem of global climate change will not be solved, Dorr warns, unless we are 
prepared to accept the personal moral challenge posed by the eco-justice agenda and to reconsider 
both our own lifestyle choices and the values we choose to stand for in electing our politicians: 
In recent years it has become increasingly obvious that even our most pressing economic and political 
problems need to be situated within the context of the ecological issues that threaten life on Earth as 
we have come to know it. This is the background against which we need to deal with all the other issues 
of the social justice agenda.
213
  
This analysis of the climate crisis and related ecological problems in terms of their effects on 
vulnerable human beings is certainly a strong argument for Catholic engagement in advocating 
greenhouse gas mitigation efforts as an imperative of social and intergenerational justice. If, as Dorr 
argues, the fundamental option for the poor is the pivotal concept in Catholic social teaching, its 
extension—to embrace the ecological causes of social injustice and conflict—brings action for 
climate justice under the wider umbrella of Catholic responses to issues of justice, peace and social 
responsibility. This makes sustainability central to the Church’s mission to ‘make salvation 
integral’,214 and central to the apostolic responsibility of all Catholics as they each live out their 
individual vocation as a specific embodiment of our shared faith and calling.   
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Even in the absence of a Liberation theology perspective giving centrality to the ‘option for the poor’ 
in Catholic social teaching, there is a clear mandate for all Catholics to engage in local action to give 
concrete expression to other Catholic principles, such as the call for ecological conversion, through 
projects and initiatives to enable the transition to sustainability. As Celia Deane-Drummond 
comments: ‘the call for ecological conversion is theologically conservative in that it does not demand 
a weakening of the place of the human, but calls for a fundamental awareness of the 
interconnectedness of human beings to all forms of life and human responsibility in the light of that 
interconnection.’215 Yet active Catholic engagement in ecological conversion, including the lifestyle 
change required for its implementation and clearly mandated as an imperative of Vatican teaching, 
would hardly be politically conservative in its effects—if ‘conservative’ is interpreted as tending to 
perpetuate ‘business as usual’ economic activity without regard for ecological and social 
externalities. As Dorr comments in relation to Benedict XVI’s vision for economic restructuring in 
Caritas in veritate—which in my view provides a blueprint for the future green economy—there is 
unfortunately little evidence that serious efforts have been made by lay Catholics to actualise this 
vision216 through entrepreneurial endeavour; yet—as Dorr puts it—if a sufficient number of 
Christians and other people of goodwill were to take Caritas in veritate seriously and act upon it, 
‘this could change the world.’217 Projects seeking to respond to the call for ecological conversion can 
further the environmental agenda even where the motivation behind them is purely 
anthropocentric. Certainly there is much to be gained, both for the Church and for the 
environmental movement, in putting aside philosophical differences in order to work together as 
people of faith and goodwill on practical projects towards the achievement of shared climate justice 
goals.  
However the question remains as to whether the Catholic tradition is correctly categorised by 
ecotheologians as anthropocentric, and whether this species bias needs to be renounced in order for 
Vatican teaching to appropriately embody an ecological ethic in the light of the climate crisis. As 
regards both of these questions, Nairn, Schaefer and Dorr join with other voices in ecotheology218 in 
critiquing the inherent anthropocentricism of the tradition and recommending a paradigm shift 
towards ecocentricism as the remedy for its philosophical deficiencies. The argument that traditional 
Christian anthropocentricism is incompatible with an ecological ethic—and the corollary that, 
historically, Christian beliefs have been a major driver of ecological damage—was, as we have noted, 
most famously espoused by historian Lynn White.219 Notwithstanding a huge literature devoted to 
Christian attempts to refute this thesis, the ecological perniciousness and hence the pressing need to 
overcome this human-centred perspective and move towards what Sallie McFague calls an 
‘ecological Catholicity’220 remains a persistent theme in the work of Catholic ecotheologians.    
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Dorr’s critique of Vatican teaching as recalcitrantly anthropocentric arises from his historical survey 
of the development of the ecological perspective in the post-Vatican II period. However, as Thomas 
Nairn points out, reflection on the relationship between humankind and the rest of creation has 
deeper roots in Church tradition. Writing in 1994, when most of the developments discussed by Dorr 
were still in the future, Nairn helpfully contributes a longer perspective on the development of social 
Catholicism, which—in combination with Dorr’s more recent work—provides a complete historical 
narrative of the ‘greening’ of Catholic social teaching. Nairn identifies three different stages of 
development: 
As regards ecology, this tradition can be seen as having at least three different, though related, phases: 
the first from Leo XIII until the beginning of the Second Vatican Council, the second from the Council 
through the pontificate of Pope Paul VI, and the third during the present pontificate of John Paul II. 
Although these phases are in fact different, they revolve around two common rubrics: in each the 
Church situates the question of the environment within the larger context of justice and the common 
good.
221
 
Nairn critiques the concept of a hierarchical ‘natural order’—prevalent in the first of his three 
phases—which on his account regarded humankind superior to other aspects of creation, concurring 
with Aristotle and Aquinas that ‘since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must 
have been made by nature for the sake of humans.’222 He concludes that this phase in the 
development of Vatican teaching displayed ‘deep ambivalence regarding ecological questions’ and 
lacked the analytic tools to ground a fully developed ecological ethic.223 
Nairn’s second phase—that of ‘human interdependence’ was initiated by the Second Vatican Council 
which, Nairn argues, replaced the earlier rigidity of the natural law and its abstract notion of order 
with a more experiential worldview that took as the starting point for theological reflection the 
actual concrete experience of men and women. Although Nairn sees the imagery of the signs of the 
times and a world in the pangs of childbirth as ‘potentially a more apt vision upon which to build an 
ecological theology’, Gaudium et spes still analyses the environment and ecological questions in 
terms of human interdependence.224 Whilst relationship to others in love and justice is essential to 
the divine image in humanity, the ‘others’ in question remain exclusively human others.225  
Nairn’s third phase—that of human co-creation—continues this anthropocentric focus: For John Paul 
II, on Nairn’s account, creation is made for humans and the focus of his treatment of the ecological 
crisis is on the human consequences of exploitation of nature in making us less attentive to the 
needs of the weak and vulnerable among us. Nairn concludes: 
When one looks at the Church’s contemporary social tradition as described above, one sees certain 
constants within all three phases: the centrality of the notion of the common good, a corresponding 
notion of harmony and order, human interdependence, a distinction between the instrumental value of 
material creation and the intrinsic value of humanity, and a setting of the ecological question within 
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that of human society. In spite of differences, in each period the ecological question soon risks 
becoming instead a question of how humans relate to one another. As important as this consideration 
is it is insufficient to ground a significant ecological ethic. Indeed it suggests that the conflict between 
what is good for nature and what is good for poor people and poor nations will very well continue.
226
 
Dorr’s analysis begins with John XXIII, but focuses mainly on the pontificates of John Paul II and 
Benedict XVI. Although he draws attention to many positive developments in Catholic social teaching 
on ecology and on the climate crisis specifically, like Nairn before him Dorr still concludes from his 
more up to date survey of post-conciliar teaching on ecological questions that anthropocentricism 
remains a problem that is endemic within the tradition: 
In the light of the overall approach adopted in the many documents to which I have referred […] it is, I 
believe, reasonable to say that Catholic social teaching, as it is expressed in official Vatican documents 
on ecological issues, is basically anthropocentric in outlook. By this I mean that it consistently puts 
humans at the centre, that the value judgements it makes are generally made in terms of what will be 
of benefit to humans and that it shows a marked reluctance to put any emphasis on what we might call 
the intrinsic value of animals, plants, forests, scenery and all the other myriad nonhuman aspects of 
creation.  
However, Dorr’s critique adds two important qualifications: firstly, Vatican anthropocentricity is 
nuanced and secondly it cannot reasonably be accused of providing a scriptural or theological 
justification for heedless exploitation of the earth. In calling the magisterial approach ‘nuanced’, 
Dorr stresses that the teaching is balanced by a strong emphasis on God’s prerogative as creator 
which demands we respect the integrity of the created order. In contrasting Catholic teaching with 
the commonly assumed—if rarely articulated—assumption in secular society that humans are at 
liberty to exploit nature for our own benefit, Dorr argues that the legacies of Popes John Paul II and 
Benedict XVI contradict this interpretation of human dominion as absolute power over the natural 
world. 
Precisely because John Paul and Benedict are good theologians, their anthropocentric approach is 
located within a God-centred vision. If committed Christians and other people of goodwill take seriously 
the teaching of these popes on environmental issues, they can help to bring about the ‘ecological 
conversion’ that the popes call for and can play their part in solving the environmental problems that 
our world now faces.
227
 
However, having insisted that Vatican teaching has not been guilty of justifying human exploitation 
of nature, Dorr nevertheless feels that ‘it does not emphasise sufficiently the sheer urgency of the 
need for a model of human development that respects the environment and repairs the damage 
already done to it’ and that it ‘does not sufficiently insist on the serious moral obligation of all 
Christians and all people of goodwill to work for the adoption of such a model’228 and he agrees with 
the many ecotheologians who express dissatisfaction with the current Vatican position. As we saw 
earlier in this chapter, he laments the fact that Pope Benedict XVI ‘did not locate everything he has 
to say about human responsibility and business activity in this time of economic crisis within the 
broader context of the ecological crisis of our time’ and characterises his teaching as emerging ‘from 
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an older anthropocentric paradigm where ecological issues are treated almost entirely in terms of 
present-day human concerns.’229  
Dorr argues that there are two interrelated barriers to a movement towards biocentric thought in 
Catholic social doctrine: firstly there is a concern that ecotheology plays down the transcendence of 
God, sometimes to the point of embracing nature worship, and secondly there is a desire to uphold 
the concept of unique human dignity. As regards the first, Dorr suggests that ecotheologians can 
rebalance the Vatican’s over-emphasis on transcendence by renewing attention to incarnational, 
immanent aspects of authentic Christian understanding of the Godhead. This need not result in a 
denial or neglect of the transcendence of God. Dorr says ‘it is unfair to assume that ecotheologians 
agree with those who divinise nature or adopt a pantheistic position.’230 However, whilst it may be 
unfair to assume this of all ecotheologians, there are scholars working in this field—as we have 
seen—who have embraced the divination of Gaia, advocated neopagan animism or broadened the 
scope of the incarnation’s significance to the point of blurring the distinction between God and 
creation.231 On the other hand, as Dorr points out, there are deeply committed ecotheologians like 
Denis Edwards—who argues in favour of a ‘biblical theocentric vision’232—and John Feehan, who 
grounds his concept of ethical kinship and consanguinity between all God’s creatures in Thomas 
Aquinas’s argument that nature is not intended primarily for us, but was created for God’s own 
pleasure.233 I would agree with Dorr that there is no necessary connection between radical 
theological revision and emphasising care for creation; this thesis argues that Germain Grisez’s 
environmentalism goes beyond the current Vatican position and hence opens up possibilities for 
developments in Catholic social doctrine in this area, within a worldview that does not 
fundamentally challenge Roman Catholic theological orthodoxy.  
The second concern that Dorr identifies is less easily resolved, although a number of suggestions 
have been put forward. Dorr himself proposes that Bernard Lonergan’s writings might suggest a 
resolution: Lonergan sees value as an emergent property of complex systems—humans represent a 
level of complexity at which the capacity to apprehend and create value emerges. But this does not 
give us the moral right to use the rest of creation for our own exclusive benefit; our call is to use 
both our rational capacities and our affective-empathetic links with other creatures to find ways to 
live responsibly, respectfully and contemplatively as humans in the world.234 Along similar lines, 
Christopher Vogt suggests that Daniel Cowden’s nuanced discussion of human exceptionalism, whilst 
offering a critique of the Vatican’s insistence on an axiological and ontological distinction between 
humans and other creatures, nevertheless remains sceptical about claims that humans are simply 
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one species amongst many.235 For good or ill, humans now occupy a unique position in our ability to 
nurture or destroy our common planetary home.236  For Jame Schaefer, scientific evidence of our 
biological connection to other species seems to necessitate a move away from anthropocentric 
exceptionalism as a matter of intellectual honesty237 as well as an ethical imperative in the light of 
the climate crisis. Similarly, Celia Deane-Drummond finds current Vatican teaching insufficiently 
informed by contemporary developments in the science of Ecology and inclined to romanticise the 
natural order or to understand it through the now discredited scientific paradigm of stability and 
immutability of species.238  
This thesis proposes that the worldview described by Germain Grisez is capable of transcending the 
apparent contradiction between our status as fellow creatures with others in biotic community and 
continuity and our unique dignity as bearers of the imago Dei.  The Vatican position seems to be 
underpinned by a concern that removing the ontological distinction between humans and other 
creatures, leading to recognition of rights for non-humans, would undermine the concept of unique 
human dignity and hence lead to the overriding or denial of the human rights of vulnerable sub-
groups of our own species, such as incurably senile or comatose patients and pre-natal children 
whose development is at an early a stage and who therefore would not be recognised as ‘human 
persons’ by those looking for a medical criterion to justify the termination of their lives. This thesis 
argues that Germain Grisez—who has been one of the staunchest supporters of conservative 
Catholic teaching on issues relating to human dignity and the pro-life agenda—whilst he fully shares 
the Vatican’s concerns and desire to retain the centrality of human dignity, is nevertheless able to 
contribute some interesting insights on issues like the theological basis for inherent value in nature 
that shed light on the potential for evolution of Vatican teaching on ecological questions. 
Writing in 1994, during Blessed John Paul II’s pontificate, Thomas Nairn considered the 
anthropocentric tendency to reduce ecological questions to issues of relationships between humans 
as a limitation of the tradition. On the other hand, he saw John Paul II’s emphasis on contemplation 
of nature as a positive and potentially fruitful path towards an ecological ethic. 
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Contemporary ecologists suggest that the proper stance toward nature is one which avoids irreversible 
change, optimises natural diversity and emphasises natural stability. An ethics of appreciation can 
enable these sorts of choices by demonstrating the need to locate oneself in and reconcile oneself to 
the rest of nature. The questions of justice and the common good do in fact remain, but placing these 
issues in dialectic with a larger ethics of appreciation provides a more adequate grounding for ethical 
thought, a grounding which at the same time is able to situate the human person in the world as 
science sees it and, because of its basic spirituality, is able to speak not only to the human head but to 
the human heart.
239
 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Benedict XVI, although he returned to ecological 
questions repeatedly throughout his pontificate, did not in fact develop the tradition in the direction 
Nairn foresaw as a possibility latent within the thought of his predecessor. However, for Dorr, 
developments during Benedict’s pontificate were nonetheless positive: He feels that John Paul II 
‘downplayed’ the ecological issue by contrasting it with what he saw as the ‘more serious’ issue of 
‘the human environment’. Benedict XVI, by contrast, seemed to Dorr to take a more subtle approach 
in his insistence on an inseparable link between human ecology and natural ecology. In Caritas in 
veritate, Benedict includes the environment as a strand woven into the ‘seamless robe’ of integral 
humanism, and refers to nature as ‘a wondrous work of the Creator containing a “grammar” which 
sets forth ends and criteria for its wise use, not its reckless exploitation.240 For Dorr, ‘the image of 
“grammar” is particularly helpful. It would only be a short step for him to go from this “grammar” of 
nature to affirming that each of the elements of nature has its own inherent value, but he does not 
take this final step.’241 Dorr clearly finds this reluctance to embrace a new ecocentric paradigm—and 
to rethink other dimensions of Catholic social teaching in the light of this shift—frustrating.   
Nevertheless, Dorr acknowledges major developments in Vatican teaching towards recognition of 
ecological issues and the emphasis given to the connections between environmental degradation 
and social injustice in global perspective. As regards the climate crisis, he highlights comments from 
both John Paul II242 and Benedict XVI243 on the problem of environmental and social externalities and 
the moral imperative of ensuring that the real costs of economic activity are borne by the 
contracting parties and not perforce underwritten by future generations or those less able to protect 
their own interests due to inequalities of wealth and power. Dorr concludes that it is now 
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appropriate to speak of an ‘option for the poor and the earth’ as a dominant motif in Catholicism. 
Yet whilst—as we have seen—he acknowledges that magisterial anthropocentricism is nuanced and 
cannot be construed as justifying exploitative practices that pollute the planet, destroy or deplete 
natural capital and perpetuate social injustices, overall, he remains fundamentally dissatisfied with 
the Vatican position, calling for a ‘theological conversion’244 as a necessary adjunct to John Paul II’s 
encouragement of ‘ecological conversion’ as the Church reflects on and responds—with an 
appropriate sense of urgency—to the climate crisis as a ‘sign of the times’.  
Christopher Vogt draws attention to three ways in which the ‘option for the poor’ has been invoked 
in Catholic social teaching on environmental ethics. Firstly, it has called attention to the burden on 
the poor consequent upon environmental degradation.245 Secondly, it has noted that poverty can be 
a driver of ecologically destructive behaviour246 and thirdly, it has stressed the need to balance 
conservation with the imperative of providing economic opportunities for the working poor by 
pursuing authentic human development.247 However, Vogt stops short of endorsing the call by 
ecotheologians for the concept to be broadened to overcome its anthropocentricism by including 
ecological vulnerability as a new dimension to our concept of ‘the poor’.  
Jame Schaefer goes further: in discussing the possibility of extending the concept of an ‘option for 
the poor’ to include what Sallie McFague calls ‘the new poor’—the suffering, vulnerable animal and 
plant species, ecological systems and the biosphere—she calls for a recognition of the intrinsic value 
of aspects of creation beyond our own species.248 For Schaefer, a failure to move beyond valuing 
nature only instrumentally exhibits ignorance of our profound dependence on ecosystem services, 
ignorance of the cosmological to biological history out of which humans emerged, from and with 
other species, and the perpetuation of an anthropocentric mindset which—on her view—is 
ecologically damaging. Furthermore, for Schaefer, a failure to recognise intrinsic value in non-human 
aspects of creation is a failure of gratitude, both to the nurturing presence of our natural life-support 
system and to God as Creator. 
The Evolution of the Common Good in the Anthropocene?  
Dorr—as we have seen—emphasises the preferential option for the poor as central to the Catholic 
understanding of social responsibility, and indeed other principles of social Catholicism are closely 
aligned and interwoven with this Biblical motif. Another overarching principle employed in Vatican 
social doctrine has been the Thomist concept of the ‘common good’, which refers to the set of 
conditions under which a community and every member of that community may flourish249 and 
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requires the creation and maintenance of just institutions to enable all members of society to 
participate and to actualise their potential. As Christopher Vogt explains: 
The Logic of the common good goes something like this: Humans need access to many things to survive 
and realise their full potential. A good society facilitates universal access to all of those goods—known 
as the common good. Think about how much one’s life would be diminished if one did not have access 
to a good educational system or if one could not go to hospital when extremely ill or if one did not have 
access to art or literature or if one lived in a place in which the economy was so underdeveloped that 
no jobs were available. The common good includes all of these concrete goods plus other ‘social 
conditions’ that are conducive to a good human life, including the very existence of a community that 
provides these goods. It is the responsibility of everyone to build up the common good.
250
  
Solidarity and subsidiarity are key principles of the Catholic common good tradition. John Paul II 
defined solidarity as ‘a preserving determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to 
say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.’251 The 
related concept of ‘subsidiarity’ concerns the appropriate division of responsibility for upholding the 
common good between individuals, local associations, the institutions of civil society and the various 
levels of government. This principle and the similar Calvinist principle of sphere sovereignty are often 
invoked in connection with the autonomy and competence of sovereign states within the European 
Union. Pius XI is credited with coining the term—which derives from the Latin root subsidium 
meaning help or assistance—in his 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo anno.  
Pius XI was troubled by the subsuming of small labour associations, which had been able to 
accomplish their goals through their own initiative, into less efficient and less socially constructive 
larger collectives. He taught that it is an injustice, ‘a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to 
assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organisations can do.’252 He 
also applied this principle to the State which, he argued, ‘should let subordinate groups handle 
matters and concerns of lesser importance which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly.’253 
Abraham Lincoln—back in 1854—had much the same idea in mind when he said: ‘the legitimate 
object of government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done, but 
cannot do at all, or cannot do well, for themselves—in their separate and individual capacities. In all 
that the people can individually do as well for themselves, government ought not to interfere.’254 
Clearly then, the common good requires that responsibility be devolved to the appropriate level in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and that the pursuit of self-interest is properly 
tempered with the virtue of solidarity. The Church, in following her calling to live in solidarity with 
and for the vulnerable in society, is enabled to promote the common good, since—as we have 
seen—attention to the plight of the poor provides a litmus test for social justice and indicates the 
health of public institutions. But how are we to apply these important but apparently 
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anthropocentric principles in an age characterised by unprecedented ecological as well as social 
problems and concerns?  
It can be and has been argued that—responding to the ecological crisis as a ‘sign of the times’—
recent Catholic teaching has evolved, adapting the principles of the common good tradition to meet 
this new challenge. Dorr argues that ‘the official teaching of the Church has failed to move beyond 
an anthropocentric viewpoint’;255 William French sees a progressive ‘greening’ of recent papal 
thought, beginning with the publication in 1987 of John Paul II’s encyclical on social concern 
Sollicitudo rei socialis, which on French’s analysis ‘is the first in the social encyclical tradition to give 
any sustained attention to ecological issues.’256 Jame Schaefer critiques the tradition in similar vein: 
Catholic social teaching [on solidarity, subsidiarity and the option for the poor] appear sufficient when 
focusing on the good of human persons and much can be accomplished when functioning from this 
anthropocentric perspective. However, are these teachings sufficient when they are exclusively 
centered on the human common good? Are they too centered on valuing the human intrinsically while 
only valuing other species and biological systems instrumentally for how they can be used to achieve 
the human common good? Are these teachings sufficiently relevant to the climate crisis when 
considering the long-term effect on humans, other species, ecological systems and the biosphere? Are 
they sufficiently realistic and intellectually honest when recognising that homo sapiens evolved from 
and with other species over millions of years on a planet that had its beginnings with other planets and 
solar systems approximately 14 billion years ago and when acknowledging that humans are radically 
dependent upon other species, ecological systems and the biosphere to sustain our lives and efforts to 
flourish? Are they sufficiently helpful for dealing with a complicated and seemingly intractable global 
problem caused by many human-induced sources—the climate crisis?
257
 
Her questions are rhetorical; on Schaefer’s reading Catholic social teaching is recalcitrantly 
anthropocentric and to remedy this would require a biocentric reconfiguration of the central 
principles of the common good tradition. This interpretation of Aquinas is widely shared by 
theologians and secular philosophers commenting on his work. According to the narrative proposed 
by this group of scholars, Church teaching is becoming progressively ‘greener’ as societies have 
developed towards greater transnational interdependence and the globalisation of both trade 
relations and ecological problems during the Anthropocene: the age in which human impacts have 
come to dominate the natural environment. According to such scholars, this ‘greening of the papacy’ 
is exemplified by an expansion of our concept of the common good which has—in the process—
become an important concept for addressing global environmental concerns from a Catholic 
perspective. As Vogt argues:  
A crucial step has been the recognition in Catholic social teaching that a safe and healthy natural 
environment is an important component of the common good. Every person has the right to live in a 
place in which the environment has not been degraded, in which people are not exposed to dangerous 
toxins, and in which clean water is readily available. In addition, every individual and every society has 
                                                          
255
 Dorr, Option for the Poor and for the Earth, p. 438. 
256
 William French, ‘Catholicism and the Common Good of the Biosphere’ in: Michael Horace Barnes (ed) An 
Ecology of the Spirit: Religious reflections and Environmental Consciousness (Lanham, M. D: University Press of 
America, 1994) pp. 185–186; quoted in Charles C. Camosy, ‘Intellectual Strangers No More? Peter Singer and 
Roman Catholicism on Ecological Concern’ Claritas: Journal of Dialogue and Culture 1:2 (October 2012) pp. 45–
70 at p.49. http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/claritas/vol1/iss2/7/ [accessed 19 October 2015]. 
257
 Schaefer, ‘Solidarity, Subsidiarity’, pp. 409–410. 
 73 
an obligation to promote and protect the vibrant health of the natural environment. The responsibility 
stems from humans’ duty to protect and build up the common good.
258
  
On this evolutionary account of Vatican teaching, the concept of the common good has been 
understood in global terms since Mater et Magistra in 1961259—in which, Daniel Scheid argues, John 
XXIII widens the circle of concern to include the plethora of new forms of relationship and 
interdependence in and between contemporary societies.260 The US Bishops, according to this 
narrative, then adopted this understanding of the universal common good and applied it to the issue 
of global environmental problems in Renewing the Earth, in which they wrote: ‘Some of the gravest 
environmental problems are clearly global. In this shrinking world everyone is affected and everyone 
is responsible.’261 Overall, these scholars conclude, there is a clear trend in recent magisterial 
teaching towards a larger understanding of the common good as well as the importance of 
environmental responsibility as an essential element of Catholic commitment to its realisation: both 
Paul VI in Populorum progressio262 and John Paul II in Centesimus annus263 further expanded the 
purview of the concept, to include intergenerational justice and to link this specifically to the 
ecological question. Building on the long tradition of the universal destination of goods—which 
teaches that the Earth’s bounty exists for sustaining life and should be used for the benefit of all—
Paul VI and John Paul II insisted that every generation has an obligation to preserve this common 
patrimony for the benefit of future generations who have equal entitlement to the use of common 
resources.  
More recently still, on Dorr’s account, Benedict XVI’s approach to the common good of our natural 
heritage—as Dorr reads him—is more balanced and subtle than that of John Paul II and represents a 
small step forward in Vatican teaching on the ecological crisis whilst perpetuating the traditional 
anthropocentric paradigm.264 Certainly Benedict XVI throughout his pontificate—in his encyclicals 
and other writings—repeatedly drew attention to the interdependence between human ecology and 
natural ecology rather than prioritising the former as did his predecessor. During his time in office 
and before his election to the chair of St Peter, as Dorr notes, it is generally recognised that Benedict 
XVI was always very concerned about human harm to the environment, deeply committed to raising 
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awareness of the urgency of the need to address such problems and promoting ecologically 
respectful lifestyles.265 
This narrative of a ‘greening of the papacy’ begins with the assumption that Aquinas—in following 
Aristotle and given that both of them lived during a period of history in which it was inconceivable 
that the activities of humankind could jeopardise ecosystems—understood the notion of the 
common good in purely anthropocentric terms. However, although—as William French notes—
many commentators on Aquinas have focused on one organising principle of Thomas’s ethical 
system: ‘the absolute superiority of rational human life over all lesser creatures’, 266 nevertheless a 
growing body of Thomist scholars dispute the characterisation of Aquinas’s ethics as 
anthropocentric, and—on this basis—also dispute readings of the social encyclical tradition as 
inappropriately human-centred and hence inadequate in the face of the climate crisis.  
Certainly, in appealing to the common good Aquinas—following Aristotle—recognises the irreducible 
interdependence of citizens and the importance of just institutions for their mutual thriving: as 
Daniel Scheid puts it ‘individuals cannot flourish whilst the structures of the state crumble around 
them.’267 Aquinas believed that humans, as naturally social beings, are created by God to live in 
societies and that there is a good to human life that cannot be found in isolation from others. This 
concept can be a useful corrective to modern Western society’s overemphasis on individualism, 
although—as Daniel Scheid notes—Aquinas’s communitarianism is not unqualified: he clearly does 
not mean to valorise a totalitarian state in which the individual is involuntarily sacrificed for the 
perceived good of others. Scheid proposes that the concept of the common good as used in Catholic 
social teaching can and should encompass the entire created order268 yet in his contribution to 
Tobias Winright’s edited collection Green Discipleship he does not seem to attribute this view to 
Aquinas himself269—arguing rather that extending our concept of the common good in this way 
seems reasonable in the light of ‘Aquinas’s understanding of the importance of biological diversity 
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and ecological sustainability and the insights of contemporary science that highlight the 
interdependence among all earthly creatures’.270 Scheid notes indications in recent episcopal 
documents that the idea of a planetary common good already influences the bishops’ reflections on 
the climate crisis271 and, with a broader concept of the cosmic common good as his interpretive lens, 
he faults Benedict XVI for narrowing the focus of his teaching to the human good272 in comparison to 
his predecessor’s occasionally wider ecological vision,273 which for Scheid suggests quite the 
opposite conclusion on Benedict XVI’s contribution to the general trend of recent papal teaching on 
the environment compared to the frustratingly slow but otherwise positive historical trajectory 
detected by Donal Dorr. 
Although Scheid does not cite the work of other Thomist scholars such as Celia Deane-Drummond 
and John Berkman in support of his arguments for a wider understanding of the cosmic common 
good, there is a growing body of academic opinion that commends as authentic a reading of 
Aquinas’s creation theology that embraces an ecological vision of the common good. Celia Deane-
Drummond and David Clough critique readings of Aquinas on animals that ‘set up certain 
theologians as instigators and culprits of a negative attitude towards animals’; they suggest that this 
reinforces the view of some secular philosophers that Christianity’s cardinal error has been its 
assumption that humans are different from animals.274 Indeed atheist environmentalists commonly 
fault the entire Judeo-Christian tradition for its supposed anthropocentric focus, and Peter Singer—
for egregious example—has said that Thomas Aquinas ‘has room only for sins against God, ourselves 
and our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the 
natural world.’275 To the contrary—Deane-Drummond insists—notwithstanding the more obvious 
ethical views towards animals that Aquinas shared with his cultural contemporaries, there is implicit 
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in his thinking a far more sympathetic and sensitive treatment of non-human creatures.’276 Charles 
Camosy, drawing on the work of John Berkman in Deane-Drummond and Clough’s 2009 edited 
volume Creaturely Theology, argues that Aquinas is a more complex thinker than secular 
philosophers like Singer have allowed: his concept of the common good does not limit itself to 
human beings or even to this planet, indeed for Aquinas there is a ‘universal common good’ which 
‘employed as a cosmological-ecological principle suggests that all species, including the human, are 
parts which participate within the greater whole of the universe’277, hence—despite his assertion of 
the superiority of rational beings over lesser creatures—for Aquinas God’s plan in creation whilst 
hierarchical is by no means anthropocentric. 
Solidarity, Subsidiarity and Sustainability 
The key concepts of the common good tradition, solidarity as the virtue that predisposes citizens to 
pursue the common good and subsidiarity as the organising principle within society that most 
efficiently conduces to its realisation, might be expected to have co-evolved with the notion of the 
common good in our age of heightened ecological peril. Hence it is no surprise that scholars who 
endorse the dominant narrative of a progressive ‘greening’ of Vatican teaching detect a similar 
historical trend in the scope of solidarity and subsidiarity within the common good tradition. 
Arguably, there has been a movement towards recognition of sustainability as an equally essential 
principle of the common good in Catholic social teaching which is inter-tangled with other social 
trends that have been reflected on, adapted and taken up into Vatican doctrine over the same 
period.  
Unfortunately, as Dorr notes, every shift in emphasis or direction signalled by the Vatican—however 
nuanced—becomes contested territory between rival political partisans who mine every new 
addition to the doctrinal corpus for nuggets in support of their own worldview as well as for 
evidence of trends they wish to oppose and counteract.278 At times the threads are genuinely 
difficult to disentangle—some ecotheologians have attempted to make common cause with feminist 
or socialist critics of Vatican teaching and indeed these other agendas have been the dominant 
chords in the thought of some eco-feminist and eco-socialist thinkers—but in principle there is no 
necessary connection between a worldview that values the natural world as the common patrimony 
of humankind and radical, revisionist theological agendas within the Church and within the wider 
political discourse.    
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Historically, the principle of solidarity in Catholic social teaching has been closely aligned with the 
requirement to have a preferential focus on the needs of the most vulnerable; indeed as Dorr 
construes the concept of this option for the poor, solidarity is the virtue essential its implementation 
as the Church lives out her vocation to stand with and for the poor. As Johan Verstraeten stresses, 
there is an important dialectic between love and justice: if love ‘is the highest and universal criterion 
of the whole of social ethics’, nevertheless it cannot be proclaimed without justice, since to do so 
would ‘make the poor again the objects of paternalistic benevolence and no longer the carriers of 
inherent rights that must be protected by the state and civil society.’  Social ethics cannot be 
reduced to inter-subjective relationships—an error Verstraeten thinks the Compendium falls into—
since it is rooted in the longing to live a good life with and for others in the context of just 
institutions.279   
Verstraeten discerns a tendency during the pontificate of John Paul II towards what he sees as the 
subordination of justice to discourse on love and a corresponding reduction of the concept of 
solidarity to mere ‘social love’. For Verstraeten, this was consequent upon and indicative of a gain in 
influence over Catholic social teaching by those with a neo-liberal agenda—although he 
demonstrates that neither Centesimus annus nor the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church can truly be said to give an unqualified ‘ringing endorsement’ of that agenda. Market 
capitalism is accorded only limited and conditional approval in Centesimus annus, remaining firmly 
subordinate to the universal destination of goods and to the priority of the human person as worker. 
Verstraeten argues that historically love and justice received more balanced attention in Catholic 
social teaching: for example, in Populorum progressio, solidarity included not only ‘love in action’ but 
also ‘the aid that richer nations must give to developing nations’,280 whilst ‘social justice’ was 
construed as the structural ‘rectification of trade relations between strong and weak nations’ and as 
‘equality of opportunity’.281 However, it should be noted that in Populorum progressio, Paul VI—not 
unlike John Paul II in Centesimus annus—gave (suitably qualified) endorsement to market 
mechanisms, commenting that ‘competition should not be eliminated from trade transactions; but it 
must be kept within limits so that it operates justly and fairly, and thus becomes a truly human 
endeavour’. 
Writing in 2011, Verstraeten argues that Benedict XVI in Caritas in Veritate corrects ‘the un-nuanced 
rejection […] of the social assistance state by Pope John Paul II in Centesimus annus’. In view of this 
and of the close connection we have noted between the virtue of solidarity and the doctrine of the 
preferential option for the poor, it seems remarkable that Dorr nevertheless detects a simultaneous 
weakening of the motivating passion for giving preference to the vulnerable—which for Dorr can 
only retain its full meaning, its implications and its challenge as part of a spirituality that values and 
emphasises the concept of liberation, with its background of social analysis and its overtones of 
contestation and struggle—during the pontificate of Benedict XVI. In my view there is a danger of 
over-interpreting differences in style and of mistaking this for differences of substance. As with the 
data relating to anthropogenic climate change there is also a risk, in focusing on the minutiae, of 
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misinterpreting the longer-term trends. It is not clear that Benedict XVI can meaningfully be said to 
be more or less ‘conservative’ than his predecessor in his approach to social ethics, or that a clear 
trend in one direction or the other is really discernible between Paul VI and Pope Francis. And, as we 
have seen, whether or not a progression towards a more ecologically inclusive concept of the 
common good and towards the adoption of criteria of ecological sustainability as essential to 
solidarity and subsidiarity can be detected as an underlying trend in Catholic social teaching will 
depend upon whether Deane-Drummond’s controversial reading of Aquinas ultimately seems 
persuasive.    
Dorr, as we have seen, remains dissatisfied with current Vatican teaching on the option for the poor 
and on the ecological crisis; alongside Drew Christiansen, Jame Schaefer and a host of other voices in 
Catholic ecotheology he argues for further development of Catholic social teaching away from its 
anthropocentric roots and towards ecocentricity. Writing back in 1996, Christiansen argued that 
promoting the common good—properly understood—ought to aim at sustaining and serving the 
ecological or biotic community as well as humans.282 Similarly, Schaefer argues for development of 
the common good tradition towards what she calls ‘earth solidarity’ which will require: 
[…] choosing to make decisions now for the common good of all species, abiota, ecological systems and 
the biosphere. In the light of the ongoing disruption of the global climate, choosing to make decisions 
for the good of all will require a change in attitude. [This] requires a conversion from an 
anthropocentric attitude that they are merely instruments intended for human use to a planetary 
attitude that prompts us to intrinsically value other species, the air, the land, waters, ecological systems 
and the biosphere within which all function as contributors to and benefactors of a life-sustaining 
climate.
283
 
Regardless of whether or not one accepts Schaefer’s narrative and her consequent call for Catholic 
conversion from our ignoble history of anthropocentricism, her phrase ‘earth solidarity’ 
encapsulates an important concept, weaving ecological concern into Catholic social ethics and 
linking the conservation agenda to the commitment to live in solidarity with the most vulnerable in 
the human community as well as to expand our concern to vulnerable others beyond our own 
species. Perhaps Deane-Drummond would see this as a correction to others’ misreading of Thomist 
theology, but—since this is not the dominant contemporary interpretation of Aquinas—the qualifier 
is useful in providing a concise label for a Catholic worldview that embraces environmental 
protection whilst honouring long-standing and treasured principles of natural law and social concern 
within the Catholic tradition. The idea of ‘earth solidarity’ or ‘integral ecology’ seems to me to 
encapsulate the worldview towards which Germain Grisez’s environmentalism strives without really 
quite reaching. Could ‘earth solidarity’ be one of those ideas ‘whose time has come’, which—as 
victor Hugo famously remarked—no army can withstand?284   
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Schaefer sees her larger project, of retrieving and reconstructing medieval and patristic concepts as 
foundations for environmental ethics, as her contribution to a collective response by theologians to 
a call from Catholic Bishops to engage with the environmental insights of our tradition and in 
particular to explore the connections between the duty of stewardship and the dignity of the human 
person. In ‘thinking with the Church’ in this way, the theologian may be able to uncover fruitful 
insights that already exist within the tradition—such as Deane-Drummond’s ecological reading of 
Aquinas—which, once they have been tested and their authenticity established, can provide a more 
secure foundation for developments in social doctrine than the strident voices of political activism 
and revisionist theology. Schaefer proposes a critical-creative methodology: critical in examining 
sources in the light of their intellectual context and recognising the disjuncture with our 
contemporary worldview, and creative in restructuring their concepts in the light of such cultural 
barriers to mutual understanding, and hence imagining how they might speak to our context.  
Daniel Scheid adopts a similar methodology in reflecting on Aquinas’s creation theology; although in 
his earlier work—as we have seen—Scheid appears to accept the dominant evolutionary view of the 
common good tradition, in his contribution to Schaefer’s edited volume Confronting the Climate 
Crisis, Scheid finds warrant within St Thomas’s thought, which is foundational for the Catholic 
tradition, for the idea of intrinsic goodness in all God’s creatures and for valuing biodiversity as the 
temporal dimension of the cosmic common good.285 For Scheid, this Thomist understanding suggests 
that Humans should work to preserve those ecosystems and creatures that add to biodiversity and 
the sustainability of life on Earth, promoting the flourishing of creatures and the complex networks 
of interconnections between organisms that grow and thrive in symbiosis and mutual 
interdependence. He notes the similarity between this Thomist understanding and the US Catholic 
Bishop’s statement that ‘the human family is charged with preserving the beauty, diversity and 
integrity of nature as well as fostering its productivity.’286 Aquinas—Scheid cautions—would resist 
the reduction of ‘productivity’ to economic growth or human consumption; since within his 
worldview the order of the universe is its greatest attribute, hence humans must take into account 
the need to preserve the natural order in its diversity and integrity and foster its sustainable 
fecundity.  
Aquinas gives good reason for saying animals, trees, and so on are intrinsically valuable apart from 
human use: all creatures are intrinsically good because they have been created and preserved by God; 
and they have a particular set of attributes by which they may return to God, and fulfilling these 
inclinations or “appetites” glorifies God. Aquinas also offers a defence of ecological diversity, rooting it 
not in contemporary concern for endangered species but in a theological interpretation of God’s 
purposes for creation. Aquinas argues that a diversity of creatures with varying inclinations is not only 
part of God’s Eternal Law but also is necessary for the universe to fulfil its purpose of imitating the 
divine goodness […] ‘For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and 
divided; and hence the whole universe together participates [in] the divine goodness more perfectly, 
and represents it better than any single creature’
287
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Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to arbitrate between competing scholarly interpretations 
of Aquinas, the work of Celia Deane-Drummond and Daniel Scheid occasionally departs from the 
dominant narrative of a greening of the Papacy, indicating an alternative approach that seeks to find 
resources within the tradition with which to construct a consistent trajectory for possible future 
doctrinal development. As we have seen, a preoccupation with the issue of anthropocentrism has 
produced a radically critical strand of ecotheology, but there is room within a broad and inclusive 
field for a more theologically conservative approach, glimmers of which appear in the writings of a 
number of Catholic theologians.  
Conclusion 
Catholic social teaching unfolds as the Church reflects on the signs of the times in continuity with the 
tradition; calls for a paradigm shift or a new theology more fitting in an age of ecological crisis should 
therefore be viewed with some suspicion when we seek to predict the likely content of the new 
environmental encyclical. It may be that Germain Grisez, in defining his project in moral theology as 
one of ‘thinking with the Church’ can provide us with insights into environmental ethics that are 
more illuminating in terms of the likely evolution of Vatican teaching in this field. His understanding 
of authentic Catholic teaching—as we shall see—is particularly interesting when he treats the 
secular environmental concept of ‘inherent value’ in nature as naming a concept inherent in the 
teaching rather than a break with tradition. If Grisez is able to make this move it seems possible that 
the Vatican will do likewise at some point in the future. Grisez’s work may also provide the key to 
likely developments on climate change, as the tradition unfolds in our context of ecological concern. 
Hence this project seeks to recover Grisez’s thought on environmental ethics, and proposes the 
adoption of a Grisez School dialectical methodology, reflecting on our environmental challenges 
from with the living truths of faith, in search of authentic Catholic responses to the ecological crisis 
which—in Chapter Two—we have established as a scientific reality and a ‘sign of the times’.  
Having identified the intellectual lacuna in Catholic ecotheology that this project seeks to fill, we are 
now in a position to proceed to an examination of Germain Grisez’s environmental ethics, the fruit 
of his conscientious application of this methodology, and to suggest how we might extend his 
insights and approach to the climate crisis: this will be the task of Chapter Four. 
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Chapter 4: Germain Grisez—The Forgotten Environmentalist? 
Introduction 
Having made the case in Chapter three for approaching the ecological challenge from the 
perspective of the Grisez School, employing a dialectical methodology, my aim in this chapter is 
threefold. Firstly I shall seek to show that Grisez’s theological ethics needs to be read through the 
lens of his creation theology. This rereading enables the crucial ecological dimension to his natural 
law theory to come into focus, paving the way for a constructive and previously unexplored 
engagement with environmental issues from within the existing structures of Catholic moral 
theology, rather than dependent on a radical restructuring to accommodate the ecological agenda. 
Secondly I aim to analyse a number of objections to Grisez’s ethics that have been raised by his 
environmentalist critics and to show that these critiques do not have traction against the new 
natural law when important misunderstandings of Grisez’s work have been exposed and corrected. 
Indeed, substantial common ground can be identified between Grisez and his environmentalist 
interlocutors at the level of their practical conclusions on conservation issues and central planks of 
the animal welfare agenda. Thirdly, by applying insights drawn from my study of Grisez’s fascinating 
but widely overlooked environmental ethics, together with established principles of Catholic social 
teaching, I shall propose a strategy for a Grisez School response to climate change that prioritises 
fast-track mitigation without sacrificing climate justice outcomes; the chapter will conclude with a 
reflection on the new environmental encyclical, Laudato Si’ from a Grisez School perspective.    
(1)Grisez’s Creation Theology, Environmental Ethics and Natural Law 
This section argues that Grisez’s creation theology is an important interpretive lens for his natural 
law ethics, without which his whole project is in danger of being misinterpreted. In order to make 
this case I shall proceed as follows: Firstly, I shall provide an exposition of Grisez’s work on 
environmental responsibility in volume two of his trilogy The Way Of the Lord Jesus: Living a 
Christian Life.288 Secondly, I shall give an overview of his concept of the vocation of the Church and 
more specifically that of the moral theologian in contemporary society. Thirdly, I shall sketch out the 
structural core of the new natural law so that we can see how Grisez’s theological ethics relates to 
his concept of vocation and how the whole scheme fits together into a coherent vision of Christian 
life and character in the light of his creation theology.  
Exposition of Grisez’s Creation Theology and Environmental Ethics 
Grisez treats work, subhuman realities and property in chapter ten of Living a Christian Life and it is 
important to understand how these topics are interrelated in order to properly appreciate his 
specific treatment of animals and nature. Grisez’s monumental work in theological ethics is 
encyclopaedic in its scope, but the dangers of reading his treatment of nature without a broader 
contextual understanding of how this aspect of his work fits into the broader system he articulates 
cannot be overemphasised. In particular his treatment of work and its relationship to human dignity 
and dominion and his work on property, which for Grisez is always held subject to the universal 
destination of goods, contain important resources for environmental as well as social ethics and 
contain many insights of relevance to an authentic Catholic response to the climate challenge. In this 
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exposition of Grisez’s creation theology I shall summarise the relevant aspects of his treatment of 
work, subpersonal nature, animals and property. 
Work 
For Grisez, property has Lockean origins in human work and occupancy, which renders hitherto 
common natural objects into possession,289 although he rejects the view that ownership derives 
entirely from work290 and does not construe the ‘state of nature’ as a literal primitive social order in 
which the material world was jointly owned with each having an equal share.291 Grisez has a high 
view of work as a basic human good through which people develop their skills and realise 
themselves as acting persons.292 This intrinsic association between work and human dignity is 
essential to the meaning of good work, although Grisez asserts that those who are unable to work 
retain full human dignity and can still live worthwhile lives.293 Grisez warns against the error of 
economism in which the monetary value of the product is mistaken for the sole value of work294 and 
stresses that voluntary service295 and work within the home296 are no less valuable for want of 
remuneration. Good work uses nature to serve human needs within the framework of God’s plan297 
and we wield God-given authority over nature to that end alone. There is no licence to exploit or 
destroy in the dominion mandate as Grisez understands it:298 we are called to responsible work as 
our share in God’s activity, to continue his work of creation and redemption.299 All our endeavours 
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depend on God for their success and our part is to pursue the good by co-operating in our work with 
God300 in accordance with the natural law inscribed on all human hearts. 
Nature 
For Grisez, nature is endowed with intrinsic goodness.301 Each creature is preserved to meet a 
particular need and has inalienable meaning and value302 that should not be abused or 
disregarded.303 Good human use of non-human creatures is in accordance with the God-given 
direction of practical reason and therefore, for Grisez, fulfils and does not conflict with the creature’s 
inherent meaning and value.304 Natural entities are neither to be exploited or held sacred,305 but to 
be used for good human purposes within the limits set by deep respect for creation and the 
creator.306 Humans are responsible to God and to each other—not least to future generations—for 
the use they make of God’s gift of nature307 which in effect we hold on trust for our descendants.308 
For Grisez, our sins—specifically laziness, abuse of power and pursuit of pleasure, wealth, status, 
power and the illusion of security—are the root causes of ecological devastation.309 
Grisez condemns unrestricted, exploitative ‘development’ which leads to irreversible changes in the 
natural world, depletes resources and involves injustice to the poor.310 He especially condemns 
powerful people who ‘decide which claims will count as fair and even which individuals will count as 
persons’311 and engage in wanton waste and spoliation of the earth, pursuing—at best—the long 
term interests of themselves and those they care for rather than the common good.312 However he 
also points out that romantic environmentalism can be unjust to the poor, hence environmental 
policy should take into consideration the burdens imposed by job losses and increased costs of 
necessities such as food, shelter, home heating and transport that disproportionately impact the 
poor.313 
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Grisez draws on three biblical motifs to make the case that there are moral limits to human 
dominion over nature: the ecologically inclusive Noahic covenant,314 the prohibition on ‘eating the 
fruit of the tree’ as a symbol of moral limits to human licence315 and the ‘Sabbath of the land’ 
allowing fallow periods for the earth to rest and recuperate.316 Thus he derives norms of reverence 
for the creator, respect for nature and use of natural entities subject to restraint and reasonableness 
in pursuit of authentic human development. 
Animals 
For Grisez, human rights are derived from the concept of human dignity as imago dei317 and rights in 
this sense cannot be extended to animals. As we have seen, he associates animal rights with a 
hedonistic consequentialism that does not acknowledge the rights of vulnerable categories of 
human person such as unborn and neonatal children.318 Grisez argues that lower animals cannot be 
fulfilled by sharing in intelligible human goods;319 lacking ‘rights’, animals may be killed to put them 
out of misery (whereas euthanasia is absolutely prohibited)320 and humans may kill, harm or cause 
pain to animals in the course of pursuing any good human purpose.321 Nevertheless, humans do 
have duties of kindness and care towards animals:322 cruelty and negligent abuse are prohibited,323 
endangered species should be protected and harmless animals and birds provided for where this 
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does not conflict with an overriding human good.324  Grisez identifies the use of fur as fashion and 
hunting as a status activity as examples of abuse of animals. However it is important to note that his 
objection is not to wearing fur or hunting in principle, but to doing so in pursuit of some selfish end 
rather than in pursuit of real human goods.325 He cautions against keeping pets without good reason 
or without giving due consideration to the costs and responsibilities of ownership and the 
environmental impacts associated with domestic animals.326 Acceptable reasons for keeping pets, 
for Grisez, include teaching children, companionship for the lonely or self-development through 
training and caring for animals.327 Vegetarianism, for Grisez, is commendable but not obligatory. Bad 
practices in animal husbandry, human health considerations of a meat-rich diet and the implications 
for food security of the use of agricultural land and grain for pasture and animal feed are 
considerations relevant to Christian moral choices concerning meat consumption.328 
Property 
The doctrine of the universal destination of goods is key to understanding Grisez’s treatment of 
questions relating to property:329 God has destined the earth and all it contains for the use of all 
human individuals and peoples in such a way that under the direction of justice accompanied by 
charity goods ought to flow abundantly to everyone on a fair basis.330 In the light of this, no one has 
absolute entitlement to his own property, to use or abuse as he chooses. Property owners have a 
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duty to care for and conserve their property and having met their own needs and those of their 
dependants to use it to meet the needs of others.331 
It follows from this that on occasions there may be a duty to forego material goods to which one is 
legally entitled332 or to use one’s possessions to benefit others in ways to which they have no legal 
right. It also follows that where private owners act against the common good in their use of their 
property it’s expropriation by the state may be justified and in some cases Grisez holds that even 
confiscation without compensation may be warranted or, if the full value of the property reflects in 
part the expectation of unjust profits to be made from its exploitation, a fair level of compensation 
may be less than the market price.333 
In particular, the universal destination of goods encodes an absolute duty to feed those dying of 
hunger, since—as St Ambrose said—‘if you have not fed them you have killed them.’334 Grisez is 
clear that this is a requirement of justice and is not a supererogatory act for the Christian.335 Needs 
arising from some sin or defect in one’s own community deserve special consideration even if one 
has done all one could to prevent the injustice that inflicted the hardship.336 For Grisez, both direct 
action to aid particular people in need and socio-political action to address structural injustices that 
cause human misery are requirements of the Christian life.337 Within the parish or neighbourhood, 
Grisez endorses the practice of lending and borrowing, recommending social cooperation in 
maintaining a catalogue of possessions that parishioners or neighbours are prepared to loan to 
others.338 But although Grisez clearly rejects the harsh individualism of unfettered capitalism, he 
retains a role for just private ownership339 and the administration of capital for the common good 
through responsible private business ownership340 and ethical investment.341 
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of others. Consequently, under certain conditions almsgiving is so grave an obligation in strict justice that 
failure to feed the hungry can be a form of homicide.’ Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, QE 1 (a) p. 
800. 
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It follows from Grisez’s understanding of the universal destination of goods that Christians living in 
wasteful, materialistic, individualist cultures are called to witness to their faith by adopting a less 
material way of life.342 Grisez comments that most Christians overlook this duty and the gravity of 
our responsibilities to share343 and conserve344 are seldom appreciated, adding that: 
Considering what is now known about the environmental impact of many activities, the harm a person 
does to others by maintaining a wasteful consumerist style of life can no longer be judged insignificant 
as it once was. Even if particular instances do little harm the choice—and so the moral responsibility—
usually does not concern those individual instances, since they result from the habits and policies of 
one’s style of life. In view of the harm done to others resulting from one’s whole way of life, the choice 
not to undertake the practice of conservation and change one’s habits can hardly be a light matter.
345
 
Grisez attributes our materialist ‘throw-away’ culture to radical dissatisfaction that arises when we 
try to find fulfilment through satisfaction of desires—often stimulated by advertising—that can 
never be assuaged by ownership of more and more material goods.346 In acquiring property, the 
Christian should be careful to purchase only those things necessary to discharge the responsibilities 
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of her vocation.347 She should also consider all the on-going costs and responsibilities of 
ownership348 and the side-effects of one’s use of the property,349 including the environmental 
consequences of petrol and electricity use.350 The latter requirement is relaxed slightly by 
considerations of affordability for the poor, with wealthier people and nations held to stricter 
account for mitigation of environmental impacts.351 The Christian obligation to conserve leads Grisez 
to endorse the reuse of items where possible, donation for use by others, recycling and salvaging of 
parts, composting of organic material and careful disposal of other waste.  
To sum up Grisez’s position on property: Natural entities are rendered into possession through 
human work and occupancy; the Church recognises both public and private property. However—
since wealth and property are not goods intrinsic to persons—there is no absolute right to 
ownership nor does possession licence irresponsible use of property. In addition to the norms that 
apply to human use of natural entities—reverence for the creator, respect for the inherent meaning 
and value of the thing itself, and the duty to use things with restraint for good and reasonable 
human purposes—private property is to be shared, conserved and used responsibly for the common 
good and is always held subject to the universal destination of goods and the strict obligation in 
justice to aid the destitute. 
As this exposition of his theological treatment of work, nature and property clearly shows, Grisez 
expounds a balanced and well developed Christian environmental ethics and this sensitivity to our 
duties to the creator and his creation pervades and underpins his position on work and property. 
This observation leads me to the hypothesis that his treatment of the environment is no mere 
optional appendix to his theological ethics, but an essential element of a holistic appreciation of 
Grisez. As I hope to show in my next section, this profoundly creation-centred orientation can also 
be seen in Grisez’s understanding of the mission of the Church and the vocation of the moral 
theologian, providing additional evidence for my thesis. Furthermore, given that work is one of the 
basic human goods for Grisez and friendship with the creator God is an aspect of human flourishing, 
the ecological dimension of work and vocation imports Grisez’s environmentalism into the heart of 
                                                          
347
 ‘Vocation must not be understood narrowly or individualistically; it extends to the whole of life, including 
such matters as friendships and legitimate recreation, and it specifies all the individual and social 
responsibilities of a Christian. Therefore, to devote material goods to the service of Jesus’ kingdom means 
acquiring, using and retaining them precisely insofar as they are necessary for survival or are suitable for 
fulfilling responsibilities pertaining to one’s personal vocation.’ Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, QE 2 
(b) p. 804. 
348
 Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, QE 3 (a) p. 806. 
349
 Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, QE 3 (c) p. 807. 
350
 ‘Where the impact is on others, the question is whether the harm can be accepted fairly. For example, using 
amplifiers and speakers to play music can disturb others who do not wish to be disturbed; using poisons 
around the house and garden can endanger neighbours’ children and pets; using gasoline and electricity 
usually has a negative environmental impact. Sometimes the use is fair despite the side effects, and other 
times the activity can be modified to prevent or sufficiently mitigate them; but sometimes one should forgo 
the use to avoid them.’ Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, QE 5 (i) p. 815. 
351
 ‘Although, to avoid severe environmental damage, some things should no longer be manufactured or 
brought into use, the cost of replacing similar things already in use may warrant continuing to accept their bad 
effects on the environment. Again, because poor individuals and societies have fewer alternatives, they may 
rightly accept side effects wrong for the wealthy to accept. Thus the affluent should willingly accept greater 
burdens in preventing and correcting pollution, rather than favouring measures which overburden the poor by 
imposing identical burdens on rich and poor alike.’ Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, QE 5 (i) p.815. 
 89 
his theological ethics. I shall therefore briefly discuss the structural core of Grisez’s natural law 
theory in order to make my central argument: that Grisez School ethics as a whole needs to be read 
through the lens of his creation theology and in that light it can be seen to be an ethics of integral 
ecology. 
The Mission of the Church and the vocation of the moral theologian 
For Grisez, personal vocation is key to the life of the faithful and each Christian is called by name for 
a unique task through which she participates in the apostolate, the activity of the Church directed 
towards carrying out her mission. Chapter thirty-one of Christian Moral Principles and chapter two of 
Living a Christian Life, provide an extended treatment of this subject, connecting the sacrament of 
confirmation352 and the infused virtue of hope353 respectively to the concept of personal calling. 
Further insights into the connections Grisez draws between vocation and redemption can be 
gleaned from chapter twenty-three of Christian Moral Principles, which concerns God’s redemptive 
work in the lives of Christians;354 chapter twenty-seven—on life transformed by the modes of 
Christian response—explains how Grisez’s theological ethics shapes and is shaped by personal 
vocation.355 And chapter twenty-eight, on the practicability of Christian morality addresses the 
question of how commitment to one’s personal calling promotes growth towards perfection.356 
For Grisez, a Christian’s whole life should be apostolic, integrating all activities—domestic, 
professional, social and technical—with religious values, which should direct everything to the 
kingdom.357 The Christian moral life is organised according to the individual’s personal calling, hence 
an irreducible ecological dimension to Grisez’s concepts of vocation and apostolate implicates the 
whole of his moral theology in his ecological vision, such that no Christian life could be divorced from 
creation care without doing violence to its organising principle.  
The key ecological point to draw from Grisez’s theological ethics in relation to the integral role of 
moral works in living a Christian life is the cosmic breadth encompassed by the Catholic vision of the 
elements of the temporal order that belong to the fullness of human persons, the subject matter of 
human moral action. As Grisez explains:  
Human persons complete one another in various forms of society and are fulfilled by work and culture. 
Indeed, ‘man in the entirety of his being’ refers also to the surrounding cosmos, for people cannot live 
without the natural world, in which humankind dwells as in a womb. Thus everything else in visible 
creation pertains to human beings and their salvation would be incomplete were not all things brought 
back to God in Jesus. John Paul II’s statement also indicates the precise way in which the Church’s 
mission includes all the dimensions of persons. The Church becomes concerned with all the elements of 
the temporal order, which have their own value as created goods, insofar as they pertain to the 
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fulfilment of human persons and so are destined for a place in the kingdom where all goods will be 
restored to God in Jesus.
358
 
This statement hangs on an understanding of basic elements of Grisez’s eschatology and his creation 
theology which underpin his concept of flourishing and the inherent value of creation respectively. 
Although precisely how subpersonal creation will exist in the eschaton remains mysterious on 
Grisez’s account, the theological proposition that all of nature will share in redemption is confirmed 
as a revealed truth of scripture ‘for in Jesus all things are to be saved and reintegrated to form new 
heavens and a new earth’.359 Grisez’s understanding of the mechanism by which all good things are 
to be restored to God in Christ involves active participation by Christians in the renewal of the 
created order. The eschatological restoration will not happen automatically, Grisez tells us, but 
requires our commitment to deal with nature according to God’s plan, working towards 
transforming it from divine gift to humanised asset perfectly linked to the human person and 
suitable to be offered back to God as part of the fulfilled creation. Grisez’s creation theology 
proposes inherent value on the basis of scriptural evidence that God creates all his works in wisdom 
and loves everything he makes and furthermore in the biblical creation story God looked on his pre-
human creation and declared it good, before he made mankind. Grisez concludes from this that non-
human nature has value in itself and is not merely valuable as instrumental to human purposes.360 As 
I have shown in the previous section of this chapter, a broad appreciation of Grisez’s creation 
theology in the context of his thought on work and property is necessary to understanding his 
environmental ethics. Furthermore, the argument of this section is that Grisez’s cosmic eschatology 
is key to interpreting his thought on mission and vocation as integrally ecological. Given the 
connections Grisez draws between vocation and moral action this provides further evidence to 
support my thesis that his theological ethics can only be fully appreciated when viewed through the 
interpretive lens of his integral ecology. 
What Grisez seems to be saying is, firstly, that moral action is integral to the mission of the Church 
and to the particular vocations of individual Christians—their portion of the collective mission—and, 
secondly, that the eschatological goal of fulfilment in Christ is ecologically inclusive since the whole 
created order has inherent value as God’s good creation and therefore must be included within the 
scope of ‘all goods’ that will be subject to eschatological restoration to the Father in the Son. It 
seems apparent then, that the theological concept of flourishing for Grisez is an ecologically holistic 
notion. Once this point has been clarified it seems to me that it is no longer possible to read any part 
of Grisez’s theological ethics without perceiving its inherent ecological implications: the hermeneutic 
of his missiology together with his theology of work, creation and property provide a binocular focus 
that reveals a thoroughly green theological ethics.  
Grisez understands his own academic vocation as a faithful response to the second Vatican council’s 
prescription for renewal in moral theology. It therefore seems highly significant that he prefaces two 
of the three volumes of his systematic moral theology, Living a Christian Life and Difficult Moral 
Questions, with the same quotation from paragraph 38 and 39 of the Vatican II document Gaudium 
et Spes, and also comments on paragraph 39 in the prologue to Christian Moral Principles. The 
passage in question reflects on the eschatological ‘new earth and new heaven’ in which the good 
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fruits of our nature and effort will be ‘cleansed of all dirt, lit up and transformed, when Christ gives 
back to the Father an eternal and universal kingdom’.361 In a document noted for the paucity of its 
ecological content, it is interesting that the paragraph Grisez singles out as centrally significant for 
his work cautions that the temporal and the eternal need to be kept in balance in the Christian life 
and reminds us that ‘the expectation of a new earth ought not to dampen but rather to enkindle our 
concern for cultivating this earth.’ Grisez clearly has this passage in mind in his discussion of the 
Church’s mission and the role of the natural world in salvation, since he refers to paragraph 39 as 
authority for his assertion that all the elements of the temporal order ‘are destined for a place in the 
kingdom, where all goods will be restored to God in Jesus.’362 
Precisely because this passage from Gaudium et Spes is identified by Grisez himself as the 
cornerstone of his whole project, his reflections on the passage elsewhere in his work are likely to be 
the fruit of much reflection and cannot be dismissed as anomalous in the context of his larger work. 
It therefore seems reasonable to argue that interpretations that overlook the ecological boundaries 
within which Grisez constructs his natural law ethics seriously misconstrue his moral theology. That 
this reading of Grisez is novel and significant is evident from a lack of engagement by the Grisez 
School in ethical analysis of contemporary ecological challenges and—as we shall see later in this 
chapter—from the misinterpretation of his work by environmentalist scholars. Disciples and critics 
alike appear to share the assumption that Grisez’s ethics is irrelevant or even inherently inhospitable 
to ecological engagement. This thesis challenges this assumption, opening up new vistas for what 
may be an important conversation between environmentalists and conservative Catholic disciples of 
Germain Grisez.   
Integral ecology and the new natural law 
Having looked at Grisez’s ecological ethics in the context of his theology of work and property and 
the ecological sensitivity integral to his eschatology, his missiology and his thought on personal 
vocation, it remains to analyse the integral ecology within his overall natural law ethics in order to 
substantiate my thesis that the substructure of Grisez School ethics is irreducibly ecological. In order 
to make this case I shall first present an exposition of the structural core of the new natural law, 
followed by a discussion of the ecological implications of key pillars of the theory. 
The structural core of Grisez School ethics 
This summary of the structural elements of the new natural law aims to address three questions 
central to the Grisez School’s proposed reconstruction of natural law: Why is a reconstruction of 
natural law needed? What are the goals of the moral life and how shall we choose and act in order 
to direct our moral lives to these ends?  
Over the years, Grisez and his team of collaborators have produced various formulations of their 
theory. The account that follows draws on an article by Grisez, Finnis and Boyle, which Biggar and 
Black describe as ‘the most philosophically precise account of their mature work’,363 fleshed out 
where necessary with reference to Finnis’s Natural Law and Natural Rights and Fundamentals of 
Ethics and Grisez’s Christian Moral Principles.  
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Why is a new natural law needed? 
Our first question—why was there a need for a reconstruction or revival of natural law?—relates to 
the history of theological ethics and the part that Grisez’s work has played in its unfolding. The 
perceived need for a new version of natural law arose, for Grisez, in response to discernment within 
the Catholic Church of substantial and logical inadequacies in classical articulations of the theory. For 
two decades—beginning in 1977 and culminating in the publication in three volumes of his magnum 
opus, The Way of the Lord Jesus—Grisez’s life and work was structured around his vocation as a 
theological ethicist to answer Vatican II’s call for renewal in moral theology.364 Grisez’s new natural 
law theory aims to provide a philosophically coherent and theologically cogent framework for moral 
reasoning that will assist people to live life to the full in community with others. Grisez critiques 
Scholastic versions of natural law as over-focused on heaven and hell—and hence inadequate in 
providing guidance on the meaning and value of the present life—as well as essentialist, legalistic, 
static in character and lacking a positive vision of how to respond morally to the unfolding of new 
possibilities for human fulfilment.  
Even more significant for Grisez than this list of flaws in classical accounts of natural law is what he 
calls the ‘logically illicit step’ of deriving normative conclusions from factual premises. The necessity 
of reconstructing natural law to avoid this logical error is a key conceptual presupposition of Grisez 
School ethics. Their solution to the naturalistic fallacy represents one philosophically coherent 
approach to this problem and is founded on the distinction they make between theoretical and 
practical reason and their careful articulation of the relationship between the two. For Grisez, 
theoretical reason establishes the truth of a proposition by testing it’s conformity to some prior 
reality through inductive or deductive reasoning. By contrast, practical reason is intelligence applied 
to propositions for action that will bring a new reality into being; it is reason applied to the exercise 
of free choice. That human beings are capable of such choice is—on their own account—perhaps the 
most important conceptual presupposition of the Grisez School’s ethical framework,365 since they 
hold it to be significantly constitutive both of personal character and of human fulfilment.366  
So in answer to our question ‘why is a new natural law needed’ the Grisez School response is that 
older manifestations of the natural law tradition were compromised and inadequate, a problem that 
had been discerned by the Church, who challenged theological ethicists to respond to the resulting 
moral lacuna. Taking up this challenge Germain Grisez dedicated his life and work as a moral 
theologian to constructing the theoretical framework of the new natural law.  
What goals should we pursue? 
Grisez School ethics provides a two-fold response to our second question: what goals should we 
pursue in the moral life? On their account, we should pursue intelligible human goods—the 
dimensions of human flourishing—both for the sake of flourishing itself and in the process to 
promote good character development. For Grisez, as for Stanley Hauerwas, virtues and vices are 
considered to be the residue of one’s previous acts as the predisposition to engage in further acts 
similar in moral quality to those which established the disposition through habituation.367 Thus there 
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is a reciprocal relationship between character and conduct: how one behaves is constitutive of 
character as well as promoting or impeding the actualisation of human flourishing. If we want to act 
well and promote positive development of our character by entrenching the disposition to act well, 
we need to have some substantive notion of what human flourishing entails, so that we can choose 
to act consistently with the pursuit of flourishing. If we interrogate our own actions and those of 
others, we find that there exists a set of goals towards which human behaviour is ultimately 
directed, and from this more general set we can identify those that can be described as ‘basic 
intelligible goods.’ Physical pleasure, although it is frequently the object of human desire is not 
amongst the Grisez School list of goods, on grounds that it is a sensory and not an intelligible goal 
and lacks the requisite connection to human flourishing. It is important to note, however, that the 
pursuit of genuine human fulfilment can be pleasurable, for example: spending time in the company 
of friends is usually accompanied by warm feelings and developing skill in playing the violin brings 
pleasurable feelings of accomplishment and aesthetic appreciation. Autonomy or freedom is another 
potential candidate for the list that is rejected by the Grisez School, in this case because it is a 
prerequisite of the moral life rather than a good to be pursued by persons already endowed with 
autonomy in moral decision making.  
Finnis suggests a list of seven basic goods: life and procreation, knowledge, some degree of 
excellence in work and play, aesthetic experience, sociability or friendship, practical reasonableness 
and religion.368 These goods are basic in the sense that they provide reasons for acting that require 
no further explanation, for example a decision to go out with friends requires no more ultimate 
explanation than the pursuit of friendship itself; it is self-evident to anyone who has experienced 
friendship that its pursuit fosters human flourishing. For the Grisez School the goods are pre-moral: 
since they provide a general explanation of reasons people have for acting, the pursuit of these 
same goods is frequently the motive behind behaviour that is immoral. Biggar and Black cite the 
example of a terrorist who chooses evil means to a good end, believing that bombing civilians will 
achieve justice for his oppressed people. Social justice is a constituent of Finnis’s good of sociability 
or friendship, but the fact that it can be pursued through destructive violence with disregard for the 
lives of innocent people demonstrates that it is a pre-moral good: intending a good outcome—even 
if its achievement through evil means is certain—does not make the action itself moral for the Grisez 
School. A further feature of the goods is that they are incommensurable and non-hierarchical: they 
cannot be ranked or compared, since each is a distinct reason for acting and there is no more basic 
value to act as common coinage to trade them against each other. For example, there is no reason 
intrinsic to the goods themselves to choose to stay in and study—in pursuit of the good of 
knowledge—rather than to spend time in the company of friends. Some extrinsic consideration is 
required—in this case consideration of how best to balance vocational and social goals within a suite 
of personal commitments. It is an important feature of Grisez School ethics that this requirement of 
balancing admits of plural moral judgements, depending not only on the personal vocation of the 
agent but also by the community and culture that shape the particularity of lives embedded in social 
structures. As Biggar and Black explain: 
This is an important feature to highlight, because claims for a set of goods can appear to express a 
questionable Enlightenment universalism. In the case of the Grisez School, the combination of the 
diversity of goods, their incommensurability and their non-hierarchical relationship provides both an 
explanation of cultural diversity and a strong basis for affirming its value. […] contrary to many 
                                                          
368
 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 59–99. 
 94 
perceptions of natural law theory, this new account provides a basis for explaining and affirming moral 
diversity, rather than a target for it. Nevertheless, alongside its valuing of cultural diversity, the theory 
retains a capacity to provide a universal moral critique of extreme behaviour or cultural practices such 
as genocide, apartheid or female circumcision.
369
 
The science of anthropology—as Biggar and Black point out—compares the behaviours of different 
peoples and cultures and is theoretically predicated on the existence of some account of basic 
human goods that are capable of being pursued in culturally diverse ways: without such an account 
the behaviour of people in other societies would be literally inexplicable. 
Finnis considers his proposed list of goods as open to modification, but on the basis of his own 
reflection it seems to him that these seven goods are all the basic goals of human action and that 
any other purpose which you or I might recognise and pursue will turn out to represent or consist of 
some aspect of some or all of them. Indeed, as Sabina Alkire’s careful analysis and comparison of 
different accounts of the dimensions of human flourishing shows, there does seem to be substantial 
empirical evidence for a surprisingly extensive cross-cultural consensus on the basic human goods.370 
So the Grisez School response to our second question ‘what goals should we pursue in the moral life’ 
is that we should act for basic intelligible human goods in pursuit of flourishing—as reasoning social 
beings—and in so doing we should also pursue self-improvement, aiming to conform our character 
ever more closely to the ideal of Christian virtue. 
How should we choose and act? 
The third question we need to address to complete our exposition of the structural core of Grisez 
School ethics is: how should we make choices in acting for the goods we have identified? The Grisez 
School system of natural law takes as its self-evident first principle St Thomas’s dictum ‘Bonum est 
faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum’ (the good is to be done and pursued and evil 
avoided). For Aquinas the good simply is that which all things pursue, hence—on Grisez’s 
interpretation—this is the first principle of practical reasoning itself.371 Every creature in so far as its 
environment allows, naturally unfolds its development towards full flourishing as a member of its 
natural kind. Our own species—endowed with natural capacities for free choice and rational self-
direction—is uniquely able to participate in the Divine plan through intelligent and active pursuit of 
the dimensions of our own flourishing. The Grisez School formulate the first principle of morality as: 
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and 
otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will towards integral 
human fulfilment.
372
  
For both Grisez and Finnis, being moral equates to being completely practically reasonable in making 
decisions about how to pursue human fulfilment although they provide different accounts of how 
this overall requirement translates into normative injunctions.  
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Requirements of practical reasonableness 
For Finnis, practical reasonableness is both a constituent of human flourishing and the mechanism 
by which it is to be pursued. Practical reasonableness is realised in persons who have the good 
fortune to be accorded the freedom to shape their own lives and the wisdom and virtue to invest 
their opportunities in the constructive pursuit of goods that—as we have seen—collectively 
delineate contours of the flourishing life. Finnis’s ‘requirements of practical reasonableness’ spell 
out the logical consequences of a commitment to the pursuit of happiness guided by intelligent 
reflection on options for action; he begins his reflection on moral reason by agreeing with John 
Rawls that every mature person should formulate a rational plan of life. This creates a framework of 
commitment to a harmonious set of purposes and orientations that organise practical choices 
towards becoming the person one aspires to be. In the light of our finite life-span and the broad 
horizons of our freedom, some general commitments and projects—formulated in light of personal 
preferences, talents and circumstances—are necessary to give our lives focus and direction. 
However, Finnis takes issue with Rawls’s ‘thin’ theory of the good which treats only liberty, 
opportunity, wealth and self-respect as primary goods in the interests of democratic impartiality 
between differing comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the good life: Finnis’s second 
requirement is that the agent should not arbitrarily exclude any basic good from his moral 
deliberation, since full flourishing requires the harmonious pursuit of all the basic goods. A coherent 
life-plan may include focus on particular goods at the expense of others, but the decision to close off 
opportunities for flourishing should not be arbitrary but rationally chosen. 
For Finnis—as for Rawls—participation in some form of social contract is integral to human 
flourishing and hence practical reasonableness requires that one should show no partiality between 
persons in pursuing the goods. Finnis compares this third requirement to the Golden Rule, to the 
Kantian principle that moral judgements be universalisable and to Rawls’s heuristic device of the 
‘veil of ignorance’ behind which contracting parties in the original position choose fair terms of 
engagement with others in founding a society. 
In order to pursue a rational plan of life in the midst of uncertainties beyond one’s control, some 
degree of flexibility is required to make the most of opportunities that arise and to weather the 
collapse of projects to which one had committed time and energy. However given the costs involved 
in rethinking objectives, retraining and diverting energies into some other life-plan, it would not be 
reasonable to abandon long-term commitments on a whim. Hence Finnis’s fourth and fifth 
requirements are that we should pursue our projects with reasonable detachment and commitment. 
We should adopt efficient strategies for achieving our objectives to avoid wasting effort and 
opportunity. For Finnis, consequentialist analysis—which he rejects as an overall mechanism for 
moral reasoning—is nevertheless relevant to this sixth requirement of practical reasonableness. 
However the seventh requirement—that one should respect every basic good in every act—
prohibits the pursuit of good consequences through evil means and gives Finnis’s natural law its 
standing as a bulwark against those species of consequentialism that would deny all moral absolutes 
in the face of sufficiently dire consequences. Finnis compares this requirement to Kant’s categorical 
imperative. 
Underpinning most of our concrete moral duties is the requirement that we should foster the 
common good of our communities, Finnis’s eighth requirement. Finally, since the moral life for Finnis 
is the rational pursuit of flourishing, one must act in accordance with conscience understood as the 
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conscious fruits of moral deliberation. The nine requirements of practical reasoning organise and 
direct the moral life; the person who conscientiously strives to live according to these principles 
aspires to live a good life and to the extent that she succeeds constitutes her own character as a 
wise and virtuous person capable of being salt and light in a fallen world. Finnis tells us that ‘each of 
the requirements can be thought of as a mode of moral obligation or responsibility’ alluding to 
Grisez’s formulation of the principles of the moral life as modes of responsibility and response to the 
Christian calling.  
Modes of Responsibility and Response 
For Grisez, the first principle of morality needs further specification to give us a set of requirements 
for a moral life; he advocates eight such intermediate principles which he calls ‘modes of 
responsibility’. Each mode ‘excludes a certain unreasonable way of willing, a particular way of acting 
which is inconsistent with a will towards integral human fulfilment.’373 A theme running through 
Grisez’s eight modes is the variety of ways in which our emotional lives can betray us into acting 
against the intelligible goods that constitute real human flourishing. However the aim of the moral 
life is not to extinguish or ignore our emotional life but to restrain and discipline its destructive 
excesses as the process of sanctification moves us closer to the alignment between desire and duty 
characteristic of the virtuous. 
The Christian ‘modes of response’ are—for Grisez—‘ways of acting characteristic of a person whose 
will, enlivened by charity, is directed in hope towards the fulfilment of everything in Jesus’.374 They 
are faith’s specification and charity’s fulfilment of the eight modes of responsibility, which forbid 
that which is incompatible with a will toward integral human fulfilment. These principles of the 
Christian life are more like blessings than demands, since the grace of God which reveals them also 
leads the Christian to conform his will to their fulfilment. Each mode of response corresponds to one 
of the Beatitudes proclaimed by Christ in his Sermon on the Mount, the virtues Jesus identified as 
traits of the blessed transform the dry bones of the modes of responsibility into the living flesh of 
the Christian moral life in response to God’s calling. 
So in answer to our third question ‘how should we pursue flourishing’ the Grisez School respond that 
we should discern our individual vocation—in secular terms ‘formulate a rational plan of life’—and 
structure our lives through this overall commitment. In the light of this framework for personal 
discipleship, we should reflect conscientiously before acting and choose only those options that are 
‘practically reasonable’ which is to say those options that are compatible with a will towards 
flourishing and with our vocational commitments.    
Integral ecology 
This thesis argues that Germain Grisez’s theological ethics is shot through with ecological sensitivity 
such that to ignore his environmental strands of thought is to misconstrue his whole project in moral 
theology. To make my case for this conclusion I have shown how, in situating his teaching on sub-
human nature within his broader discussion of work and property ethics, Grisez articulates an 
authentically Catholic and integrally ecological concept of human responsibilities and dominion over 
nature in our capacities as workers and property owners. I have also shown that Grisez’s eschatology 
as well as his teaching on mission and vocation is ecologically inclusive, exhorting all Christians to 
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discern their own unique calling within the collective task of the Church: to share the Gospel, serve 
human persons and cultivate this earth through acts of charity in anticipation of the day when the 
whole of creation will be freed from slavery to vanity, when Christ gives back to the Father an 
eternal and universal kingdom. It remains to demonstrate that the new natural law is itself 
inherently ecological; in order to make my case I shall begin with the connections between vocation 
and practical reasonableness, followed by a discussion of the ecological implications of pursuing the 
basic human goods and the disputed potential for the revival of natural law to speak to our situation 
of ecological crisis. 
Finnis’s first requirement of practical reasonableness is that every agent should adopt a rational plan 
of life. As we have seen this secular formulation mirrors Grisez’s theological exhortation to the 
faithful to discern our personal vocation, through which we will participate in Christ’s work of 
redemption, in the light of our talents and opportunities. For both Finnis and Grisez, the moral life is 
structured by an overarching vocational commitment: If—like Grisez—I am called to undertake the 
task of moral theologian as my role and service to the Church, the whole of my moral life is 
constructed around this framework. This has implications for my acquisition and use of property 
since—as we have seen—reasonable ownership is limited to that which is either necessary for life 
and health or suited to my vocational role. It has implications for work and training: under the 
umbrella of my vocational commitment, I must exercise environmental responsibility and work for 
the common good in collaboration with other people of good will within the community delineated 
by our shared vocation. And it has implications for every choice I make in the exercise of my 
freedom and responsibility as the organising principle of my moral life. If practical reasonableness 
itself and the basic intelligible goods I am pursuing have an ecological dimension, as I hope to show, 
the moral life cannot but walk in lock-step with environmental values. 
If my vocation—and every other plan of life open to human choice—has an element of 
environmental responsibility built into its very foundations in this way, and vocational commitment 
is the cornerstone of participation in the moral life, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
substructure of Grisez School ethics is integrally ecological. However it seems to me that not only 
the foundations but also the pillars and arches of the new natural law are green to the core: Each of 
the basic goods has its ecological dimension. Life and procreation are ecologically dependent: to 
ensure the preservation of this good for the benefit of future generations it is essential that we 
respect the natural limits of the system that supports human life and fertility. The possibility of 
pursuing knowledge of other species and ecosystems will be curtailed if we do not act to preserve 
biodiversity. Work and play—as we have seen—have built-in environmental responsibility 
requirements; aesthetic experience is frequently sought and found in the beautiful forms in nature 
(as Finnis himself asserts in Natural Law and Natural Rights).375 Friendship and sociability require 
other-centeredness and respect for the common good including its ecological dimension. Practical 
reasonableness presupposes all the virtues, including moderation in the consumption and use of 
natural entities and authentic religion requires respect for the creator and commitment to 
responsible exercise of human dominion over the natural world. Sabina Alkire recommends the 
addition of a separate dimension of flourishing that she calls ‘harmony with the natural world’ to 
Finnis’s list of basic goods, but she acknowledges the ecological implications of the existing 
dimensions: 
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Nussbaum proposes ‘being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world 
of nature as a basic capability. Is this a basic reason distinct from those already discussed? Part of the 
value of harmony with the non-human environment is aesthetic—for example the beauty of crashing 
waves or of a soaring heron. Part of the value of the environment to people is that it provides life—
nourishment and security—and is also instrumental to work and leisure. Part of the value of animals is 
instrumental, if they are for food or work or security and ones relationship to domestic animals also 
partakes in a limited way of the value of friendship. Part of being at harmony with nature is very much 
like being at harmony with a greater-than-human source of meaning and value—and indeed Finnis 
earlier described this dimension as ‘harmony between oneself and the wider reaches of reality’. 
Nevertheless, I would propose harmony with the natural world as a distinct reason for action since it is 
not reducible to the other aspects of human relatedness, i.e. harmony between all the dimensions 
within the self, with other people and with God.
376
     
Having argued that for the Grisez School the concepts of mission and vocation, the requirements of 
practical reasonableness and the basic dimensions of the flourishing life all reveal an authentic 
Catholic integral ecology, it remains to ask whether the overarching approach adopted in Grisez’s 
reconstruction of natural law theory is hospitable to the environmental agenda. Michael Northcott, 
having argued in The Environment and Christian Ethics that a suitably modified form of the theory 
could be pressed into service in relation to environmental ethics, retracted this in his paper ‘The 
Moral Standing of Nature and the New Natural Law’ for Biggar and Black’s collection of essays. 
Northcott argued there that ‘the Grisez-Finnis restatement of the natural law tradition is more 
flawed than I earlier proposed, and in particular that their uniquely modern reconceptualization of 
natural law in deontological terms seriously disables the tradition as a vehicle for establishing the 
moral standing of nature and the duties we owe to the natural world.’ Northcott and others argue 
that a naturalist, Thomist reconstruction of natural law is required to overcome the flaws in Grisez 
School ethics as a conceptual framework for ecological values. My next section analyses the 
arguments of Grisez’s environmentalist critics. Discussion of whether and how a more traditional 
Thomist natural law theory might rise from the ashes of scholasticism in the light of the fact-value 
distinction, and whether this might be a more fruitful approach for ecological engagement is 
deferred to chapter five.       
(2) Conflict and common ground with Environmentalists 
There have been few recent attempts to relate natural law theory to environmental ethics.377 James 
Nash378 advocates the idea of ‘ecosystem compatibility’ as an important moral norm and a corrective 
to what he sees as ‘the serious ecological deficiencies in the natural law tradition’; he cites Robert 
George’s edited collection Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays379 as evidence that natural law 
is not merely an historical curio but shows signs of recovery in contemporary legal philosophy. 
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However his essay does not engage seriously with the Grisez School or attempt to apply their 
methodology to environmental ethics. Michael Northcott—as we have seen—commends the Finnis-
Grisez theory as a resource for environmental ethics in The Environment and Christian Ethics,380 but 
repudiates this in a later article, in which he dismisses Grisez’s work as incapable of ‘ecological 
repristination’ because it comprises ‘a restatement of classic Christian anthropocentricism, which 
has traditionally involved the exaltation of the theme of dominion over other themes which also find 
Biblical warrant—such as those of stewardship, asceticism, and community between nature and 
humans’.381 Donnelly and Bishop also see the scope for ecological recovery of the new natural law as 
limited, since for them the theory’s anthropocentricism means that it ‘can provide a strong rationale 
for environmental protection [only] so long as specifically human goods are at stake’; 382 they look to 
other versions of Thomism for a philosophical defence of biocentric principles. My aim in this section 
is to explore the conflict and common ground between Grisez and his environmentalist critics, to 
make the case that the flaws in Grisez’s articulation of Christian environmental responsibility are less 
pervasive than his critics have supposed and that the extent of their common agenda is more 
promising for future engagement. In pursuit of this aim I shall analyse and critique Michael 
Northcott’s position and that of Donnelly and Bishop on Grisez School environmentalism. 
Michael Northcott 
Michael Northcott poses a serious challenge to the whole project of ecological engagement with 
Grisez’s work and identifies aspects of Grisez’s position on animal rights as particularly problematic. 
It is worth giving careful consideration to Northcott’s critique, in view of which I quote at length 
from his 2000 article ‘The Moral Standing of Nature and the New Natural Law’: 
Grisez’s position is a restatement of classic Christian anthropocentricism, which has traditionally 
involved the exaltation of the theme of dominion over other themes which also find Biblical warrant — 
such as those of stewardship, asceticism and community between nature and humans. Lynn White was 
the first among many scholars to draw attention to this anthropocentricism in the origins of the current 
global crisis of the environment. Despite Grisez’s principal qualification of this position (that sub-
personal creatures have God-given inherent value) his approach gives weak moral grounds for ascribing 
weight to the inherent value of nature independently of human needs. Therefore it gives insufficient 
support to attempts by lawyers, philosophers and citizens to resist the ecological depredations of 
corporations and governments through economic developments that are said to meet human needs. 
While Grisez might concede that, in particular cases such as the Sierra Nevada or Sarawak, clear-cutting 
forests to feed the human demand for paper and plywood is not a reasonable use of nature, his 
insistence that the ultimate good of trees is dependent on their potential for use by (redeemed) 
persons prevents their being granted the moral and legal standing for the general regulation of such 
use. 
The weakness of Grisez’s position from an environmental perspective is even more clearly manifest in 
his treatment of the status of animals. He begins by dismissing the concept of animal rights, arguing 
that their ascription to animals undermines their ascription to humans since animals have no sense of 
moral obligation and cannot therefore share moral status analogous to that of persons. The priority in 
the consideration of the treatment of animals is therefore the needs of persons, and not of animals 
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themselves. Although they are part of God’s good creation, cruelty towards them is intrinsically bad 
only when this treatment does not clearly serve human benefit: ‘it is cruel to cause animals pain by 
misusing them for activities which serve no basic good of persons, for example purported experiments 
which offer no reasonable prospect of advancing scientific knowledge.’ However the clear implication is 
that it is not cruel to cause animals pain when there is such a prospect. The reason why pain has no 
determinate moral significance for animals as it does for humans is because ‘animals’ lives are ‘not 
sacred as human life is’ and hence ‘their suffering cannot have the spiritual and moral meaning human 
suffering has’.
383
  
As can clearly be seen from my exposition of Grisez’s environmental ethics, Northcott’s dismissal of 
the new natural law as destructively ‘anthropocentric’ is too sweeping. Whilst Grisez’s animal ethics 
is open to the charge of anthropocentricism, his overall ecological consciousness is more nuanced; 
his acknowledgment of the inherent meaning and value of pre-human creation is much more 
significant than Northcott allows and the inherent ecological dimension of Grisez’s concept of 
human flourishing in addition to his explicit teaching on immoral models of development—both of 
which Northcott overlooks—contradicts Northcott’s suggestion that his ethics could be used to 
justify ecological destruction on grounds that economic development meets human needs.   
Grisez asserts that the wrong use of natural things not only impedes the true fulfilment of their 
human abuser but also harms the thing itself since, rather than fulfilling its divinely given 
potentialities: 
Immoral use always partly displaces and blocks their fulfilment. Thus because the bad human act 
conflicts with the God-given direction of practical reason, it violates the subpersonal creature’s inherent 
meaning and value. If the action is morally bad, culture damages nature as devastation replaces the 
wilderness, for in this case bad human acts fail to cooperate with and complete God’s creative work.
384
  
Grisez seems here to be advocating a biocentric view: that human abuse of natural entities is wrong 
because it violates their inherent value and obstructs the fulfilment of their God-given potential. In 
addition he is scathing in his critique of ecologically destructive models of development which he 
attributes to an atheist worldview that regards nature as nothing more than material for 
exploitation: 
This irreligious view provides a rationale for treating nature without piety, that is, without limits 
grounded in deep respect for subhuman things. Development then means unrestricted exploitation, 
which leads to irreversible changes in the natural world and tends to exhaust natural resources. Yet 
many people pursue this sort of development without recognising any limit except self-interest, which, 
at best, embraces the long-term interests of themselves and those they care for. As they treat the world 
without reverence towards God the creator, those enjoying the fruits of such development are further 
enriched and the poor further impoverished.
385
  
Furthermore, Grisez does not defend an unfettered concept of dominion386 as Northcott suggests; 
he clearly argues that human dominion over nature is not to be seen as unrestricted power but as 
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exercise of responsibility within a community of creatures and limited by moral norms.387 Morally 
acceptable human use of nature, for Grisez, is restricted to the reasonable pursuit of sustainable 
development, in the context of a proper respect for the creator God, for the inherent meaning and 
value of all God’s beloved creatures and for the integrity of creation itself, which God gives not to 
individual humans, or to collectives such as the corporations and governments Northcott accuses of 
ecological depredations, but to all of us in perpetuity as the common patrimony of humankind. 
It is not at all clear why Northcott concludes that Christopher Stone’s thesis388 — that the rights of 
natural entities might be recognised using the legal fiction of personhood that was created to 
attribute responsibility collectively to bodies such as trusts, corporations or public institutions — 
might be undermined by Grisez’s theological argument that the ultimate eschatological good of 
trees is dependent on their use and appreciation by redeemed persons. For Grisez, it is clear that all 
of nature is to share in redemption, although ‘precisely how subpersonal creation will exist in the 
kingdom remains mysterious.’389 But since he argues that Christians should help to liberate and 
renew subpersonal creation, his moral theology would seem to provide encouragement for Christian 
environmentalism and resistance to ecological depredation, whereas his denial of ‘rights’ for animals 
and other natural entities on a metaphysical level does not affect the technical mechanisms 
discussed by Stone and others as possibilities for extending legal protection to trees, since such legal 
mechanisms do not require the recognition of any actual moral rights for the entity concerned. 
For the purposes of this chapter the key point on the issue of animal liberation is that Northcott 
correctly identifies a serious problem with Grisez’s position on cruelty to animals. It is difficult to 
avoid the implication in Grisez’s brief discussion of medical experimentation that it is not only 
acceptable but somehow ‘not cruel’ to cause suffering to animals in experiments that hold out 
legitimate hope of improving medical provision for human patients. He seems in danger at this point 
of slipping into a consequentialist justification of cruelty and his denial of ‘rights’ to animals removes 
the buttress he builds against such arguments in relation to cruel treatment of human subjects 
where the interests of others are at stake. However Northcott misreads Grisez’s argument for 
denying the existence of ‘animal rights’: Grisez does not argue that animals cannot share moral 
status analogous to that of persons since they have no sense of moral obligation. Indeed Grisez 
could not hold such a position and coherently argue for the full personhood of human embryos and 
senile or seriously mentally disabled human persons. What Grisez actually asserts is that human 
beings by and large lack any ‘common sense’ intuition that they themselves have moral obligations 
towards animals such as ‘rats and skunks’.390 Grisez’s argument at this point is not persuasive; it 
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seems detached from—even arguably in conflict with—his hallmark natural law approach, which in 
other contexts seeks to replace commonly held but uncritical views with informed moral 
deliberation,391 but Northcott does not address this issue.  
Northcott also misrepresents Grisez’s argument in such a way as to suggest a callous and speciesist 
disregard for animal suffering. To the contrary, Grisez’s comment that ‘animal suffering cannot have 
the spiritual and moral meaning human suffering has’392 is made in the context of advocating that 
suffering animals should be killed where necessary to end their misery, whereas the sacredness of 
human life and the spiritual and moral meaning of human suffering implies, for Grisez, that 
euthanasia is never to be countenanced. Northcott quotes this out of context as the rationale for 
Grisez’s position on the pursuit of scientific and medical knowledge through experiments that cause 
suffering in animal subjects. In fact, for Grisez, pain has no ‘determinate moral significance’ for 
animals or for persons; frequently the right thing for a human to do is not that which produces the 
least pain. But deliberately to inflict pain on another human being without consent or to benefit 
another would transgress justice and ‘human rights’ requirements which Grisez’s system does not 
extend to animals. However such an extension would be completely compatible with Grisez’s 
worldview and would bring his currently ambivalent position on cruelty into alignment with his 
broadly compassionate and ecologically informed environmental ethics. 
In summary, I submit that Michael Northcott overlooks the biocentric elements of Grisez’s thought, 
overemphasising the anthropocentricism he associates with the idea of dominion and the pursuit of 
human goods. On my reading, Grisez’s environmental ethics is much more nuanced than Northcott 
allows, giving no warrant to abuse that obstructs the God given purpose, meaning and value of 
God’s nonhuman creatures and criticising both destructive models of development and an 
unfettered construction of the biblical concept of dominion. The idea of giving legal standing to 
natural entities—whether through Stone’s legal personhood construction or Mary Christina Wood’s 
proposal that the environment be construed as a trust held for the benefit of future generations—
seems to me to be in no way obstructed by Grisez’s anthropocentricism. Northcott’s objections to 
Grisez’s animal ethics are based on a misreading of his position, but they alert us to real problems 
with Grisez’s reasons for rejecting animal rights and his treatment of cruelty. 
Donnelly and Bishop      
Donnelly and Bishop focus on a dispute between Robert George and Jeffrey Goldsworthy as to 
whether a concept of ‘good’ is distinguishable from the pursuit of specifically human wellbeing.393 In 
context, George is defending the natural law position that the intelligible point of moral behaviour is 
the pursuit of human flourishing. Goldsworthy disputes this, using environmentalism as an example: 
‘some environmentalists value nature for its own sake and say that its conservation is good 
independently of its effect on the wellbeing of people or even of other creatures [hence] it is not 
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necessary that people believe that something is good for someone in order to believe they have a 
reason for action.’394 
It is important to note that the dispute here is not fundamentally about environmentalism; it is 
about whether an act can be good without contributing to human wellbeing. In ‘Fact and Value in 
the New Natural Law Theory’,395 Goldsworthy proposes a non-cognitivist critique of the Grisez 
School theory, to which George is responding in the essay cited by Donnelly and Bishop. George’s 
comment, which they construe as asserting that ecocentrism is ‘the fruit of emotion or ideology 
rather than reason or [...] a covert appeal to certain aspects of human wellbeing served by a healthy 
natural environment’ is taken out of context by Donnelly and Bishop.396 Here is Robert George’s 
point in full: 
It is apparently psychologically possible for people to value nature apart from its value to human beings. 
This does not however mean that action to preserve the non-human world other than for the sake of 
human values has an intelligible point. On the contrary, valuing nature in this way can only be 
accounted for as expressive of a purely emotional attachment or some sort of non-rational faith or 
ideology. Environmentalism has its rational appeal because people grasp the value for themselves and 
others (including members of future generations) of preserving nature. Unsurprisingly, 
environmentalists’ arguments characteristically appeal to human values: possible damage to human 
health, the potential loss for science and aesthetic experience, injustice to future generations and so 
forth. In any event I do not see how anyone who, laying these considerations aside, fails to see the 
value of environmental preservation as good-in-itself and thus providing a non-instrumental reason for 
action, could justly be accused of a failure of practical reason. More to the point, the fact that some 
people, whatever their subjective motivation, value nature apart from its value to human beings does 
not entail that specifically human values lack an intelligible point and must similarly be accounted for as 
merely expressive of feeling or desires.
397
 
Clearly, George is attempting to defend his natural law methodology, not stating the Grisez School 
position on environmentalism. In fact, as I have shown in the previous section of this chapter, for 
Grisez, not only is human wellbeing inseparable from considerations of ecological sustainability, he 
goes beyond anthropocentricism in acknowledging inherent meaning and value in pre-human 
creation and advocating respect for creation as an aspect of proper piety in the Christian life. Whilst 
the list of arguments that appeal to human values given by George as illustrative examples in the 
above quote is limited to anthropocentric human concerns, an exhaustive list of possible examples 
of the pursuit of human goods that would provide intelligible reasons for environmentalism, for 
Grisez—and presumably also for George—would include the good of participating in a relationship 
with God which for Grisez would also include conscientiously living a Christian life, of which respect 
for the inherent value of God’s creation is an integral part. Donnelly and Bishop argue that: 
In the classical natural law formulation human fulfilment cannot be realised by advancing only those 
capabilities that secure a benefit for us. Rather to ensure that we are aiming fully towards the 
completion of our being we need to pursue all the qualities that go, most essentially, to making us 
human. In turn, part of what does make us human is the capacity not only to advance our own ends but 
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also to appreciate that other entities have ends that may sometimes have a value that is worth pursuing 
for its own sake [...] the ability to perceive and to understand that other creatures have ends is part of 
what it means to be human.
398
  
It seems to me that there is nothing in this statement that the Grisez School would find 
objectionable or outside the bounds of their own conception of the moral life. Grisez argues for 
kindness to sentient animals, on the basis of their capacity for suffering and with no human 
advantage in view; he advocates human action to provide for harmless creatures and to conserve 
biodiversity, and he construes such actions as intelligible, in terms of his understanding of natural 
law morality, as requirements of the pursuit of right relationship with the creator God, an aspect of 
human flourishing. So although Donnelly and Bishop are correct in stating that ‘in the new natural 
law scheme we are not afforded the opportunity to ask whether there can be a reason for human 
action not connected to what is good for human beings’399 Grisez’s concept of what is good for 
human beings cannot be equated with the selfish pursuit of human desires and preferences but goes 
beyond anthropocentric human benefits to embrace a larger view of what is ‘good for us’ as social 
animals in a dependent relationship with the ecosystem and with the creator God who loves all his 
creatures and calls us to care for his world.  
In summary, Grisez’s environmentalist critics appear to overlook the substantial and valuable 
contribution to the field that Grisez articulates as an inherent part of his vision of the Christian moral 
life. Although Nash’s suggestion that a specific ecological dimension be added to the natural law 
conception of flourishing could be usefully incorporated into Grisez’s secular formulation of his 
ethics, it is clear that his moral theology includes a concept of inherent value and God-given meaning 
and purpose for natural entities that human beings should respect and even actively facilitate where 
possible, and his concept of ‘flourishing’ presupposes the limitations on human preference-
satisfaction imposed by ecosystem sustainability and the right of future generations to share in the 
ecological inheritance of God’s gift of creation. Northcott’s critique too quickly dismisses the 
biocentric facets of Grisez’s environmental ethics, overlooking the ecological dimension to Grisez’s 
concept of flourishing as well as his critique of unsustainable development. Northcott’s charge that 
Grisez’s ethics overemphasises ‘dominion’ and misconstrues this biblical doctrine in the ecologically 
destructive manner identified by Lynn White is simply mistaken, and although he is correct in 
pointing out Grisez’s ambivalence on the subject of cruelty to animals he misconstrues Grisez’s 
rationale for the position he adopts and misreads his argument for the conceptual rejection of 
animal rights. Donnelly and Bishop make a false distinction between Grisez School ethics and other 
species of Thomism and base their conclusions on Grisez’s environmentalism on a single paragraph 
from George’s work that is taken completely out of context. I would conclude therefore that, 
notwithstanding these three environmentalist critiques, there is much to be gained through an 
ecological engagement with Grisez’s ethics and the fact that both environmentalists and members of 
the Grisez School appear to have overlooked this aspect of his work does violence to a full 
appreciation of his legacy in respect of both his natural law and his Catholic ecological 
consciousness.    
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(3) A Grisez School Approach to the Climate Challenge 
The aim of this section is to draw out the aspects of Grisez’s theological ethics that are specifically 
relevant to the climate challenge400 and hence to construct a concept of climate justice and a 
response to the new environmental encyclical Laudato Si’ from a Grisez School perspective. 
Elsewhere I have reviewed one influential American contribution to the pre-Copenhagen climate 
debate, arguing that a natural rights perspective would be a more appropriate construction of the 
proposed climate treaty, which Posner and Weisbach construe as a legal instrument for the creation 
of a public good. I shall not rehearse the details of Posner and Weisbach’s argument here except in 
so far as is necessary to make my case. I shall argue that Grisez’s ethics confirm two of the three 
central claims of the climate justice movement that these authors dispute: that poor nations should 
not have to spend as much on emissions reductions as rich countries, that differentiated historical 
responsibility creates an obligation on Annex-I countries to take the lead, and that emissions permits 
should be allocated on a per-capita basis not grandfathered to existing emitters. This section 
concludes with a reflection on Laudato Si’ from a Grisez School perspective. 
Posner and Weisbach 
On the first issue, the question of differential burden sharing, Posner and Weisbach argue that 
claims based on redistributive justice are potentially in conflict with the imperative of agreeing a 
deal that will achieve the desired climate outcome. Furthermore, if wealthy nations agree to an 
abatement regime that is more ambitious than would be optimal on a cost-benefit analysis, this 
would have the consequence of redistributing wealth to the most vulnerable states, many of which 
are poor, but would be an inefficient and poorly targeted mechanism if redistribution were the 
desired outcome. And—crucially—if wealthy nations scale back their emissions whilst major emitters 
in the developing world do little or nothing, costs would escalate and the prospect of achieving the 
desired outcome would be jeopardised by ‘leakage’—the relocation of industry to areas not 
penalised by emissions caps. For these reasons the authors favour a symmetrical agreement with 
broad participation, although they conceded at the time of writing that there might be some 
headroom for developing countries to increase their emissions in the very short-run whilst they 
develop the institutional capacity to transition to a low-carbon economy. In the light of subsequent 
years of continuing increases in carbon emissions it is questionable whether they would now feel 
such concessions were compatible with achieving an ecologically acceptable outcome. 
The second contested claim concerns historical responsibility or ‘carbon debt’. Posner and Weisbach 
present data that purports to show that cumulative emissions attributable to developing nations are 
likely to equal those attributable to the industrialised world by as early as 2030. They also dispute 
the corrective justice model in principle, arguing that current Americans cannot be held responsible 
for the emissions of past generations, and that failing to cooperate with international abatement 
efforts—even after the first IPCC report, which many people regard as the date from which the 
negative consequences of climate change could no longer be regarded as unforeseeable—did not 
amount to negligence. Furthermore they argue that it is important to disentangle other historical 
grievances that risk miring the climate negotiations in interminable disputes over who owes what to 
whom. They therefore propose a forward-looking agreement that disregards the issue of historical 
responsibility. 
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The third argument, that everyone should have equal emissions rights, is widely seen as a 
requirement of justice. One version of this principle advocates allocation of permits in a cap-and-
trade scheme on a per-capita basis. Posner and Weisbach’s objection to this is largely pragmatic. In 
their view states cannot realistically be expected to enter into any agreement that substantially 
deviates from International Paretianism: all parties must be better off under the treaty than they 
would be without it, or—to the extent that they are not—must receive side-payments or other 
inducements to secure their cooperation. A global cap-and-trade scheme with per-capita allocation 
of permits breaches this requirement by in effect redistributing wealth on an unacceptably large 
scale from high per-capita emitters (not all of whom are wealthy) to low per-capita emitters (not all 
of whom are poor). Additionally they argue that any treaty that gives an advantage to the most 
populous states has unfortunate incentive effects. They contend not only that the US is likely to veto 
global cap-and-trade with per-capita permit allocation because of the redistributive consequences, 
but more contentiously that they are right to do so. Interestingly however, they point out that 
‘anyone who favours a treaty that stabilises greenhouse gas concentrations favours eventually 
moving towards roughly equal per-capita emissions’401 since contraction creates its own 
convergence. 
Burden Sharing, justice and Grisez School ethics 
On the first point, Grisez is extremely clear that differential burden sharing in mitigation of 
environmental harms is a requirement of justice, arguing that: 
Because poor individuals and societies have fewer alternatives, they may rightly accept side effects 
wrong for the wealthy to accept. Thus the affluent should willingly accept greater burdens in preventing 
and correcting pollution, rather than favouring measures which overburden the poor by imposing 
identical burdens on rich and poor alike.
402
  
This requirement is striking in its similarity to article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC):403 
The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
And principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in 
view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command.
404
 
                                                          
401
 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, p. 125. 
402
 Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, QE 5 (i) p. 815. 
403
 Article 3.1, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
404
 Principle 7, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, 
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio.declaration.1992/portrait.a4.pdf [accessed 20 
October 2015]. 
 107 
However, although it seems that Grisez would endorse the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities as a requirement of climate justice, it may be that the very real 
pragmatic, political difficulties in implementing asymmetrical greenhouse gas abatement pathways 
for different countries depending on their level of development could be accommodated in some 
other way, through compensatory development assistance or technology transfer under the clean 
development mechanism for example. Clearly as time goes on and emissions continue to rise, the 
available headroom for prioritising development needs envisaged in the framework convention is 
increasingly exhausted, forcing a situation in which an environmentally acceptable outcome will 
require rapid abatement efforts from all major emitters. But Posner and Weisbach claim not only 
that an asymmetric deal is impractical and politically unachievable (and, I would add, inadequate to 
the scale of the challenge) but that a forward-looking, symmetrical abatement regime is what 
climate justice requires. In principle, it would seem that Grisez would not support their position on 
this issue.  
On the second point, Grisez’s position on the duty to aid others who have been adversely affected 
by the actions of one’s own community seems relevant to the question of historical responsibility for 
climate change: 
Needs due to some sin or defect of a community to which one belongs (for example, misery in a region 
one’s own nation has devastated by unjust military action) deserve special consideration even if in no 
way one’s own fault (one did everything one could to prevent the injustice)
405
 
Grisez is extremely critical of the throw-away culture of materialistic lifestyles in the affluent world, 
commenting that ‘the essential conditions of human life on earth would suffer irreparable damage if 
everyone consumed and polluted at the same rate as people living in wealthier nations’406 adding: 
Moreover, considering what is now known about the environmental impact of many activities, the 
harm a person does to others by maintaining a wasteful, consumerist style of life can no longer be 
judged insignificant as it once was. Even if particular instances do little harm, the choice—and so the 
moral responsibility—usually does not concern those individual instances, since they result from the 
habits and policies of one’s style of life. In view of the harm to others resulting from one’s whole way of 
life, the choice not to undertake the practice of conservation and change one’s habits can hardly be a 
light matter.
407
 
In view of this critique of Western lifestyles, it would seem that Grisez cannot endorse Posner and 
Weisbach’s call for an amnesty on historical responsibility for climate change. Even those in the 
industrialised world who conscientiously endeavoured to live an ecologically responsible lifestyle are 
part of a community that has inflicted and continues to inflict harm on others through the pollution 
that accompanies a consumerist culture. We cannot disregard the universal Christian duty to aid the 
destitute, which Grisez derives from the doctrine of the universal destination of goods, nor can we 
evade the particular duty we owe those whose destitution is a result of climate change caused by 
our energy profligate culture. 
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Furthermore, as we have seen in chapter two of this thesis, it would seem that the US government 
were seriously at fault in interfering with independent scientific findings and stalling the climate 
negotiation process. On the evidence this would seem to amount at least to negligence, implying a 
moral duty to recompense those injured as a result. So it would seem that Grisez’s theological ethics 
leads us to the conclusion that citizens of industrialised societies in general and of the United States 
in particular are under an obligation to assist climate victims now suffering the impacts of historical 
emissions. At least since the time when the scientific basis of climate change was sufficiently well 
understood to reasonably foresee that harm to others would be caused by ongoing emissions, it 
would seem that parties who failed to take abatement action were at least negligent, and wilful 
distortion of evidence—where this has been shown to have occurred—makes the resultant injustice 
more serious. If Posner and Weisbach want to argue that the United States as sole super-power will 
exert disproportionate bargaining-power in the international arena, that is one thing, but to claim 
that such action meets the requirements of justice overstates the case.   
However, again, it is not necessary for a just outcome that the abatement aspect of the climate deal 
should fully reflect differential historical responsibilities, provided the principle of differential burden 
sharing is applied to the overall treaty such that historical wrongs are not simply imposed without 
redress on those least able to bear the burden. In addition, Grisez’s ethics mandates Christians to 
take personal responsibility for alleviating the plight of victims of injustice ‘even though the mass of 
human misery will be reduced only infinitesimally’ since the value of such action derives from ‘the 
immeasurable dignity of each person whose need is met.’408 And we should also be prepared to ‘co-
operate in using every morally acceptable means to mitigate and overcome structural injustices’409—
including unabated climate change—that are the cause of human misery. 
On the third issue, the sharing of emissions allowances: if one considers the atmosphere as the 
global commons, Grisez’s norm for the use of common property—that it should be shared fairly—
might be seen as applicable. This would seem to suggest in principle that equal per-capita emissions 
entitlements would be reasonable, notwithstanding the redistributive consequences of moving 
towards such an arrangement. Grisez’s discussion of state expropriation of property that is being 
unjustly used against the common good is also relevant here. On this basis, we might argue that 
those who are currently free to exploit more than their fair share of the atmospheric sink should not 
expect to be compensated for losses incurred when public authorities restrict their unjust activities 
for the common good. 
However, we must also consider Grisez’s construction of the state of nature in his discussion of the 
origins of property and the implication he himself draws from this: 
The universal destination of goods must be understood rightly. This principle does not mean that in the 
beginning human persons jointly owned the material world, with each having an equal share; no such 
primitive social order ever existed. Therefore the universal destination of goods does not imply even a 
basic or prima facie claim on the part of each individual to an equal portion of the world’s goods. The 
principle means, rather, that nothing in subhuman creation ever comes to be with a label saying: this 
good is meant for this person but not that one, this group but not that, people of this sort but not of 
that sort. Instead, both in the beginning and now, God provides all the riches of the material world for 
all people to use as he directs. His directions are the moral norms flowing from the principles of 
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practical reason, which human beings naturally know. Thus, God makes material goods available for all 
humans to use reasonably, that is, for the promotion and protection of true human goods, not only in 
the users but in others, by cooperating justly with their creator and with one another.
410
 
This passage seems to suggest that Grisez would not endorse the claim frequently made by the 
climate justice movement that equal per-capita shares in the atmospheric capacity should be 
construed as a natural right. However, as we have seen, he does argue strongly both that property 
ownership is primarily a responsibility to administer assets for the common good and that ownership 
does not imply any right to abuse or squander property.  
Grisez cautions against romantic environmentalism that takes no account of the costs of 
environmental legislation imposed through job-losses and increased costs of necessities that 
disproportionately impact the poor. This is of course true within nation states as well as between 
them: domestic legislation needs to take into consideration the negative impacts on the working 
poor of recessionary policy proposals designed to promote ecological security. 
On balance, I would conclude that Grisez’s ethics does not favour grandfathering of pollution rights, 
but he would endorse Posner and Weisbach’s proposal for parallel mitigation curves over Aubrey 
Meyer’s ‘Contraction and Convergence’ model.  
Laudato Si’: A Grisez School Response 
On 18 June 2015, whilst I was making final revisions to this thesis, Pope Francis published his long 
awaited encyclical on the environment, Laudato Si’. Since this development in Catholic social 
teaching is crucial to my academic interests, some response is clearly called for. My aim in this 
section is to offer a brief exposition of the new encyclical followed by a reflection on its content from 
the perspective of Grisez School environmental ethics. This reflection will focus on climate change 
and the links between this challenge and other aspects of the ecological crisis. I shall also comment 
briefly on animal ethics issues in Laudato Si’. 
In writing his environmental encyclical Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home,411 Pope Francis’s 
intention was not to settle disputed science or to replace politics,412 but to initiate an inclusive 
conversation413 with a clear articulation of the Catholic position, in the hope that an open and 
honest debate414 on how we address the ecological challenges of our times might ensue. The key 
features of the crisis identified in Laudato Si’ are pollution and climate change, depletion of water 
resources and the collapse in biodiversity. As regards the climate challenge, the Pope laments the 
failure of our collective efforts to bend the trajectory and identifies a number of factors that have 
contributed to this failure. One problem has been the inadequacy of our economic models to 
address intergenerational justice issues and to value ecosystem services appropriately.415 Another 
has been the failure of our systems of governance at all levels to respond robustly and on a scale 
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commensurate with the size of the challenge. As a ‘global commons problem’ climate security needs 
to be addressed at the international level and the lack of effective structures of global governance is 
problematic.416 Progress on implementation of the Rio principles and negotiations towards agreeing 
an enforceable treaty have been impeded by nation states prioritising their self-interest over the 
global common good.417 At the national and local levels of government, weak structures of 
governance, corruption and the breakdown of the rule of law in some places bodes ill for the 
enforcement of environmental legislation.418 Yet even where robust structures are in place, 
campaigns of misinformation, evasion of responsibility and the problem of political short-termism 
have resulted in slow progress.419 At every level Pope Francis discerns an absence of the culture and 
moral commitment necessary to confront a challenge of this magnitude.420 
The solution Laudato Si’ proposes requires action at every level focused on the global common good 
and integrating the imperative to care for creation with action to address poverty and uphold 
universal human dignity.421 On the political level, Pope Francis calls for an international treaty that 
adopts the polluter-pays422 and precautionary423 principles and incorporates intergenerational 
justice requirements and fair burden-sharing. In an unusually specific public policy interjection, 
carbon trading is dismissed as a mechanism for internalising the cost of pollution and incentivising 
behaviour change in industry.424 Although use of consumer pressure to push for moral change is 
commended425 there is no specific mention of divestment. However more generally, in the 
workplace, civil society and the family, everyone is exhorted to play their part in achieving the 
transition to climate security, through establishing green businesses and social enterprises, through 
consumer power, ecological citizenship and re-examining our lifestyles. The educational challenge 
goes beyond raising awareness of the science and politics of climate change, requiring moral 
education, nurturing of the virtues and a renewed attention to aesthetics as a motivator of creation 
care.426  
As regards the water crisis, Pope Francis reiterates established Catholic teaching on water as a 
human right, which gives rise to a ‘grave social debt’ towards those suffering from water poverty and 
thereby prevented from living lives commensurate with their dignity.427 He notes the connection 
between climate change and both food and water security issues, especially in Africa where crop 
yields are threatened by rising temperatures and drought.428  
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Pope Francis laments the collapse of marine biodiversity429 and stresses the inherent value of all 
God’s creatures,430 species431 and ecosystems.432 The concept of an ‘integral ecology’433 that links 
care for the vulnerable, including unborn children,434 to creation care is a central motif of the 
encyclical and St Francis of Assisi is held up as a model of this integration.435 Laudato Si’ forcefully 
rejects the idea that ‘dominion’ can be equated with a licence to exploit other animals.436 Although 
factory farming is not specifically addressed, civic support for small scale local production is 
commended,437 and—in the context of a discussion of medical experimentation—needlessly causing 
animals to suffer and die is condemned.438  
The encyclical is coloured throughout by Christian hope, insisting that love always proves more 
powerful than the forces of violence and disintegration, even in dire circumstances,439 since we are 
creatures with inalienable dignity as Imago Dei who were made for love. Hence gestures of 
generosity, solidarity and care cannot but well up in us440 and the potential to make a positive 
contribution to the collective challenge, entering into a civilisation of love441 that will protect human 
dignity and the environment, exists in every human heart. This gives us reason to hope that our 
generation will be remembered for generously shouldering our responsibilities,442 for the awakening 
of a new reverence for life, the firm resolve to achieve sustainability, the quickening of the struggle 
for justice and peace and the joyful celebration of life.443 
A Grisez School Response 
The encyclical—in keeping with the tradition of its genre—is an essay in moral theology in the light 
of papal discernment of the signs of the times. As the prominent Grisez Scholar Robert George 
correctly notes in a much discussed article444—published in anticipation of a focus on climate change 
in Laudato Si’—although the Pope can teach authoritatively on our moral responsibilities in relation 
to the natural environment, his teaching authority does not extend to scientific questions. Pope 
Francis acknowledges this, stating that the Church does not presume to settle scientific questions or 
to replace politics. Nevertheless he states baldly that a ‘frank look at the facts’ reveals the 
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dilapidation of our common home, and proceeds on the basis of an acceptance of the scientific 
consensus on anthropogenic global warming. Noting that some committed and prayerful Christians 
still tend to ridicule concern for the environment,445 Pope Francis makes clear his view that the 
climate crisis is an issue of such grave concern that even doomsday predictions can no longer be 
dismissed with irony.446  
Climate change has been described as ‘the ultimate global commons problem’:447 the atmosphere is 
vulnerable to over-exploitation unless a concerted international effort is made to address the carbon 
pollution that arises from disparate sources and exerts its warming effects in geographically distant 
locations. In this context, Pope Francis reiterates the call of his predecessors in office for a ‘true 
world political authority.’448 Such a project is likely to prove unpopular in the United States, 
especially amongst political conservatives, yet—perhaps surprisingly—Germain Grisez urges 
Catholics to support international collaboration towards developing such an institution: 
Since there is a universal common good, the good of humankind as a whole, which neither national 
governments nor existing international organisations adequately serve, Catholics should support the 
self-limitation of its sovereignty on behalf of their nation and its collaboration in developing a 
worldwide political authority capable of discerning and evaluating problems which affect the universal 
common good and effectively directing international cooperation towards their just resolution. Pending 
the development of such an authority, Catholics should support the participation of their government in 
existing international organisations to the extent the activities of the latter seem to serve the 
international common good.
449
 
Pope Francis asserts the urgent need for an enforceable international agreement and global 
regulatory norms to impose obligations and prevent unacceptable actions.450 He laments the fact 
that international negotiations cannot make significant progress due to positions taken by countries 
which place their national interest above the global common good.451 In Climate Change Justice, 
Posner and Weisbach insist that the only way to ensure broad participation in a climate treaty is to 
build into its design the requirement of International Paretianism—each individual nation state must 
be better off under the treaty than without it or at least not much worse off: national abatement 
costs cannot be significantly more than benefits in the form of avoided climate-related harms.452 The 
international negotiation arena, on this analysis, is essentially a Hobbesian state of nature in which it 
is unexceptional for countries to place their own national interest above the global common good. 
Clearly, neither Germain Grisez nor Pope Francis would accept their argument or the national 
negotiating positions that have been adopted on this basis. 
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For Pope Francis, an international climate treaty must meet the requirements of intergenerational 
justice453 and fair burden-sharing.454 As regards intergenerational justice, it has been a long-standing 
tenet of Catholic social teaching that the environment is a gift from God; Grisez quotes John Paul II: 
‘humanity has in its possession a gift that must be passed on to future generations, if possible, 
passed on in better condition’;455 Catholic teaching on the equal dignity of persons and the rights of 
the unborn are of a piece with concern for posterity. As regards fair burden-sharing, as we have 
seen, Grisez would not favour Posner and Weisbach’s suggestion that historical emissions 
responsibility should be disregarded, since ‘needs due to some sin or defect of a community to 
which one belongs […] deserve special consideration even if in no way one’s own fault.’456 This 
principle is expressed in the context of a discussion of Christian responsibilities to the poor in light of 
the universal destination of goods, but it seems reasonable to apply it in the context of fair 
distribution of the burdens of climate change. In addition, as we have seen, Grisez’s argument that 
poor societies may rightly accept environmental side-effects wrong for the wealthy to accept leads 
him to conclude that the affluent should accept greater burdens in preventing and correcting 
pollution.457 This is the thinking behind the formulation of article 3.1 UNFCCC and principle 7 of the 
Rio Declaration, which call for differential burden-sharing on the basis of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities. In principle, the polluter should pay the costs of pollution 
abatement, but some allowances need to be made for countries that need to strengthen their 
institutions and address acute poverty before it is reasonable to expect them to invest in transition 
technologies. However, there is a need for creative interpretation here, given the need for all major 
emitters—including developing countries like China, India and South Africa—to commit to 
comprehensive decarbonisation in the near-term if we are to retain a realistic chance of avoiding 
climate chaos. The industrialised world will need to trade technology transfer and assistance for 
abatement compliance in order to honour the requirements of climate justice whilst pursuing an 
aggressive global mitigation strategy.  
The specific condemnation of carbon-trading in Laudato Si’ is troubling. Clearly some policy 
mechanism is needed that puts a price on carbon in order to incentivise clean neotechnologies and 
internalise the cost of polluting. Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes are the two alternatives 
and there has been a great deal of academic debate between economists and ethicists as to their 
relative merits. Michael Northcott is scathing on the subject of carbon-trading. Noting the 
ineffectiveness of the European Emissions Trading Scheme, Northcott sees such market mechanisms 
as: 
A significant further advance in international law of the neoliberal utopian dream of regulating all 
human activity through the interaction of supply and demand curves, and autonomous economic 
management, instead of moral and political deliberation in parliaments, courts and local forms of 
governance. Carbon emissions-trading also represents an attempt by governments to avoid their 
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responsibility for legal regulation of carbon emissions which would make polluters pay—through 
taxation and fines—for the damage they are doing to the climate. Carbon trading in its various forms is 
a highly ambiguous development. The new global carbon market is not incentivising real reductions in 
emissions. But it has created tremendous new trading opportunities, and new opportunities for fraud 
and injustice.
458
 
Posner and Weisbach argue for a carbon tax regime over cap-and-trade as a policy instrument for 
decarbonisation mechanism, essentially on the basis that the latter—coupled with per-capita 
allocation of permits—would result in unacceptably large transfers of resources from wealthy 
countries like the United States to developing nations459 whose corrupt governments—they allege—
cannot be trusted to manage such vast resources or to enforce rules against their wealthy cronies.460 
Richard Cooper favours a carbon tax regime for the same reason, describing international carbon-
trading as ‘politically impossible’ because of its wealth redistributing consequences.461 However, 
cap-and-trade schemes have their able defenders462 and it is not clear that as a policy instrument 
they are either necessarily inadequate to the task or simply a mere ploy to maintain excessive 
consumption as Pope Francis asserts. Effectiveness would depend on setting a high enough carbon 
price and ratcheting it up over time to drive emissions down; the unfair advantaging of current 
polluters would only apply to schemes in which there was grandfathering of emissions rights, not to 
per-capita allocation schemes or auctioning of permits.  
Before the encyclical was published, I thought that Grisez’s ethics would not favour equal per-capita 
emissions rights, even in the long-term, since he argues that the universal destination of goods does 
not imply a prima facie claim on the part of each individual to an equal portion of the world’s 
goods.463 On the other hand, his argument concerning the right of the state to expropriate property 
that is being used irresponsibly led me to conclude that he would also oppose the grandfathering of 
emissions permits to existing polluters. It would seem that Grisez, Northcott, Cooper and Posner and 
Weisbach might all share the misgivings expressed in Laudato Si’ on carbon trading, but for very 
different reasons.  
Environmental campaigners for ‘divestment’ were frustrated that, although consumer boycotts of 
certain goods as a mechanism for exerting pressure for moral change are mentioned,464 this is not 
explicitly extended to personal and corporate investment decisions. Grisez is more forthright, stating 
that one should ‘try to avoid turning over the management of one’s savings to people who will use 
them in unjust or otherwise immoral activities, and should try instead to invest in something morally 
acceptable.’465 Investors need to make a prudential judgement as to whether or not fossil fuel 
industries are using their capital in activities that are rightly judged to be unjust or immoral, given 
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that it would be unreasonable to expect all fossil-fuel use to cease immediately, and we are all 
complicit in various ways in propping up the fossil economy. As Giddens cautions, we should guard 
against the easy demonising of the oil industry.466 According to Giddens, BP was the first major oil 
company to publicly acknowledge the dangers of global warming, accepting that the industry 
needed to be part of the solution, in a speech by CEO John Browne at Stanford University back in 
1997. Other oil companies quickly followed suit.467 As Giddens says, ‘a new generation of business 
leaders—who quite often work directly with NGOs—is arising which not only acknowledges the 
perils of climate change, but is active in the vanguard of reaction to it.’468 
For Catholics, work is an arena for moral action, whether in the context of a profit-making 
conventional enterprise or some form of cooperative venture or social enterprise. Pope Francis 
commends different models of business activity, but contrary to some commentators on Laudato Si’ 
he does not endorse an anti-market left-wing agenda. Business is held up as a noble vocation 
directed to producing wealth and improving our world and a fruitful source of prosperity, especially 
if it sees the creation of jobs as an essential part of its service to the common good.469 This is in line 
with Grisez’s position that some are called to administer material things for others’ use: 
Sometimes, although its owners could give away property or money, they have such a gift for 
administering material goods that they should accept that as an element of their personal vocation. 
For example, people with both surplus wealth and skill in management can rightly set up or invest in 
businesses which provide just wages for gainful work and useful goods and services at fair prices, 
along with enough profit to compensate them reasonably for their work, which contributes to 
society’s common good. 470 
However, as we have seen, Grisez argues that owners have no absolute rights over their property: 
they have no right to abuse or squander assets; rather they have a duty to use their property for the 
common good and a strict obligation to aid the destitute. Hence for Grisez, the practice of 
conservation is not a ‘merely fashionable cause’471 but an essential aspect of the Christian moral life, 
and unjust use of property generally constitutes grave matter.472 It is in the context of his discussion 
of conservation of property that Grisez makes the connection between environmental harms and 
sinful profligacy, underscoring that the harm done to others by living a wasteful, consumerist 
lifestyle can no longer be judged insignificant in view of what we now know about the environmental 
impact of such choices.473 On this issue, Grisez is perfectly aligned with Laudato Si’ in which Pope 
Francis repeats calls by his predecessors in office for ecologically and socially responsible lifestyle 
change and in addition has no hesitation in warning consumerist industrialised nations that they 
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stand in a position of grave ecological debt towards the victims of climate change, especially in 
Africa474 where the rise in temperature together with drought threatens staple food production.475 
The three main features of the ecological crisis identified in Laudato Si’—pollution and climate 
change, water security and the collapse in biodiversity—are closely interconnected since climate 
change is a major driver of water related challenges and species loss. Where access to drinking water 
is at risk, Catholic social teaching is clear that this is a human rights issue.476 As Christiana Peppard 
warns, fresh water looks set to become an increasingly scarce and contested resource as climate 
change amplifies patterns of aridity and deluge, making access to water a key justice issue of our 
times and one that disproportionately impacts the lives of women and girls.477 Laudato Si’ connects 
the dots between poverty, water challenges and food security in the context of a changing climate 
and stresses the gravity of our social debt to those suffering from water poverty.478 For Grisez, as we 
have seen in our discussion of fair burden-sharing, there is a strict duty on all Christians to aid the 
destitute;479 this duty operates irrespective of any culpability on the part of those giving aid, but as 
Grisez argues, is all the more pressing where the community to which one belongs has been the 
cause of the suffering.480 Grisez warns us to resist the temptation to rationalise evasions of this 
obligation.481 Although in fulfilling this requirement of Christian justice as individuals we will neither 
change the world nor eliminate poverty, even if we have vast our personal resources at our disposal, 
it will make a real difference to each person whose plight is mitigated and is worthwhile because of 
the immeasurable dignity of each human person.482  
Laudato Si’ laments the loss of biodiversity, particularly the decline in marine species that is turning 
the wonderworld of the seas into an underwater cemetery bereft of colour and life.483 In Pope 
Francis’s critique of the concept of dominion and his attribution of inherent value to ecosystems and 
non-human species, Charles Camosy sees a positive shift in teaching in Laudato Si’.484 Yet, as we 
have seen, Grisez construes the dominion mandate as no more than a call to responsible work,485 
limited by moral norms requiring preservation of the common heritage for future generations,486 
and he also recognises inherent value in other species.487 Given his orthodox methodology, it is clear 
that Grisez did not intend this to be a theological innovation, but a faithful exposition of existing 
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Catholic teaching. As I have argued earlier, Grisez’s endorsement of inherent value in non-human 
creatures suggested that the concept is consistent with Catholic doctrine, raising the expectation 
that it might be incorporated into the Church’s social teaching: an expectation that Laudato Si’ has 
now fulfilled. Camosy is disappointed that factory farming as a structural sin is not specifically 
addressed, nor is the connection between intensive agriculture and greenhouse gas emissions 
adverted to in the encyclical. It may be that Grisez’s footnote on vegetarianism488 provides a clue as 
to how Catholic social teaching might develop in the future: Since Scripture and tradition allow meat 
eating, it is unlikely that vegetarianism will be mandated by the Vatican any time soon, but one 
would expect at some point in the future that the practice might be commended as a specific 
incidence of a commitment to a less wasteful, less climate polluting lifestyle, and current teaching 
that condemns ‘needless suffering’ in experimentation on animals might be extended at least to the 
more egregious abuses of millions of non-human animals in the meat industry.    
To sum up: Laudato Si’ is a restatement of Catholic moral theology in the light of the ecological crisis, 
and as such we would expect substantial alignment between the new encyclical and the application 
of Germain Grisez’s orthodox Catholic moral theology to climate change proposed in this thesis. For 
example, Grisez’s internationalism is aligned with Pope Francis’s position because both Grisez and 
the present Pope draw heavily on the work of Francis’s predecessors in office Laudato Si’ 
reinterprets their thought in a new context. It was predictable that the new encyclical would call for 
an enforceable international treaty that incorporated intergenerational justice requirements and fair 
burden-sharing arrangements, taking account of historical emissions responsibility and the 
development needs of the poor. Grisez’s theology can help us to flesh out the concept of climate 
justice envisioned in the encyclical and highlight where the proposals for a ‘fair and ambitious’ 
abatement deal fall short of the Catholic vision. In view of the long-standing common good tradition, 
it was no surprise that Pope Francis calls on nations to subordinate their national self-interest to the 
global common good and the established doctrine of the universal destination of goods, the 
foundation stone of Grisez’s treatment of work and property, made clear that—in the context of 
food-security and water challenges in a changing climate—Laudato Si’ would stress the absolute 
duty on Christians to aid the destitute.  
The recognition of the climate challenge in Laudato Si’ is far from new, although its discussion in an 
encyclical invests Catholic commitment to solving this crisis with the highest authority. In the light of 
the new encyclical the urgent need for a Grisez School engagement with the issue is highlighted, 
showing the importance of the project this thesis seeks to initiate. In view of the connection 
between climate change and biodiversity loss, it was clear that the encyclical would promote 
protection of ecosystems and endangered species and again this aligns with Grisez’s environmental 
ethics. The move in Laudato Si’ towards full recognition of inherent value for non-human animals—
which Grisez anticipates—seems not so much an innovation as a re-expression of an existing concept 
within Catholic social teaching in language more familiar to secular animal rights activists. However, 
in the context of bridge-building between the Church and the secular environmental movement 
which will be crucial for improving networks of Christian transition projects, the official recognition 
of inherent value creates an important new area of common ground. This might be a crucial first 
step towards a more coherent animal ethics in future Vatican teaching, which could include specific 
condemnation of the abuses involved in factory farming, which Grisez clearly does not condone. His 
                                                          
488
 Grisez, Living a Christian Life, Chapter 10, Question C, 2(c) p. 787, n 54. 
 118 
comment on vegetarianism, stressing both food security and animal welfare issues, indicates one 
possibility for future development in Catholic social teaching in a climate constrained world.  
The antipathy towards carbon trading in Laudato Si’ was a surprise and the lack of any mention of 
divestment disappointed some activists. Those seeking to make an argument for divestment from 
fossil-fuel industries will find Grisez’s position on ethical investment a stronger basis for their 
strategy than the new encyclical, although it remains a matter of judgement as to whether fossil fuel 
investments are unethical and whether divestment is likely to be a successful strategy in addressing 
the climate challenge. Pope Francis’s commendation of business as a noble calling, where it is 
directed to creating worthwhile jobs and useful goods and services as a contribution to the 
commonweal, is a helpful corrective to politically left-wing interpretations of his position on carbon 
trading. Grisez’s treatment of enterprise and investment chimes perfectly with this strand of thought 
in the encyclical.  
In conclusion, it seems to me that there is much theological work to be done in analysing Laudato Si’ 
and making its message accessible to a wider audience and there are a number of areas in which 
insights gleaned from Grisez’s environmental ethics can augment areas of the encyclical that were 
not spelled out with much specificity and illuminate possible future moves in the development of 
Catholic social teaching on the environment.      
Conclusion 
As we saw in Section One, for Grisez, human persons are responsible to God and to one another—
specifically including future generations—for our use of natural entities.  He construes the whole 
realm of non-human nature as divine gift, possessing inherent meaning and value, subjected by 
divine mandate to responsible human dominion and ordered to human flourishing. I have shown 
how ecological considerations colour the whole structure of Grisez’s ethical system. The language of 
‘sub-personal nature’, dominion, ownership and subjugation is easily dismissed as speciesist and 
pejorative by environmentalists, as we saw in Section Two, but a closer look at Grisez’s theological 
treatment of the biblical concept of dominion and its practice by Christians called to ‘subdue the 
earth by their work’ reveals that his understanding of the central concepts does not conform to 
environmentalists’ expectations of a simplistically instrumentalist anthropocentricism productive 
of—and providing cultural justification for—ecologically destructive behaviour. In Section Three I 
have abstracted and applied central principles of Grisez’s environmental ethics to the climate 
challenge, demonstrating that the Grisez School should endorse at least two of the three central 
claims of the climate justice movement. 
Grisez’s methodology does not encourage theological innovation, as we saw in Chapter Three of this 
thesis, which makes it extremely interesting that a moral theologian whom Ralph McInerny 
characterises as having ‘long ago accepted the role of the paladin of the magisterium, taking on its 
critics whenever the opportunity presented itself’489 can be shown to endorse inherent value in 
nature and to present as Catholic orthodoxy an ecologically constructive account of human 
dominion, work and property ownership as imbued with environmental and animal welfare 
responsibilities. This suggests that even if Catholic social teaching has elements of anthropocentrism 
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in tension with the more ecologically nuanced elements Grisez identifies it would seem possible in 
principle for the teaching to undergo ecologically positive development in a conservative, self-
consistent way rather than through the more radical revisionism favoured by many scholars in 
ecotheology. Grisez exhorts Christians today to ‘make a special effort to bring the light of faith to 
bear in understanding their responsibilities for subhuman creation.’490 In light of the climate 
challenge as a sign of the times this task is all the more urgent, making the Grisez School 
construction of climate justice and the response to Laudato Si’ in this thesis a timely and important 
contribution to Catholic ecotheology.  
My next chapter discusses Jean Porter’s important critique of the new natural law theory, which 
challenges Grisez and Finnis’s construction of Aquinas and questions the foundations of their secular 
ethics. I shall argue that, notwithstanding Porter’s objections, Grisez’s theological ethics represents 
one philosophically coherent and theologically cogent ethical system and that, as such, it deserves 
much wider recognition and deployment, beyond the narrow confines of conservative Catholic 
medical and sexual ethics with which it is most commonly associated. 
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Chapter 5: Some Theoretical Issues 
Introduction 
We have seen in Chapter Four of this thesis that Grisez develops a sophisticated and ecologically 
constructive account of environmental ethics in which animals and natural entities are accorded 
inherent meaning and value. We have seen that application of principles drawn from Grisez’s work 
to our contemporary climate crisis enables his work to be taken forward to meet this novel challenge 
and establish common ground with the climate justice movement. We have seen that 
environmentalist critics of Grisez’s ethics have been too quick to dismiss his work, overlooking the 
animal welfare and environmental responsibilities that are built in to the new natural law placing 
ecological restraints on responsible dominion, work and property ownership and colouring the 
whole structure of Grisez’s ethical system. Having recovered this underappreciated resource for 
environmental ethics, it remains to respond to some theoretical challenges to the new natural law: 
this will be the task of the present chapter.  
The aim of this chapter is to engage with some of Grisez’s critics in order to address the question: Is 
Grisez’s ethics a species of natural law in the Thomist tradition and what implication does this have 
for its application to the ecological crisis? Grisez’s and Finnis’s critics in theology, philosophy and 
jurisprudence are many. Unfortunately, space available in this thesis will allow me to treat only a 
small selection of the voluminous literature on the theoretical basis of the Grisez School theory. 
Grisez and his collaborators, disciples and sympathisers have replied at length to their critics.491 Nigel 
Biggar responds to Protestant critiques from the Barthian School,492 and his student Rufus Black’s 
ecumenical project seeks to reconcile Grisez with Oliver O’Donovan and Stanley Hauerwas.493 Robert 
George responds to a swath of critiques from legal scholars in his In Defense of Natural Law.494 The 
disputes between Grisez and his collaborators and others including Roman Catholic scholars from 
the Proportionalist School on disputed areas of sexual ethics, are notorious.495 My intention here is 
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not to revisit these debates, but to focus mainly on Jean Porter’s careful theoretical critique, pieced 
together from my reading of the central texts of her oeuvre,496 drawing occasionally on the work of 
Ralph McInerny and others where necessary to illuminate the discussion. I have chosen to focus 
mainly on Jean Porter’s critique since on her analysis the new natural law ‘cannot be taken seriously 
as the effective guide to upright human choice, in the here and now, that it purports to be.’497 
Clearly, if this is the case, one should look elsewhere for answers to our contemporary ecological 
crisis and, since this is the opinion of a scrupulous and learned scholar, it warrants our careful 
attention. 
In her prolific and influential work, Jean Porter argues for a recovery of virtue ethics, observing in 
moral theology a parallel set of problems to those diagnosed by her mentor Alasdair MacIntyre in 
philosophical ethics in the wake of the collapse of the enlightenment project. Her own preference is 
for a naturalistic approach to the task of reconstruction. Her central objection to the Grisez School 
project is that their recovery of natural law is unnecessary as a response to the naturalistic fallacy 
and is over-reliant on self-evidence in constructing its moral edifice. Porter sees the new natural law 
theory as aspiring, as did the enlightenment project, to autonomous moral reason; she finds their 
construction of practical reasoning overstrained and counterintuitive, running contrary to the way in 
which we naturally reason morally, and she offers a careful and challenging critique of the Grisez 
School’s interpretation of Aquinas.     
In order to defend my thesis that Grisez’s theological ethics and its application to the climate crisis 
can yield a significant contribution to Catholic theological reflection in the Anthropocene, it will be 
necessary to rebut Porter’s suggestion that the new natural law, as it stands, is unworkable. I shall 
argue that Grisez’s theological ethics is less reliant on self-evidence than Porter seems to allow and, 
notwithstanding the difficulties she identifies with Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas on practical 
reasoning and the basic goods, the theory stands as a cogent moral theology anchored to a biblical 
theory of Christian character derived from Christ’s Sermon on the Mount.  
The question this chapter aims to address is raised by Nigel Biggar in his conclusion to the volume of 
essays in response to the Grisez School that he co-edited with Rufus Black. 
We are reminded that the rationalist form of ethical realism that Grisez and Finnis espouse has long 
brought them into contention with certain other Thomists—for egregious example Henry Veatch—who 
prefer a naturalist version. To some extent this is a dispute about who can lay best claim to the mantle 
of St Thomas; and as such it is of limited importance. What would be of much greater importance is the 
claim that the rationalism of the Grisez School suffers from a serious deficiency that a certain ethical 
naturalism can supply. And indeed this is what Northcott himself asserts, when he argues that the 
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School’s rationalism is expressive of an anthropocentrism that, unable to recognise the inherent value 
of non-human being, encourages human abuse of the environment; and that the prevention of this 
abuse requires the recovery of natural teleology as a basis for the ascription of rights to non-human 
species.
498
 
Biggar leaves open the question as to whether the new natural law suffers, as Northcott asserts, 
from a deficit that disables it as a vehicle for environmental ethics. I have addressed Northcott’s 
position in Chapter Four of this thesis, concluding that there is more of value in Grisez’s 
environmentalism than Northcott allows. However within a Roman Catholic context, the question as 
to who can best lay claim to the mantle of St Thomas is perhaps more important than Nigel Biggar 
allows. As a lens through which to view the development of Catholic social doctrine, and to predict 
future moves that may be open to the Vatican, one needs a coherent and sophisticated Catholic 
worldview; Grisez’s theological ethics provides one such lens. However, every lens introduces its 
own distortions and clouds the view to a greater or lesser extent. It may be, as Celia Deane-
Drummond has suggested, that Porter’s reading of Aquinas provides a clearer and less distorting 
insight into doctrinal development. If this is the case, it is important for this thesis to concede the 
point, whilst asserting that the recovery of Grisez’s environmental ethics has value nonetheless as a 
framework within which Catholics might reflect on the ecological challenges of our age. 
Is Grisez’s ethics a species of natural law in the Thomist tradition, and what implications does this 
have for its application to environmental ethics? In order to address this question we will need to 
focus on three issues: Is the new natural law Thomist? Does it qualify as a species of natural law? 
And does either of these affect its application in the context of our ecological crisis? Section One of 
this chapter looks at the Grisez School’s claim to the mantle of St Thomas and Section Two looks at 
its claims to categorisation as a ‘natural law theory,’ including  both its claims to universalism and its 
rationalistic character. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for 
the application of Grisez’s ethics to ecological issues.  
Section One: Is the New Natural Law Thomist? 
Ralph McInerny, in his contribution to Biggar and Black’s edited collection of essays, draws attention 
to differences between Grisez and Aquinas on the nature of the good and the starting point of 
practical reason. In his view it is because the Magisterium continues to recommend Thomas Aquinas 
as our mentor in philosophy and theology that Grisez often invokes him in the course of developing 
his own moral theology, but, McInerny adds, ‘it would be quite wrong to imagine that Grisez is 
undertaking yet another rethinking of Aquinas. His is, and is meant to be, an original work.’499 
Jean Porter concurs on this point, although she finds much of value in Finnis’s Aquinas, which she 
says ‘will be read as one of the latest and most developed accounts of the ‘new natural law’ theory 
developed over many years’ collaborative work among Finnis, Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and a 
number of other scholars.’500 In particular she commends his focus on those aspects of Aquinas’s 
thought that are most directly relevant to contemporary social theory, including his account of 
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cooperative action,501 his theory of positive law502 and his understanding of the common good.503 In 
his discussions of these and related questions, Porter finds, Finnis relies less on his disputed analysis 
of Aquinas’s overall moral theory and more on his insights as a scholar of jurisprudence, offering 
fresh, nuanced and largely persuasive interpretations.504 His treatment of Aquinas’s positive law she 
finds particularly valuable for its ‘carefully qualified presentation of Aquinas’s claim that an unjust 
law is in some sense not a true law at all.’505 She also finds the case he makes in arguing that Aquinas 
does not hold that the state exists to inculcate virtue in its citizens convincing, although this is a 
controversial claim that flies in the face of common assumptions about Aquinas.506 Furthermore, she 
commends his chapters on economic exchange and the state as offering ‘illuminating and largely 
persuasive readings of Aquinas’s views.’507 Nonetheless, Porter provides a trenchant critique of the 
Grisez School’s collective interpretation of Aquinas’s general moral theory, disputing their stance on 
the naturalistic fallacy and their reading of the principles underpinning Aquinas’s thought on 
homicide and on sexual ethics. In addition, she disputes Finnis’s construction of natural and 
supernatural happiness, which he continues to insist is authentically Thomist although Grisez 
concedes this point.508 A further issue of contention between Porter and Finnis is whether or not, for 
Aquinas, allowing one’s emotions sway over one’s reasons for action is ‘the paradigmatic way of 
going and doing wrong.’509  
On Porter’s reading, although their ‘new theory of the natural law’ is widely influential510 and a 
prominent exception to the general lack of engagement with the pre-modern natural lawyers by the 
various schools of contemporary jurisprudence, Grisez and Finnis ‘offer a truncated Aquinas whose 
normative judgements do not depend in any substantive way on more broadly natural or 
metaphysical—let alone theological—commitments.’511 Grisez and Finnis reject any appeal to human 
nature, broadly construed, as a starting point for ethical reflection, and it is at this point that Porter 
parts company with them, arguing instead that an Aristotelian philosophy of nature offers the most 
satisfactory way to understand the principles of practical reasoning inherent in human nature 
itself.512 Whatever we may think of the theoretical merits of  the Grisez School approach, Porter 
asserts, ‘it is clearly not Aquinas’s own, and many of its leading proponents now recognise this’;513 to 
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her knowledge Finnis is the only leading defender of the ‘new natural law’ who is still prepared to 
defend this as an accurate interpretation of Aquinas’s own view.514  
On Finnis’s reading, Porter explains, Aquinas’s moral theory rests on a particular understanding of 
what is required for human action to be fully rational. 515 We are directed by inclinations towards 
certain human goods, which are self-evident in the sense that the intellect grasps that they are good 
in themselves as soon as they are experienced, regardless of their emotional appeal or instrumental 
value to the pursuit of some other good. These basic human goods provide content for the first 
principle of practical reason: ‘Good is to be done and pursued and bad is to be avoided.’ Porter 
agrees with Grisez that this first principle is not in itself a moral principle, it is engaged in every 
operation of practical reasoning, including those operations directed towards sinful acts.516 For 
Finnis, the moral ‘ought’ arises ‘when the absolutely first practical principle is followed through, in 
its relationship to all the other first principles, with a reasonableness that is unrestricted and 
undeflected by any sub-rational factor such as distracting emotion.’517 On Finnis’s account of 
Thomist ethics, whilst an act is not rendered morally bad by the presence of self-referential and 
emotional motives, it is the rational pursuit of basic goods that renders an action morally 
praiseworthy.518 The basic human goods provide the only intelligible reasons for action and, 
although no one can simultaneously pursue every instantiation of every basic good, reason demands 
we remain open to the fullest realisation of basic goods, and rules out any direct act that is contrary 
to some basic good as, for example, killing is contrary to the good of life or adultery is contrary to 
the good of marriage.519  
Porter notes that for Aquinas, actions are to be morally evaluated by the criterion of conformity to 
reason, and scholars are agreed on this point; the distinctiveness of Finnis’s reading of Aquinas lies in 
his interpretation of this criterion. According to Finnis, morality should be analysed in terms of acting 
in pursuit of the basic goods within the parameters set by the integral directiveness of practical 
reason.520 Finnis recognises that Aquinas does not speak explicitly of ‘reasons for action’ or ‘basic 
human goods’, but he argues that these expressions nonetheless capture what Aquinas means.521 
In two areas of Aquinas’s applied ethics, in his views on the distinction between justifiable homicide 
and murder and in his sexual ethics, there are (as Finnis acknowledges) some inconsistencies 
between what St Thomas actually says and the principles of his moral theory as Finnis understands 
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it.522 For Aquinas, murder is intrinsically morally wrong, but this is not, as some commentators have 
suggested, simply because he defines ‘murder’ as ‘wrongful killing’.523 He distinguishes murder from 
justifiable homicide by means of objective criteria: killing is justified where the victim is a malefactor 
or enemy combatant, who forfeits his immunity from harm by some act of aggression, and the 
perpetrator is the state or its authorised agent or a private individual reasonably seeking to preserve 
her own life through self-defence. For Porter, neither the Grisez School nor their proportionalist 
rivals can give a plausible account of Aquinas’s teaching on homicide. The difficulty for a 
proportionalist analysis is that, whilst Aquinas allows capital punishment and killing in wartime, he 
prohibits other kinds of killing that would seem, prima facie, to have proportionalist justifications as 
strong as those he allows. Most notably, he allows capital punishment whilst prohibiting the killing 
of a criminal by a private citizen (except in self-defence).524 In addition, Aquinas insists that the 
prohibition against directly killing the innocent is absolute, where ‘innocent’ implies only that the 
individual is not guilty of or actively engaged in an act of aggression.525 The difficulty for the Grisez 
School interpretation is that Aquinas explicitly says that the judge, general, or soldier directly intends 
the death of the victim.526 Finnis argues that if Aquinas had been fully consistent, he would not have 
allowed for capital punishment at all and that his basic principles are consistent with the use of 
lethal force in wartime only where there is no direct intent to kill.527 Hence Porter’s verdict on this 
exchange is that:  
The debate between the proportionalists and Grisez and Finnis would seem to result in a draw, as far as 
this question is concerned. It is difficult to see why there might be a proportionate reason for killing a 
criminal or an enemy soldier, but never for killing an innocent person; on the other hand, it is equally 
difficult to see why the life of a criminal is inherently any less an inviolable basic good than that of a 
babe in arms. There is no satisfactory way out of these quandaries so long as we limit ourselves to the 
understanding of good and the moral evaluation of actions to be found in contemporary Catholic moral 
theology. But if we ask instead what criteria Aquinas uses to distinguish prohibited killing (murder, in 
our terms) from permissible homicides, we find that he draws the line between them in such a way as 
to suggest the concepts of the human good and human harm that inform his theory of justice.
528
  
Finnis argues that Aquinas’s treatment of self-defence lends support to his interpretation, a point 
that Porter concedes. However she counters that ‘if Aquinas does subscribe to the general principle 
that we are never morally justified in acting against certain basic goods, it is odd, to say the least, 
that the analogy between warfare and self-defence did not occur to him. This suggests an 
alternative, namely, that Aquinas does not analyse morality in terms of basic human goods as Finnis 
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understands them.’ 529 On Porter’s reading, there are too many aspects of Aquinas’ moral theory 
that cannot be accommodated within the framework of the Grisez School analysis for it to stand as a 
persuasive exposition of Aquinas’s ethics. 
On Finnis’s account, Aquinas’s sexual ethics begins with reflection on the basic good of marriage, 
understood as a relationship that is intrinsically oriented towards fidelity and openness to children. 
Any act that violates marital exclusivity or obstructs procreation therefore involves a rejection of the 
basic good of marriage.530 Finnis claims that many sexual sins are contrary to the good of marriage 
and ‘the specifically sexual vice in morally bad sex is in every case measured by the chosen act’s 
deviation, and the extent of the deviance, from truly marital intercourse’.531 For Porter, ‘while a case 
can be made that the inclination to procreate is indeed an expression of a more fundamental 
inclination to live and flourish, this conclusion can hardly be said to be self-evidently contained in the 
apprehension of the goodness of life itself.’532 Similarly, marriage, on Porter’s view ‘does not even 
exist, much less manifest itself to a rational apprehension, apart from social construction’; hence she 
questions how it can count as a self-evident ‘basic good’ for Finnis and Grisez.533 On Porter’s reading 
of Aquinas, moreover, his sexual ethics cannot consistently be construed as a defence of the basic 
good of marriage. For Aquinas, a sexual act can deviate from right reason either (1) by being 
inconsistent with the end of generation and education of children, including both fornication and 
those acts that are ‘repugnant to the natural order of the sexual act’534 or (2) by violating the claims 
that one person has on another. Sexual sins of the second sort involve violations of the claims arising 
within a kinship structure, but these are broader than the claims generated by the marriage 
relationship.535 In neither case, Porter notes, does Aquinas speak in terms of violation of the good of 
marriage per se. 
For Porter, the category of sins ‘against nature’, including sexual sins that are repugnant to the 
natural order of the sexual act, is an aspect of Aquinas’s moral thought that does not fit readily into 
the parameters of Finnis’s analysis. For the Grisez School, the moral order is irreducibly distinct from 
natural, logical and technical considerations and moral conclusions cannot be drawn from purely 
factual premises. Hence, as Finnis reads him, ‘Aquinas’s moral arguments never run from “natural” 
to “therefore reasonable and right” but always from “reasonable and right” to “therefore 
natural”.’536 Yet, as Porter points out, Aquinas’s category of sexual sins that are against nature is a 
clear example to the contrary.  Furthermore, Aquinas clearly states that such sins are contrary to the 
nature that we share with other animals, in contrast to those sins that are contrary to our nature as 
rational creatures,537 so if Finnis counters that, for Aquinas, ‘unnatural’ is just another way of saying 
‘unreasonable’, this argument will not avail him. Likewise, in his discussion of the natural love that 
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angels have for God, Aquinas says that the theological virtue of charity would be a perversion rather 
than a perfection of nature if angels and men did not naturally love God more than themselves; we 
know this to be true on grounds that we observe that pre-rational creatures naturally do so. 
However precisely we are to interpret these passages, it is clear that, for Aquinas, pre-rational 
nature provides reason with moral criteria.538 For Porter, an Aristotelian philosophy of nature offers 
the most satisfactory way to understand the principles of practical reasoning inherent in human 
nature, and she parts company with Finnis and Grisez at this point.539 For the Grisez School this 
‘naturalistic’ construction is illicit, since they see the naturalistic fallacy as a timeless truth of logic,540 
whilst Porter construes it as a chimera of the modernist mind-set that does not render all forms of 
ethical naturalism unrecoverable for contemporary ethics.541  
A further issue that Porter identifies as problematic for Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas relates to 
the Grisez School’s concept of what Aquinas calls ‘the ultimate end’. Grisez not only concedes that 
his vision of supernatural happiness is not Aquinas’s, he attempts to refute Aquinas’s argument that 
the true ultimate end of human beings is God alone, attained by the beatific vision.542 Finnis, by 
contrast, although he observes that Aquinas frequently refers to the basic goods by the singular 
noun ‘finis’ (end), argues that it is a mistake to translate this as ‘the end’.543 Yet Aquinas himself says 
that there can only be one objective final end for human life: beatitudo, and that each person aims 
at one final end, subjectively identified by the agent as his or her true ultimate happiness. Although 
it may not in fact coincide with the true end to which all persons are called, every human act is 
ultimately directed towards the individual’s subjective end.544 For Finnis and Grisez, the basic human 
goods are irreducibly plural and happiness, or in their terms ‘integral human fulfilment,’ is an 
umbrella term for the full enjoyment of all of them. Although perfect fulfilment, for the Grisez 
School, cannot be fully attained without grace, everyone may aspire to imperfect flourishing in this 
life through acting in pursuit of basic human goods and refraining from any act that would damage 
or forestall any instance of such a good. Porter finds it difficult to reconcile this view with Aquinas’s 
claim that true happiness can only consist in the direct enjoyment of God in the beatific vision. He 
does say that our desire for finite goods such as wealth and glory will be fulfilled in the blessed state, 
but he does not say that they will themselves be attained. On the contrary, he specifically says of 
Finnis’s basic good of friendship: ‘if we are to speak of the perfect happiness which will exist in the 
homeland, the society of friends is not required as an essential element, because the human person 
has the whole fullness of perfection in God.’545 For Aquinas then, Porter argues, not only is happiness 
something different from the unlimited enjoyment of basic human goods, it stands in a different 
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relationship to specific goods than Finnis can allow.546 Grisez, as we have seen, concedes this point 
of Thomist scholarship, but Finnis does not. 
Finnis points out that on Aquinas’s view we can, in this life, attain only imperfect happiness, which 
consists in the practice of the virtues, a point on which he and Porter agree.547 However, Finnis takes 
this to imply that happiness in this life consists in the greatest possible openness to participation in 
the basic goods, since for him the virtues consist in dispositions to act in accordance with intelligible 
reasons for action. Finnis essentially equates virtue with the basic good of practical reasonableness, 
but for Porter this simply underscores her earlier point that this, together with complex socially 
constructed goods like marriage and friendship, is a good of a different order from such goods as life 
and knowledge, and its claim to self-evidence as a basic human good is questionable. Porter states 
that, to her knowledge, Aquinas nowhere claims that imperfect happiness is constituted by the 
enjoyment of human goods such as life, knowledge, or the society of friends. Furthermore, the 
virtues, for Aquinas, are not merely attitudes of openness to basic goods, they provide ordering 
principles for the pursuit of these goods. 
As regards Finnis’s assertion that allowing one’s emotions sway over one’s reasons for action is the 
paradigmatic way of going and doing wrong for Aquinas,548 Porter emphatically denies this claim.  
The rational criterion, that is to say, the mean of the virtues of the passions, is determined by the 
overall good of the organism, which places sensual goods in their correct relation to that overall 
good.
549
 Likewise the mean of justice is set by the good of the neighbour and the community as a 
whole, and for this reason, justice orients the will towards a good that goes beyond the good of the 
individual.
550
 Correlatively, action out of emotion rather than reason is not presented as the 
paradigmatic form of sin, at least not in Aquinas’s mature work; the most serious forms of sin consist in 
a willed choice of lesser over greater goods,
551
 grounded in a false judgement about the ultimate end of 
one’s life.
552
 
In summary: Ralph McInerny and Jean Porter dispute the Grisez School reading of Thomas Aquinas, 
arguing that the new natural law diverges from Thomist thought at important junctures. Porter finds 
their reading of Aquinas unpersuasive at several points; specifically the Grisez School model of 
morality as the pursuit of basic human goods under the direction of practical reason is called into 
question as an interpretation of Aquinas’s underlying theory in his discussions of homicide and of 
sexual ethics, where discrepancies arise that must otherwise be seen as inconsistencies in Aquinas’s 
own corpus.553 Porter disputes Finnis’s exposition of Aquinas on natural and supernatural happiness, 
which on her reading cannot be equated with full enjoyment of an irreducibly plural list of basic 
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human goods, and on the virtues, arguing that Aquinas’s theory of character cannot be reduced to 
the acquisition of dispositions to act in accordance with practical reason and consistently with an 
openness to human goods. Finally, Porter rejects Finnis’s assertion that, for Aquinas, allowing one’s 
emotions sway over one’s reasons for action is the paradigmatic category of sin. 
It seems clear from the foregoing that Grisez consciously departs from Thomist teaching on the 
ultimate good and Finnis’s reading of Aquinas is called in question on several points. However, 
unless Porter is right in supposing that the Grisez School ethical system is simply unworkable, the 
new natural law as sui generis stands as a valuable resource for environmental ethics and, with 
suitable caveats attached, as a predictive tool for future Vatican teaching in the context of our 
ecological crisis. Hence it is to Porter’s critique of the universalist pretensions and rationalistic 
character of Grisez’s ethics that we now turn,  fleshed out where necessary with reference to the 
work of other scholars, to examine whether the Grisez School have established a workable 
reconstruction of natural law theory.  
Section Two: Is Grisez School ethics a species of natural law? 
The term ‘natural law’ has various connotations; over the course of its long history it has meant 
different and even mutually contradictory things to different theorists.554 We will focus here on only 
two of these, since they represent the most common ways in which the term is used today. For 
some scholars, to qualify as a species of natural law a moral theory must be universalist, a 
freestanding edifice constructed by reason alone. For others, the term ‘natural law’ implies that 
moral norms must be in some way derived or inferred from nature as in some sense normative. 
For Göran Bexell ‘a doctrine of natural law is universalist, containing as it does a universal claim 
based on empirical assumptions concerning human nature and the ethical capabilities of reason.’555 
Northcott critiques what he sees as the rationalism of the new natural law, preferring a ‘naturalistic’ 
version. In this regard he is in agreement with a raft of Thomist scholars who argue that the new 
natural law avoids any foundational reference to nature, its proponents having been ‘tempted by 
the devil’ as Henry Veatch rather colourfully suggests ‘so as to seem to say that natural law doctrines 
are not really based on a knowledge of nature after all!’556 As Northcott notes, for Pamela Hall their 
use of the term ‘natural law’ amounts to no more than a ‘nostalgic acknowledgement of the 
philosophical home they have departed.’557 Although Bexell also uses the term ‘rationalistic’ to 
describe Grisez’s theory, his critique is slightly different to Northcott’s, contrasting the roles of 
reason and emotion, conscious and unconscious drivers of behaviour. So in answer to the question 
‘is Grisez’s ethics a species of natural law’, this will clearly depend on the sense in which one is using 
the term ‘natural law’. A further complexity is that an ethical theory can of course be ‘rationalist’ in 
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Bexell’s sense with or without departing the ‘naturalistic’ neo-Thomist stable in the sense that 
Northcott, Porter and others understand the Grisez School to have done. 
Porter, as we have seen, disputes the Grisez School’s interpretation of Aquinas and regards their 
Herculean efforts to avoid the naturalistic fallacy as unnecessary since the critiques by Hume and 
Moore, widely thought to have undermined the philosophical credibility of all forms of natural law, 
simply do not have traction against St Thomas’s ethics as she understands it. She is critical of the 
new natural law’s universalist aspirations, at times seeming to equate their theory with some form 
of epistemologically enclosed Kantianism, and she suggests that issues with Grisez’s conception of 
practical reason render the theory unworkable. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to defend the Grisez School worldview as a cogent 
theological worldview, since if the theory is fundamentally flawed the value of my attempts to apply 
it to contemporary ecological problems is called in question. Hence this section aims to address the 
question: Is the Grisez School ethical system a viable form of natural law theory? 
Universalism 
On the issue of universalism, Nigel Biggar’s concluding comments in The Revival of Natural Law are 
insightful.558 
Göran Bexell, standing in the tradition of Paul, Augustine and Luther, over against that of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, denies the possibility of a neutral ethical understanding (or ‘reason’) that is not shaped either 
by the presence of religious faith or by its absence. Advancing this line of criticism, Rufus Black observes 
that, since Finnis asserts that knowledge of the basic requirements of practical reasonableness arises, in 
part, from an understanding of the ‘conditions of human life’, different such understandings will 
produce different conceptions of what is practically ‘reasonable’; and that pace Grisez, a Christian vision 
of those conditions does add new basic moral principles to those that are naturally knowable. Pushing 
the point one step further, I argue that even some of what Grisez (and Finnis) present as being 
elements of practical reason simply, only appear reasonable in the light of Christian faith and hope; and 
that therefore their ‘natural morality’ is actually formed by Christian presuppositions. However, as I 
have said, this need not mean that different anthropologies yield absolutely different ethics. On the 
contrary, they may well share common elements, more or less differently qualified. Nor does it mean 
that there is no scope for critical dialogue between different ethics, and no reason to hope for eventual 
(even if eschatological) consensus. What it does mean, however, is that at certain points ethical 
dialogue will grind to a halt unless it is willing to grapple with larger issues about the nature of human 
being and the universe in which it is set.
559
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Of course, whether Grisez intends to expound a universalist ethic and whether he is successful in 
doing so are separate questions. As Rufus Black reads him, Grisez’s natural law can function as a 
species of theological ethics that satisfies the criteria specified by leading Protestant scholars.560 
However he sees the common structure of practical reason that Grisez and Finnis identify as 
providing a useful epistemological superstructure for a bridge between Christian and other forms of 
ethics: 
The existence of this common structure means that where Christians and others have a shared 
understanding of the nature of human life, they are also likely to possess compatible ethical insights. 
For example, a common recognition of the finitude of life is likely to give rise to similar practical 
principles concerning the need to make life-plans and stand by commitments. While Hauerwas might 
doubt the possibility of such shared ethical insight, or suspect it of undermining the distinctiveness of 
Christian ethics, other leading Protestant ethicists defend the significance of such common 
understandings. Oliver O’Donovan, for example, considers it important to sustain this possibility that 
humans have ‘a certain natural knowledge’ which is also part of man’s created endowment. Without 
such a possibility, O’Donovan observes, moral disagreements may simply become ultimate clashes of 
commitment which are incapable of resolution […] The possibility of natural knowledge sustains the 
claim that all people face objective moral realities.
561
  
Nigel Biggar seems to interpret this aspect of Grisez’s ethics as an occasional lapse rather than a 
conscious intention, commenting: 
Where Grisez is wrong is to suppose, as he sometimes does, that there is a coherent body of knowledge 
about the human good, its components and its moral implications, which is sound per se, and to which 
reason can in fact attain ‘naturally’—that is, without illumination by revelation. The theory of the good 
and the moral law that Grisez presents as attainable ‘naturally’ is actually formed by specifically 
Christian presuppositions. It is in fact a Christian theory, formally abstracted from the theological 
context in which alone it makes sense. This flaw in Grisez’s ethic inadvertently confirms Barth’s 
contention that theological presuppositions radically determine the whole of a Christian ethic—
although there may be isolated fragments that Christians and non-Christians share alike.562 
Like Biggar, other scholars have found the secular universalist aspirations of the new natural law 
objectionable or wrong-headed. On Porter’s reading, Grisez and Finnis (like Martha Nussbaum) 
‘hope to develop moral theories that will be universally persuasive, in accordance with content-
neutral criteria for public reasonableness’.563 As we shall see in our discussion of rationalism, at 
times she seems to characterise the new natural law theory as a species of Kantianism.  
In her earlier work, Porter argued, contra Grisez, that any account of the natural law must draw on 
specifically theological elements in order to function prescriptively, and that we cannot ‘make 
theoretical sense, or practical use, of the natural law in purely rational or philosophical terms, 
without taking the contingencies introduced by theological considerations into account’.564 More 
recently, her position has shifted towards greater optimism that at the level of international law we 
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might collectively construct a universal ethic, so that, although she would still claim that the natural 
law cannot be understood outside a theological context, she now sees the dichotomy between a 
theological and a philosophical account of natural law as too simplistic. Porter argues that Christian 
commitments to human rights and to the equal value of human persons rest ultimately on 
theological foundations, especially on our traditional understanding of persons as imago dei, ‘yet it 
may be the case that others who do not share these commitments may still find the relevant norms 
attractive and persuasive, and adapt them in such a way as to appropriate them into quite different 
traditions of thought and practice—just as we owe more than we can know to central practices of 
other traditions.’565 For Porter: 
The problem that we face, as men and women confronting one another in a context of deep moral 
disagreement, is not that of identifying a pre-existent moral code that will settle these conflicts in some 
mutually acceptable way. Rather, we are challenged to construct a set of mutually acceptable norms 
through processes of shared reflection and negotiation—first of all, at the level of international law, but 
also within the increasingly permeable boundaries of our immediate political communities. This opens 
up the possibility that a universal ethic may still have validity—not as something we hope to discover, 
but something that we might jointly construct. To some extent, I would share this hope.
566
 
To sum up: on the subject of the Grisez School’s universalist aspirations, Biggar takes the view that 
Grisez and Finnis’s conception of practical reason only appears reasonable in the light of Christian 
faith and hope and what they occasionally present as a freestanding natural morality is actually 
formed by Christian presuppositions. Thus far, Black agrees with his mentor, arguing that different 
understandings of the conditions of human life arise from different worldviews and produce 
differing conceptions of what is practically reasonable. However, Black sees a positive role for 
Grisez’s secular formulation of the new natural law, as a useful bridge to promote shared 
understanding in the context of religious and cultural pluralism, whereas, for Biggar, universalism 
appears as an occasional lapse and a flaw in Grisez School ethics. Porter, observing this flaw, worries 
that the whole theory is simply unworkable. However, she shares with Black the hope that we may 
still be able to negotiate a set of mutually acceptable norms in international law, although she 
doesn’t see the Grisez School as having constructed a viable bridge to the realisation of this hope. 
Rationalism 
Is Grisez’s ethics detached from nature? 
A tranche of scholars who are sympathetic to the idea of natural law nevertheless critique Grisez’s 
version of the theory as detached from nature and overly rationalist, which on their view disqualifies 
it as a species of natural law. Biggar asks whether the Grisez School’s alleged rationalism suffers 
from a serious deficiency, in terms of its potential application to environmental issues, that a revival 
of ethical naturalism might correct, assuming the idea of natural teleology can be restored to 
philosophical respectability. In order to address this question we need to look more carefully at the 
substance of the Neo-Scholastic critique and the Grisez School’s response to it. 
Porter detects a contemporary revival of interest in the moral significance of human nature, 
including the work of philosophers motivated by recent developments in science and medicine567 
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and those exploring the contemporary significance of classical moral thought,568 as well as scientists 
working within the rapidly expanding field of evolutionary psychology, which is built on the premise 
that human behaviour is at least partly intelligible as an expression of a species-specific nature that 
can be interpreted in terms of evolutionary adaptation.569 Whilst the work of these scholars is highly 
controversial, thanks to their efforts human nature is once again a mainstream topic for moral 
philosophy as well as scientific enquiry. By contrast, Porter tells us: 
Until comparatively recently, this topic would have been ruled out of consideration from the outset. 
Most educated people believed that evolutionary theory had fatally undermined the belief that we 
possess any definite human nature at all. Furthermore, most philosophers assumed that David Hume 
and G.E. Moore had shown the logical impossibility of deriving moral conclusions from the facts of 
human nature, a mistake that came to be known as the naturalistic fallacy.
570
  
In Porter’s view, continued avoidance of the topic impoverishes both Christian ethics and the wider 
social discourse.571 Christian Ethicists, Catholic as well as Protestant, have been reluctant to address 
the question of the moral significance of human nature, in Porter’s opinion, precisely because they 
associate this topic with problematic pre-modern accounts of the natural law. Porter notes that: 
The widely influential ‘new natural law’ theory developed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis might 
seem to offer a counterexample to this claim. However this theory is explicitly distinguished from ’old’ 
natural law theories by the fact that it does not attempt to derive moral conclusions from observations 
about nature.
572
 
Porter disputes the Grisez School’s stance on the naturalistic fallacy, concluding that there is no 
compelling justification for their reconstruction of the requirements of practical reason, which they 
justify as the only way of avoiding fallacious reasoning from purely factual premises to normative 
conclusions.573 She acknowledges that the Grisez School theory stands as a major challenge to her 
own thesis that reason underdetermines moral norms at least at a level sufficiently concrete to be 
put into practice.574 However, the difficulties she sees as being raised by the rationalism of the new 
natural law lead her to conclude that pure practical reason is no more promising than her own 
preferred naturalistic approach, whatever its promises and limitations, as a basis for a theory of 
morality.575 
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As we have seen, Porter herself argues that a naturalistic account of Aquinas’s theological ethics 
remains philosophically coherent and viable as a contemporary moral theory because she takes the 
naturalistic fallacy to be an artefact of Enlightenment thought,576 which has no traction against 
Aquinas’s natural law because it is based on an Aristotelian philosophy of nature577 which offers the 
most satisfactory way to understand the principles of practical reason.578 As Porter observes: 
The arguments of Hume and Moore were developed within the context of Enlightenment 
foundationalism, and as such have been shaped by a presupposition well described by John McDowell: 
‘Modern philosophy has taken itself to be called on to bridge dualistic gulfs, between subject and 
object, thought and world.’
579
 In the case at hand, appeals to a naturalistic fallacy presuppose a gulf 
between the factual and the normative, and insist that this gulf cannot be bridged, with the 
consequence that moral arguments must be in some way self-standing, based on sentiments (as Hume 
claims), or nonnatural properties attaching to states of affairs (according to Moore) or some other 
distinctive and nonfactual basis, which nonetheless mirrors the objectivity of the factual in some way. 
Throughout the past century the very existence of such a gulf has been challenged on a number of 
grounds [...] and the persuasiveness of ‘naturalistic fallacy’ arguments has correspondingly been 
undermined.
580
 
For Porter, re-establishing the ethical credibility of a naturalistic approach allows her to recover an 
Aristotelian-Thomist theory for contemporary Christian ethics which, on her analysis, relies on a 
more plausible as well as a more authentically Thomist concept of practical reason. Porter has three 
objections to the Grisez School position on the operation of moral reasoning. Firstly, Grisez and 
Finnis justify their construction of practical reason ‘on the grounds that only on their analysis can 
practical reason avoid illegitimate inferences from states of affairs or metaphysical claims to moral 
judgements.’581 As such they offer a good illustration of McDowell’s observation that: 
Ordinary modern philosophy addresses its derivative dualisms in a characteristic way. It takes a stand 
on one side of a gulf it aims to bridge, accepting without question the way its target dualism conceives 
the chosen side. Then it constructs something as close as possible to the conception of the other side 
that figured in the problems, out of materials that are unproblematically available where it has taken its 
stand. Of course there no longer seems to be a gulf, but the result is bound to look more or less 
revisionist.
582
 
Porter agrees with McDowell that there is no such gulf, and hence no compelling reason for what 
she calls ‘the radically new structure of practical reasoning that Grisez and Finnis have proposed.’583  
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Furthermore, as we have seen,584 the difficulties Porter identifies as being raised by the Grisez/Finnis 
theory of natural law suggest, at minimum, that ‘pure reason’ is no more promising than ‘pure 
nature’ as a basis for a theory of morality585 and, this being the case, whatever the advantages and 
disadvantages of her own preferred naturalistic approach, Porter finds no justification for the claim 
that a moral theory grounded in reason provides us with a clear alternative, and several positive 
reasons for taking a naturalistic ethic seriously as a starting point for developing a theological 
account of the natural law.586 
Secondly, Porter objects that the Grisez School construction of practical reason flies in the face of 
ordinary experience: 
In order for their theory to work, Grisez and Finnis must not only show that these principles capture the 
way in which practical reason works, when it is functioning correctly; they must also show that these 
principles express the way practical reason necessarily must work when it is functioning in good order. 
And it is difficult to see how this case could be made, if only because we do not reason about practical 
matters in the way that Finnis and Grisez suggest we do. We desire and seek objects or states of affairs, 
and these are desirable to us because they fit into ongoing needs, desires, projects and long-standing 
commitments, whether our own or those of people, communities, or ideals toward which we are 
committed. Even if these desiderata could be analysed without remainder into a set of basic goods (and 
this is not apparent), we do not desire them simply as instantiations of basic goods; we desire them 
because they promote the overall wellbeing of people and other entities about which we have some 
concern, or avert harm from them. By the same token, we inevitably find ourselves weighing different 
desiderata against one another in the light of our overall concerns and commitments and this process 
will on occasion lead us to act against some goods, precisely in order to preserve other weightier or 
more urgent desiderata.
587
  
Thirdly, as we have seen, Porter disputes the Grisez School construction of practical reason as an 
accurate exposition of Aquinas. Finnis, she tells us, recognises that Aquinas does not speak explicitly 
of ‘reasons for action’ or ‘basic’ human goods, but nonetheless maintains that these expressions 
capture what Aquinas means. Porter disputes this, countering that: 
When Aquinas speaks of reason in a moral context, he interprets it in terms of a correct ordering in 
view of some higher end: ‘this pertains to right reason, that one should make use of those things which 
lead to an end in accordance with the measure which is appropriate to the end.’
588
 
Furthermore, although Aquinas does not claim that such goods as life and knowledge are 
instrumental in a narrow sense, On Porter’s account he does claim that we bring order to our pursuit 
of these and similar goods through our grasp of the end of human life,589 which, as Porter interprets 
him, cannot be equated with the unlimited enjoyment of irreducibly plural basic human goods, and 
stands in a different relationship to specific goods than Finnis can allow. For Finnis, as Porter 
understands him, happiness is secondary to the basic human goods which, since they are not 
                                                          
584
 See n. 71 above. 
585
 Porter, Nature as Reason, pp. 130–131. 
586
 Porter, Nature as Reason, pp. 130–131; Porter’s positive reasons for her preferred naturalistic approach are 
discussed on pp. 131–136. 
587
 Porter, Nature as Reason, pp. 129–130. 
588
 Porter, ‘Reason, Nature and the End of Human Life’, p.483: Citing S.T.  II-II, 152, 2. 
589
 Porter, ‘Reason, Nature and the End of Human Life’, p.482–483: Citing SCG 3.25; S.T. I-II, 1, 6. 
 136 
instrumental or derivative, cannot be dependent in any way on some more fundamental or higher-
order good for their desirability.590  
Ordering, comparative judgements, and preferential choices are integral aspects of practical 
reasoning as we experience it,591 Porter argues, and whilst no one would deny that, for Aquinas, 
actions are to be morally evaluated by the criterion of conformity to reason,592 Finnis and Grisez’s 
interpretation of this criterion is not persuasive as an account of St Thomas’s position. As we have 
seen, in Porter’s view there are too many aspects of Aquinas’s moral theory that cannot be 
accommodated within the framework of the Grisez School analysis, which suggests that St Thomas 
simply does not analyse morality in terms of basic goods as the Grisez School understand them.593  
Porter offers an alternative reading of Aquinas: on her analysis his theory of moral goodness 
presupposes a theory of goodness in general,594 hence, for Porter: 
There is nothing mysterious or even distinctive about our knowledge of good and evil, on the contrary, 
our knowledge of what is good for a thing is of a piece with our knowledge of what that thing is. To the 
extent that we know what something is we can judge how nearly it approaches to the ideal of its kind of 
creature, and in which ways it falls short of that ideal. If we know enough about the creature and its 
usual mode of existence, we can even offer suggestions about what would promote its nearer approach 
to the ideal state of existence proper to its specific kind, and conversely, what would be harmful to it.
595
 
So for Aquinas, as Porter understands him, there is no gulf to be bridged between the empirical and 
the normative realms: there can be no understanding of the facts that specify our understanding of 
what a particular biological species is and our grasp of the good peculiar to its natural kind. 
Furthermore, in our own case, our knowledge of what we ought to be, which includes moral 
knowledge, is a necessary part of our knowledge of what we are. Hence, Porter concludes, according 
to Aquinas’s theory of morality the moral ‘ought’ cannot be separated from the anthropological 
‘is’.596 
Porter’s interpretation here contradicts Grisez’s reading of Aquinas on the first principle of practical 
reason,597 which Finnis adopted in Natural Law and Natural Rights,598 and which underpins the 
further development of their moral theory. On the Grisez School account, Porter explains: 
Aquinas holds that both the first principles of practical reason, and the knowledge of the basic goods 
that give substantive content to those principles, are self-evident and therefore underived (although 
not innate in the sense of being known prior to all experience). Hence according to Grisez and Finnis, 
Aquinas holds that moral knowledge does not presuppose factual knowledge or metaphysical theories 
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of any sort whatever, but can be derived entirely from self-evident principles and our knowledge of the 
basic goods, which is also self-evident to us.
599
  
Porter notes that Grisez, in his later work, does not claim to be following Aquinas on every issue,600 
as we have seen, but both he and Finnis continue to hold that on this basic point they are in 
agreement with St Thomas and their interpretation of his thought on practical reason is correct.601 
Grisez, Porter suggests, seems to insist on this point partly to correct earlier readings of Aquinas 
which represent him as holding that moral norms are derived by means of deduction from 
statements about human nature or God’s will; thus far she agrees with him. Aquinas, on Porter’s 
reading as well as Grisez’s, does not hold that the primary form of moral reasoning is deductive.602 
For the Grisez School, a comprehensive system of moral principles may be derived from an 
indubitable first principle, as specified through the apprehension of self-evident basic goods. The 
process of derivation is one of specification rather than deduction, but this process does yield 
definite moral rules which can approach, without fully attaining, the rationally compelling character 
of the first principle of practical reason and the basic goods.603 But Porter parts company with the 
Grisez School, and other attempts to develop an account of the natural law on broadly Thomist lines, 
at the point where they reject any appeal to human nature, broadly construed, as a starting point for 
ethical reflection.604 For Porter such theories are unpersuasive as a reading of Aquinas, unnecessary 
as a response to the naturalistic fallacy and both restrictively rationalist and ultimately unworkable 
as an account of moral reasoning.  
As a consequence of their stance on the naturalistic fallacy, Porter argues, Grisez and Finnis are 
forced to deny the moral relevance of all those aspects of our humanity that we share with other 
animals.605 Aquinas, by contrast, says that reflection on animal behaviour can help to establish 
which, out of a spectrum of human desires and inclinations, should be considered normative: ‘the 
natural inclinations in those things devoid of reason indicates the natural inclination belonging to the 
will of an intellectual nature’.606 On Porter’s account, no Scholastic would interpret reason in such a 
way as to drive a wedge between the pre-rational aspects of our nature and reason; they always 
presuppose an essential continuity between what is natural and what is rational, since for them 
nature itself is an intelligible expression of Divine reason. In particular, the pre-rational components 
of human nature have their own intelligible structures, in virtue of which they provide starting points 
and parameters for the exercise of practical reason.607 
This difference at the theoretical level does have ramifications in applied ethics. Although Porter 
does not address the possibility that their theoretical structure may be hostile to environmental 
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ethics, as Northcott alleges, in the contentious field of sexual ethics she notes that their stance on 
the naturalistic fallacy requires the Grisez School to construct their defence of the traditional 
Catholic prohibition of the use of contraception as a sin against life, which represents the same 
stance of the will as is present in murder, rather than as a violation of the natural processes of 
sexuality.608 Porter notes that their reasoning here is different to the arguments set out in the 
magisterial documents that established the doctrine,609 and different from earlier Modern theories 
which reflected the assumptions of the natural theology that emerged in the seventeenth century 
and dominated scientific as well as religious thought for the next two hundred years.610 On this view, 
Porter tells us: 
The world, and more particularly living creatures, reflect God’s intelligent design, in just the same way 
as the design of an artefact reflects the design of the craftsman. On first glance, this might seem to be 
nothing more than a variant of the scholastic view that creatures reflect an intelligibility and goodness 
in virtue of their essential forms. But on the modern view, the intelligibility of creatures is understood 
by reference to an inferred design which is external to the creature itself. What this meant, practically, 
was that design was analysed in terms of the manifest functions of organs and physical processes, 
which were taken to be their purposes without any necessary reference to the overall well-being of the 
organism. The eye is meant for seeing because it is what eyes do, and the intelligent design of the eye is 
therefore manifested in the physical constitution of the organ, in terms of which it functions as it 
does.
611
 
Porter argues that the scholastic approach, by contrast, is closer to what Richard McCormick calls 
‘personalism’: it is the wellbeing of the human person in all facets and dimensions that is the 
criterion of moral normativity,612 rather than the biological function of an isolated organ being 
elevated to the status of moral determinant at the expense of other legitimate human interests, an 
approach labelled ‘biologism’ by John Courtney Murray.613 Biologism, Porter tells us, confuses the 
natural with the primordial. On the scholastic view, as Porter reads them, the goodness of a creature 
is inextricably bound up with its intelligible form, which is to say, with the ordered functioning 
proper to its natural kind, and the functions of organs are interpreted teleologically, in light of their 
contribution to the overall wellbeing of the creature itself or of its family, social group or species. On 
this account, Porter argues, ‘God’s will as expressed through human nature cannot be analysed in 
terms of the functions of the specific organs or faculties, it must be understood in terms of the 
overall functioning and wellbeing of the human creature and humankind, considered in the first 
instance as expressions of God’s will that the creature live and flourish.’614 This being the case, she 
concludes, a theological account of the natural law must proceed by way of reflection on the 
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meaning of human flourishing615 and in this at least she is in agreement with Grisez and his 
collaborators.616 
As Porter reads them, Grisez and Finnis share in the modern view that nature, understood as 
whatever is pre or non-rational, stands in contrast to reason; this is implied by their insistence that 
moral norms must be derived from reason alone, that is, from pure rational intuitions that are in no 
way dependent on empirical or metaphysical claims about the world. As we have seen, however, 
Porter insists that neither Aquinas nor any of the scholastics would interpret reason in such a way as 
to drive a wedge between the pre-rational aspects of our nature and rationality.617 This distinction, 
between the ‘new natural law’ and scholastic accounts cannot be brought out, she tells us, simply by 
a comparison of relevant texts on natural law and reason.618 However, we should be wary of 
pressing the similarity between the scholastic emphasis on the rational character of the natural law 
and the Grisez reconstruction too far. For example, there is some similarity between Albert’s view 
and the Grisez School theory since according to both the natural law is in some sense self-evident, 
but for Albert it is basic moral terms rather than basic goods which provide the starting points for 
practical deliberation:619 
According to Grisez, Finnis and their collaborators, the natural law rests on a self-evident first principle 
of practical reason: ‘the good is to be done and pursued; the bad is to be avoided’, interpreted in the 
light of the basic goods, which in turn give rise to self-evident principles of the form: ‘Such-and-such a 
basic good is to be done and/or pursued, protected, and promoted. This is not what Albert says, 
however. Rather he claims that the wrongness of certain kinds of actions (for example, stealing or 
adultery) is self-evident to us as soon as we learn the meanings of the words designating them.
620
   
For Porter the Grisez School formulation of the new natural law is over-reliant on claims to self-
evidence that she finds implausible.621 She questions the claim of their basic human goods to 
basicness in the required sense: the particular internal specifications of the substantive goods, such 
as the basic good of life which for the Grisez School includes procreation,622 jeopardise their claim to 
self-evidence, whilst the contingency of the reflexive goods such as integrity, practical 
reasonableness, friendship and marriage on the normatively freighted cultural context in which they 
exist and are experienced, throws into question their characterisation as pre-moral goods as well as 
their status as self-evident to pure practical reason.623 In order for their theory to work, Porter 
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argues, it would be necessary for the Grisez School to (1) establish the claim of their basic goods to 
self-evidence, a case she does not believe they have made persuasively, (2) to exorcise appeals to 
anything beyond practical reason in pursuit of these basic goods from the process of moral 
reasoning and (3) to assert the incommensurability of the goods, since it is necessary to their claim 
to maintain the disjuncture between the realms of fact and value that moral norms are not 
illegitimately derived from anthropological or metaphysical premises.624 Furthermore they must 
establish the transparency to unaided practical reason of the eight modes of responsibility, 
‘including, most notably, modes which rule out any kind of activity which impedes a basic good from 
coming about or damages or destroys an instantiation of such a good.’625  
On Porter’s view the inner logic of the Grisez School reconstruction of natural law overstrains the 
capacity of unaided reason to do the requisite work and they overstate the claims of their particular 
listing and internal specification of the basic goods to self-evidence. The perceived need to negotiate 
a route around the naturalistic fallacy which Porter sees as requiring this over-reliance on self-
evidence underpins the modern epistemological turn that continues to colour both Grisez School 
ethics and that of their Proportionalist rivals. Catholic moral theologians on both sides of the debate, 
she tells us, share a conviction that moral norms are to be analysed in terms of the basic goods to be 
pursued through moral action, disagreeing primarily over what is to count as ‘acting against’ a basic 
good. Furthermore, both sides agree that the natural law is to be understood as a morality of reason 
which can be grasped by all rational and well-disposed persons.626 Thus, on Porter’s view, the 
thinking of both the Grisez School and their interlocutors in contemporary Catholic natural law 
theory reflects the assumptions and concerns of modern moral thought more generally.627    
Porter detects a shift in emphasis between the early modern period, during which the natural law 
was grounded in an account of the aims and the overall order manifested in pre-rational nature, and 
later modern accounts which retained the commitment to universal cogency as the standard of 
rationality, but in order to do so were forced to choose between the naturalness of the natural law 
and its rational character. Almost without exception, Porter tells us, the later modern Catholic 
theorists chose to emphasise the rational character of the natural law, since, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, medieval constructions of nature were widely regarded as untenable, the 
biologism inherent in arguments from biological function to moral purpose increasingly seemed 
arbitrary and unreasonable, and the gulf between the realms of fact and value had come to seem 
unbridgeable.628 However, Porter notes: 
Very few Catholics have been prepared to reject the idea of a natural law altogether. For this reason 
when we examine early twentieth century accounts of the natural law, we find they agree, with few 
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exceptions,
629
 on a construal of the natural law tradition which emphasises the rational character of the 
natural law and minimises or even denies the normative significance of nature, except insofar as human 
nature is simply equated with rationality.
630
  
Porter situates the Grisez School reconstruction of natural law in the context of this historical 
development as ‘the most comprehensive expression of the approach to the natural law that 
emphasises its rational character’,631 and she characterises Grisez School natural law as ‘very much a 
natural law theory in the modern mode, since it claims to derive a comprehensive system of moral 
precepts from an indubitable first principle.’632 She notes the similarities between Grisez School 
rationalism and a Kantian approach:  
The new natural law developed by Grisez and Finnis and their followers analyses moral norms in terms 
of the exigencies for the rational pursuit of basic goods, which provide the self-evident starting points 
for all practical deliberation. This might seem at first glance to be a desire-based and therefore 
instrumentalist account of morality, but Grisez and Finnis are careful to point out that the starting 
points for rational reflection are not provided by our desires in themselves, rather these desires provide 
the necessary occasions for the rational apprehension of certain desiderata as basic goods, and it is 
these rational apprehensions, rather than the desires occasioning them, which serve as the starting 
points for practical deliberation. Indeed, according to Finnis, ‘allowing one’s emotions sway over one’s 
reasons for action is indeed the paradigmatic way of going and doing wrong.’ As Alan Donagan points 
out, this account of rationality, according to which moral norms are grounded in respect for the basic 
goods instantiated in persons’ lives, is very similar to the Kantian view that moral norms are grounded 
in respect for rational agents tout court.
 633
  
Sometimes Porter seems to be suggesting that the new natural law might be read as a species of 
Kantian ethics, whereas elsewhere she apparently regards Grisez School ethics as sui generis: for 
example, in her discussion of Albert’s conception of morality she comments that ‘his theory has 
some affinities with the Kantian conception of the natural law developed by Grisez and Finnis’634 
(although as we have seen this similarity should not be pressed too far), however later in the same 
book, Porter argues that an analysis of morality in terms of the intention of the agent yields ‘some 
version of Kantianism, or a theory akin to the new natural law defended by Grisez and Finnis’,635 
suggesting that she does not consistently characterise the Grisez School theory as a species of 
Kantianism. Elsewhere, Porter clarifies that the pursuit of basic goods is ‘not straightforwardly 
equivalent to the Kantian imperative of respect for persons, as it would be understood by most 
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philosophers’.636 Porter tells us that in Grisez’s own view his first principle of morality is an 
enhancement of Kant’s imperative, in that ‘never turn directly against basic goods’ says what 
‘respect the dignity of every person’ says and more. The basic goods, for Grisez, participate in the 
dignity of persons. In acting out of love for human persons one acts to promote and protect basic 
goods, which are the intelligible aspects of the fulfilment of persons to which human actions can 
contribute.637 
Northcott, as we have seen in Chapter Four, takes issue with what he sees as an ecologically hostile 
rationalism at the heart of Grisez School ethics. Northcott argues that: 
In their attempt to concur with post-Enlightenment philosophy, Finnis and Grisez make a virtue out of 
necessity, and present an entirely deontological, non-naturalistic and non-metaphysical account of 
natural law. Like their utilitarian and deontological conversation partners, they present a theory of 
ethics which avoids any foundational reference to nature. As Pamela Hall puts it, they present us with a 
theory of ‘natural law without nature.’ […] Veatch suggests that one who contends, as Finnis does, that 
the norms referred to in a theory of natural law should not be taken as based on judgements about 
nature ‘must surely be an opponent of natural law doctrines in ethics, not their defender!’
638
 
Veatch faults the Grisez School for erecting a ‘wall of separation between practical reason and 
theoretical reason, between ethics and metaphysics, between nature and morals, between is and 
ought’.639 On his reading, Grisez and Finnis maintain the ‘absolute independence of ethics as over 
against metaphysics, or of morals with respect to a knowledge of nature’ so that ethical principles 
are not thought of as being ‘in any sense principles of being or nature at all.’640 Thus for Veatch, 
whatever its merits, Grisez’s ethics cannot claim to be a species of natural law theory.  
Russell Hittinger critiques Grisez’s theory as exhibiting a ‘failure to interrelate systematically 
practical reason with a philosophy of nature’ and he asserts that the idea of natural law ‘obviously 
requires a commitment to law as in some sense “natural” and nature as in some way normative.’641 
Similarly, Lloyd Weinreb argues that Grisez constructs a deontological theory, detached from any 
foundational metaphysics in contrast to ‘ontological’ classical and mediaeval natural law. Ralph 
McInerny, in the first edition of his Ethica Thomistica, asserts that Finnis and Grisez hold a ‘Humean’ 
view of practical reason, which takes knowledge of the world to be irrelevant to practical 
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reasoning.642 As Robert George remarks ‘any theory that merits identification with the practical 
philosophy of David Hume cannot plausibly be counted as a natural law theory.’643 
Responding to critics in defence of the new natural law, Robert George insists that Grisez and his 
collaborators never deny that morality is grounded in nature and furthermore that their solution to 
the naturalistic fallacy, which requires the claim that moral norms are not deduced or inferred from 
prior knowledge of human nature, does not entail the proposition that morality is not grounded in 
nature: 
If Grisez and his followers are correct in supposing that the most basic reasons for action are not 
inferred from propositions about human nature but are instead self-evident, does that mean that these 
reasons (and the moral norms whose derivation they make possible) are detached from human nature? 
The answer is no. Here is why: only that which is understood to be humanly fulfilling can be understood 
to be worthwhile. Intrinsic goods are basic reasons for action precisely because they are (intrinsic) 
aspects of human wellbeing and fulfilment. They perfect human beings, i.e., beings with a human 
nature. As human perfections ‘basic goods’ belong to human beings as part of their nature.
644
 
Rufus Black tells us that the reason everyone will arrive at the Grisez School list of basic goods and 
no other, if they follow Finnis’s methodology for themselves, is that the different goods correspond 
to different dimensions of human nature. For Black: 
This correspondence indicates that the foundations of moral reasoning are grounded in the reality of 
human nature, although the logical process for identifying these foundations has not involved deriving 
them from the facts about human nature to which they correspond. The nature of practical reasoning’s 
‘grounding’ in the reality of human nature is particularly apparent, if one considers the way in which the 
basic human goods would be different. For example, if human beings were not, in fact able to feel 
emotions—like the Vulcans in Star Trek(!)—‘inner harmony’ would never be a reason for justifying why 
we do what we do.
645
 
Or as John Finnis puts it: 
Propositions about primary human goods are not derived from propostions about human nature or 
from any other propositions of speculative reason; as Aquinas says with maximum clarity, and never 
wavers from saying, they are per se nota and indemonstrabilia. For we come to know human nature by 
knowing its potentialities, and these we know by knowing their actuations, which in turn we know by 
knowing their objects—and the objects […] are precisely the human goods […] But […] if we shift from 
the epistemological to the ontological mode, the same methodological principle, in its application to 
human beings, presupposes and thus entails that the goodness of all human goods (and thus the 
appropriateness, the convenientia, of all responsibilities) is derived from (i.e., depends on) the nature 
which, by their goodness, those goods perfect. For those goods—which as ends are the rationes of 
practical norms or ‘oughts’—would not perfect that nature were it other than it is.
646
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So there seems to be a sense in which Grisez School ethics is grounded in nature, but, as we have 
seen from our engagement with Porter’s critique, the differences between Thomist and Grisez 
School conclusions at the level of applied ethics, generated by deeper theoretical issues, can be 
profound. However, before embarking on a discussion of the ramifications of this conclusion for 
environmental ethics we need to consider the question as to whether the new natural law is 
‘rationalist’ in a different sense: Does Grisez School ethics exclude emotional data in its moral 
analysis, as Bexell argues?  
The Moral Significance of Emotion 
Bexell joins with Northcott and a number of other scholars in critiquing the rationalism of the new 
natural law, but for him the Grisez system is called into question by Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious.  As Bexell points out, ‘an ethical system having at its heart freedom of choice, free will 
and rational reflection will in most cases end up in the vicinity of rationalism.’647 However, he makes 
a useful distinction between rational and rationalistic ethics: 
A rational ethic is based on rational considerations and is logically consistent; it’s opposite is an 
irrational ethic. That ethics ought to be rational, few would contest. A rationalistic ethics, on the other 
hand, allows only the reason to determine moral theology, at the expense of other human spiritual 
capabilities and other ethical phenomena; and it may well presuppose an Aristotelian view of human 
being as specifically rational. In such a system, feelings, will or intuition should not override reason as 
they may in a rational ethic.
648
  
Bexell, as a Lutheran scholar, questions the optimism of Aristotelian and Thomist anthropology and 
in his view Grisez oversimplifies the moral implications of evil.649 He is critical of Grisez’s treatment 
of the emotions, which he sees as closed to the possibility that emotions may be a rich source of 
moral knowledge, rather than mere elemental urges that need to be overcome through rational 
moral deliberation.650 
Rufus Black, by contrast, sees Grisez’s treatment of vocational choices as indicative of an affirmation 
of emotions and feelings as morally important data to be incorporated in rational decision making. 
Black sees in this a substantial point of contact with the virtue ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, since it is 
an important concern of virtue theorists that emotions and feelings be given an appropriate positive 
place in moral theory. On Black’s reading: 
According to the Grisez School, all decisions, moral and immoral, involve feelings (which include 
emotions) as motives […] feelings will at times rightly guide decision making. This account of the ethical 
role of feelings is integral to the Grisez School’s conception of ethics as centrally about the formation of 
character; an understanding which, of course, also lies at the heart of virtue ethics.
651
 
This view puts Black at odds with Finnis who—as we have seen—regards allowing one’s emotions 
sway over one’s reasons for action as the archetypal moral trespass, attributing this position to 
Aquinas. 
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To summarise:  Jean Porter argues that the Grisez School justify their reconstruction of the natural 
law and their analysis of practical reasoning on the basis that it is necessary to construe practical 
reason as functioning in this way, this being the only way to avoid fallacious reasoning from 
metaphysical or anthropological facts to normative conclusions. Porter herself finds no compelling 
justification for any such reconstruction, since she denies the existence of the alleged gulf between 
the realms of fact and value. In addition, Porter finds the Grisez School view of practical reason 
counterintuitive, running contrary to our experience of the way in which we reason morally, and 
unpersuasive as an interpretation of Aquinas. She identifies the stance taken by the Grisez School on 
the question of the naturalistic fallacy as necessitating a reworking of the traditional Catholic 
prohibition on the use of contraception, such that conservative Catholics like Grisez, who continue 
to defend the doctrine, do so on a different basis to that expounded in the relevant magisterial 
documents. An important point of agreement between Porter and Grisez is found in their rejection 
of biologism and their shared intuition that a theological natural law ethics must begin with 
reflection on the meaning of human flourishing and their identification of Aquinas’s work as 
foundational for such reflection. However, for Porter, Grisez makes claims for the self-evidence of 
the basic goods and their internal specification that she finds implausible and distinct from the 
superficially similar claims made by pre-modern writers. She concludes that unaided reason cannot 
do the work Grisez requires of it: hence she rejects what she sees as Grisez’s Kantian rationalism and 
pursues a naturalist approach to the revival of natural law.  
Other scholars who have critiqued the new natural law as deontological and detached from nature 
as in any sense normative have included Michael Northcott, as we saw in Chapter Four, as well as 
Pamela Hall, Henry Veatch, Russell Hittinger, Lloyd Weinreb and Ralph McInerny. Responding in 
defence of the Grisez School position, Robert George and Rufus Black argue that the theory is 
‘grounded in nature’ in the sense that the basic goods are dimensions of the flourishing of human 
persons who have a particular nature: different goods would be arrived at following Finnis’s 
reflective methodology if we were self-reflective creatures with a somewhat different nature. 
However it is important in the light of their understanding of the naturalistic fallacy that moral 
norms and basic goods are not in any sense derived from the facts of human nature. 
For Bexell, the chief inadequacy of Grisez School ethics is its failure to accommodate moral data 
provided by our emotions into ethical analysis. On his view, this makes the theory rationalistic. 
Finnis’s view that following emotion rather than reason is the paradigmatic way of going and doing 
wrong for Aquinas, which as we have seen Porter disputes, would seem to lend weight to this 
analysis. However, Rufus Black argues that our emotional lives are integrated into ethical decision 
making in Grisez’s theological ethics, which he construes as a form of virtue ethics with an 
understanding of Christian character close to that of Stanley Hauerwas.   
Discussion 
Thomism 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to adjudicate between Porter and Finnis on issues of 
Thomist scholarship, it seems clear that Grisez consciously departs from Thomist teaching on the 
ultimate good and Finnis’s reading of Aquinas is called in question on several points. However, 
although differences in the theoretical substructure of the new natural law have led to differences in 
argument in defence of contraception between Grisez and the Magisterium, suggesting that such 
discrepancies may have important ramifications at the level of applied ethics, Chapter Four of this 
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thesis has clearly shown that a deficit in Thomist authenticity, although it needs to be acknowledged, 
has not led to an impoverished treatment of the environment in Grisez’s work.  
In so far as the Vatican continues, as McInerny tells us,652 to recommend St Thomas as our mentor in 
theology and philosophy, and to employ his moral reasoning in doctrinal development, it may be 
that Porter’s ethics provides us with a clearer, less distorting lens through which to view the future 
developmental possibilities inherent in Catholic social teaching. However, unless Porter is right in 
supposing that the Grisez School ethical system is simply unworkable, the new natural law as sui 
generis stands as a valuable resource for environmental ethics and, with suitable caveats attached, 
as a predictive tool for future Vatican teaching in the context of our ecological crisis.  
Universalism 
In my view a major flaw in Porter’s critique of Grisez’s ethics is her tendency to overlook the cogency 
of his theological ethics in light of difficulties she identifies with the universalist ambitions of his 
secular ethical system. At times she seems to conflate Grisez’s two accounts of natural law, or to 
mistake his secular system for the new natural law tout court. This seems to me to account for her 
worry that Grisez’s ethics is unworkable. In his theological ethics, practical reason works in concord 
with a biblical vision of Christian character, which remediates the cracks and strains Porter rightly 
diagnoses as a feature of Grisez’s secular ethical edifice. Hence his theological ethics can stand alone 
as a coherent system that does not rely on implausible claims for the self-evidence of the modes of 
response. As I read him, Grisez works backwards from his moral theology to the secular modes of 
responsibility, such that they remain reliant on his Christian virtue ethics.  
I think Biggar is correct in his observation that the ‘requirements of practical reasonableness’ only 
appear reasonable in the light of Christian faith and hope. Our culture is so deeply imbued with 
Christian ethical assumptions that they are easily overlooked. On my reading, Grisez assumes a 
Christian view of virtue and thus fails to see that different ‘modes of responsibility’ could arise from 
conflicting traditions of virtue ethics, undermining their claim to secular universality. On the other 
hand Grisez’s theological ethics, legitimately moored in a biblical understanding of Christian 
character, offers a self-consistent and convincing rational system. However as a species of 
theological virtue ethics, Grisez’s theory cannot of course be classified as a ‘natural law’ theory 
under Bexell’s definition. Taken in this sense, it seems to me, Porter is correct in her criticisms of the 
new natural law, but she is wrong to overlook the virtues of Grisez’s theological ethics.  
I would agree with Black that two parallel systems can be detected within Grisez’s overall work: he 
expounds a distinctive and cogent theological ethics, grounded in an understanding of Christian 
character drawn from reflection on the beatitudes, and abstracts from this a secular bridging theory. 
This secular natural law theory may serve as a useful stand-in, in contexts in which shared 
commitment to equal human dignity can be assumed, for the ever elusive universal natural law. It is 
not in itself universally valid and intellectually compelling, since, as Porter says, our understanding 
and assessment of natural law moral norms depends on the theory of human nature that we bring 
to bear on them, and no such theory of human nature can expect to be so well substantiated as to 
be rationally compelling to everyone who understands it.653 Furthermore, as Black argues, the 
requirements of practical reasonableness arise, in part, from a person’s understanding of the 
                                                          
652
 Ralph McInerny, ‘Grisez and Thomism’, p. 53. 
653
 Porter, ‘Does the Natural Law Provide a Universally Valid Morality?’, pp. 90–91. 
 147 
‘conditions of human life’, which would include our theological understanding of questions of 
ultimate meaning.654  However, I would suggest, Grisez’s ethics has great potential as a contributor 
to the project that Biggar, O’Donovan, Porter and others hold out hope for in the face of the 
kaleidoscopic fragmentation and multiplication of ethical particularism: A global ethic we might 
jointly construct rather than hope to discover or presume to teach. 
Rationalism 
For Porter, the distorted account of practical reasoning advanced by the Grisez School is a 
consequence of their attempts to evade the is-ought problem that dominated much of Twentieth 
century ethics. On her view this supposed fallacy is an artefact of Modernism rather than a timeless 
truth of logic as Grisez and his collaborators take it to be. At times it seems to me that defenders of 
the Grisez School position and their interlocutors are talking at cross purposes on this crucial issue. I 
agree with Robert George that there is no warrant for regarding the new natural law as 
epistemologically enclosed or somehow ungrounded in nature. Yet I also agree with Henry Veatch, 
Jean Porter and others who have argued that there is no chasm between the natural and the 
normative necessitating a complete reconstruction of natural law theory. 
To flourish is to instantiate human perfections; but human perfections belong to our nature as it 
ought to be, as it was in the garden of Eden and is now only insofar as we are enabled by grace to 
live in accordance with the natural law. This, it seems to me, robs George’s riposte to Veatch of all its 
logical force. For George and for the Grisez School, for whom he is an able and articulate 
spokesperson, the distinction between what ‘is the case’ about human nature and what ‘ought to 
be’ is logically significant. Veatch claims that the very is of human nature has an ought built into it, a 
claim George dismisses as muddled. Yet, on his own account, the basic goods as human perfections 
belong to human being as part of their nature. Although as a legal scholar he does not express this 
theologically, another way of expressing the same point would be that the is of our original created 
nature, without sin and in the image of God, has an ought built into it, functioning as it does as the 
ideal of wellbeing, fulfilment or human perfection to which we aspire, enabled by grace, when we 
commit ourselves to discipleship in response to the love of Christ.  
So in answer to the question as to whether Grisez’s ethics should be disqualified as a theory of 
natural law by reason of its detachment from nature as its normative foundation, my response 
would be no: as George has shown, Grisez’s moral theology is grounded in nature and in this sense 
the theory qualifies as a species of natural law. In my view, Grisez’s neo-Thomist critics overstate the 
rationalism of his ethics, since, as I read him, a biblical Christian virtue ethics underpins the modes of 
response. Both Biggar and Black corroborate this interpretation of Grisez’s moral theology.  The 
secular modes—which are certainly far from self-evident—appear to have been arrived at by 
abstraction from the theological worldview within which they fit together into a coherent but 
irreducibly Christian ethical system.  
On the second issue, whether the new natural law is rationalistic by virtue of excluding emotional 
data from ethical analysis, I would agree with Black that this is simply not the case for Grisez’s 
theological ethics. One possible reason for the different perception between Black and Bexell is that 
the former is interested exclusively in Grisez’s theological ethics whereas the latter seeks a 
universalist ethics in Grisez’s work. Similarly, John Finnis, as a scholar of jurisprudence rather than 
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theological ethics, necessarily looks to Grisez’s secular version of the natural law in constructing his 
own worldview. It is noticeable that the secular formulation of Grisez’s modes of responsibility is 
negatively phrased and preoccupied with overcoming emotional drivers that might lead to immoral 
choices. By contrast, the Christian modes of response incorporate positive emotions such as 
gratitude for salvation as the motive for honouring the same injunctions not from obedience to rules 
but as charity’s application of faith in the Christian life. 
In my view, Bexell is mistaken in expecting to be able to discover a universal ethics and his attempt 
to avoid the trap of rationalism through a dialectical balancing of philosophical and psychodynamic 
strands of ethical thought seems likely to result in unworkable complexity. He also seems to me to 
overlook the positive role of emotion in Grisez’s moral theology as well as the psychologically deep-
rooted self-esteem of a Christian who understands herself as a child of God and the moral shield this 
conviction provides, although, of course, she remains subject to bad habits and temptations as a 
convert on the path to spiritual and moral maturity.  
Notwithstanding the evident inadequacies of any universalist ethics which one might attempt to 
abstract from Grisez’s system, it seems to me that his theological ethics can respond robustly to the 
charge of rationalism, both in Bexell’s sense and in Northcott’s. The Christian virtue ethics that 
underpins Grisez’s modes of response to the Christian calling and his treatment of personal vocation 
evidences a positive incorporation of emotion as morally cognitive and not merely as primordial 
impulses to be restrained, a characterisation that permeates Grisez’s formulation of the secular 
modes. Likewise, it seems to me that the rationalism Northcott and Porter, inter alia, perceive in 
Grisez’s natural law is an artefact of his occasional forays into secular ethics and his attempts to 
reconstruct the universalist ideal following the failure of the Enlightenment project aimed at this 
chimeric end. By contrast, his theological ethics radically depends on a broader Christian worldview 
and hence is not a freestanding rationalist construction. As I read him, Grisez’s moral theology, 
whilst it does not claim to be an authentic recovery of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, nevertheless 
qualifies as a natural law theory, providing universalism is not a defining feature of such a theory as 
it is for Bexell, since its critics overstate the extent of the theory’s rationalistic character.    
The conclusion that Grisez’s theological ethics qualifies as a natural law theory brings us back to 
Nigel Biggar’s question with which we began this chapter: does the Grisez School ethical system 
suffer from a serious deficiency, which a naturalist system might remediate? As we have seen in 
Chapter Four of this thesis, Grisez in fact expounds a sophisticated environmental ethics that on the 
practical level leads to many of the same conclusions that environmentalist scholars have argued for. 
Much of this is the fruit of his dialectical methodology which requires conscientious reflection on the 
truths of Scripture and existing Catholic social teaching. This wealth of received wisdom Grisez 
seamlessly interweaves with his natural law ethics to produce a holistic theology of the Christian 
moral life. Thus, on my reading, it is not possible to detach Grisez’s inherent ecology from his 
theological ethics without doing structural violence to his ethical system. This conclusion dovetails 
with the finding of this chapter that the alleged rationalism of the Grisez system on the theoretical 
level is overstated by critics, which gives me confidence that the Grisez School environmental ethics I 
have sought to recover can be an important and timely contribution to the field.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that, notwithstanding its departure from classical Thomism and the inherent 
weakness of the secular universalist strand of thought woven through it, Grisez’s moral theology 
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stands as a cogent ethical system that is apt for application to our ecological challenges. As Biggar 
and Black have argued, Grisez’s ethics stands on theological foundations even when he attempts to 
abstract and present a system that is accessible to all rational people of good will. If the term 
‘natural law’ implies, as it does for Bexell, a universally valid freestanding edifice constructed from 
pure secular reason, then it would seem that Grisez’s theological ethics is not a form of natural law 
and, in so far as he aspires to present such a theory, his ‘natural law’ project is unsuccessful. 
However if a natural law project requires only that the theory be grounded in nature, George and 
Black have successfully shown that the goods that together constitute human flourishing would be 
different were our nature other than it is, since they correspond to the reality of our nature as we 
experience it. Black has also shown that, for the Grisez School, emotions and the moral data they 
provide have an important role to play in Grisez’s moral theology. Hence the new natural law is not 
rationalist in either of these two senses and there is no case to answer on whether or not the alleged 
rationalism impairs its potential for application to the ecological crisis. For the purposes of this 
thesis, then, we can answer Biggar’s question in the negative. There is no theoretical flaw in Grisez’s 
theological ethics that disables it as a vehicle for environmental ethics. On the other hand, it may be 
that a sound grasp of Porter’s theoretical ethics, combined with Grisez’s ecological theology could 
equip us with an even more powerful predictive lens through which to speculate on how Catholic 
social teaching might develop in our context of ecological crisis. My next and final chapter 
summarises the findings of the thesis and concludes the project with some suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and proposals for future research 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to abstract the salient conclusions from the foregoing chapters to provide 
an overview of the whole project and the route taken in establishing the thesis. We will then look 
forward to a continuation of the wider project of theological engagement with the ecological crisis 
with a few thoughts on the possibilities for future research followed by a general conclusion to the 
project. 
Recapitulation 
Chapter One introduced this research project, beginning with my research question ‘how might 
Germain Grisez’s creation theology and theological ethics contribute to Roman Catholic responses to 
the climate challenge?’ Following a brief description of the personal context in which my interest in 
this research topic was sparked, I outlined the contribution of this research project to the field of 
Roman Catholic ecotheology and summarised the argument of the thesis. This was followed by a 
brief summary of the task of each chapter. 
The aim of Chapter Two was to build my argument for pursuing this particular research project; the 
task of Chapter Two was threefold. Section One sought to demonstrate that the scientific case for 
anthropogenic global warming is robust. Section Two argued that the scale of the challenge requires 
broad participation by the general public in the transition to a low-carbon economy, requiring a 
paradigm shift away from the highly technical and negative framing of the debate towards a positive 
vision that engages people at the level of faith and values. Section Three set the scene for the 
particular project undertaken in this thesis, arguing that the climate challenge is a ‘sign of the times’ 
in principle as this term is understood and employed in Catholic theology and that it has been 
accepted as such by the teaching authority of the Church. 
Chapter Three placed this research project in the context of the field to which it makes its original 
contribution: Roman Catholic ecotheology. Section One argued that doctrinal revisionism is not 
intrinsic to the enterprise of ecotheology and Section Two deconstructed the ‘dominant narrative’ of 
a ‘greening of the papacy’ arguing that the resources exist within current teaching for a theologically 
conservative doctrinal development towards embracing inherent value in nature. Such a 
development would not threaten central pillars of Catholic social thought such as the unique dignity 
of the human person. Chapter Three concluded that there is room in the field for a theologically 
conservative Grisez-School ecotheology, thus establishing the need for this research project to fill an 
important gap in the literature in this field of scholarly endeavour.   
In Chapter Four I established that the architecture of Grisez’s theological ethics is inherently green 
and is built on a foundation of integral ecology. This observation appears to have been overlooked 
both by Grisez’s disciples—who are notable by their absence from public debates on environmental 
issues—and by his environmentalist interlocutors who seriously mischaracterise his position. In 
conjunction with my constructive work on a Grisez School conception of climate justice and my 
application of his methodology to the new encyclical, this conclusion constitutes a novel and 
important contribution to the field of Grisez scholarship. 
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Chapter Four was sub-divided into three sections. In Section One I provided an exposition of Grisez’s 
thought on work, nature and property, followed by a discussion of the ecological implications of his 
thought on mission and vocation and the framework of his natural law, demonstrating that his 
theological ethics is dependent on an integral ecology. In Section Two, I analysed and critiqued two 
important environmentalist responses to Grisez School natural law, arguing that Grisez’s 
environmentalist critics have been too quick to dismiss the potential of his theological ethics as a 
framework for constructive engagement in environmental ethics and public policy issues related to 
the ecological challenges of the Anthropocene. In Section Three I applied principles gleaned from my 
study of Grisez’s theological ethics to three contested dimensions of climate justice, concluding with 
a reflection on Laudato Si’ from a Grisez School perspective. 
Chapter Five discussed critiques of Grisez’s reconstruction of natural law developed by Ralph 
McInerny and Jean Porter, two of his most prominent Thomist critics. We saw that Grisez concedes 
that his theory departs from authentic Thomism on the question of supernatural happiness, and that 
Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas is the subject of ongoing academic debate on a number of 
important points. However, whilst Porter’s solution to the naturalistic fallacy provides an alternative 
route to the recovery of natural law that may be closer to the Thomist legacy, I argued that Grisez’s 
theological ethics as sui generis remains a theologically cogent species of ethical realism and, as 
such, can and should raise its voice in contemporary environmental debates.  
Overall, this thesis has argued that the scientific reality of climate change and the enormity of the 
task of decarbonising the world economy in order to face up to this defining challenge of our times 
suggests in principle that this issue meets the criteria of a ‘sign of the times’ as the term is used in 
Catholic social teaching and in fact the crisis has been recognised as such within a long-standing and 
well developed corpus of Church teaching prior to, and now of course including, Pope Francis’s 
ecological encyclical Laudato Si’. Although a large body of literature on global warming exists in the 
field of ecotheology, this thesis identifies a gap in the literature for a conservative Catholic 
methodological approach, seeking to fill this by recovering Germain Grisez’s thought on the 
environment and applying it to the concept of climate justice. Hence this thesis argues for a re-
reading of Grisez’s theological ethics through the lens of his creation theology, in which light his 
natural law is seen to be established on the bedrock of integral ecology. For certain Christian 
opponents of environmentalism who share Grisez’s concerns over the possible undermining of 
unique human dignity and also for Grisez’s environmentalist critics, anthropocentrism is a key issue. 
Yet this thesis argues that Grisez’s Catholic anthropocentrism is sufficiently nuanced to sustain a 
compassionate ethics of creation care and the attribution of inherent value to other species, making 
Pope Francis’s move to embrace inherent value in Laudato Si’ a significant development but one 
anticipated by Grisez.  Applying Grisez’s theological ethics to the climate challenge, this thesis argues 
for a more ambitious and compassionate conception of climate justice than that articulated by 
Posner and Weisbach, demonstrating that Grisez’s environmentalism and his treatment of 
traditional Catholic teaching on the common good and the universal destination of goods warrants 
such a move. Notwithstanding Jean Porter’s critique of Grisez’s new natural law, this thesis argues 
that, whilst his ethics departs significantly from traditional Thomism and he falls short of articulating 
a secular universalism, Grisez’s theological ethics nevertheless provides us with a coherent moral 
system, organised around a Biblical reflection on Christian virtue, that is a substantial resource for 
engaging with the ethics of climate change and other environmental issues.   
 152 
Having thus established my thesis that Grisez’s thought on the environment reveals an integral 
ecology that pervades his theological ethics and provides useful insights in the context of climate 
change, it remains to propose some suggestions for future research before closing this project with a 
general conclusion.    
Proposals for Future Research 
Germain Grisez and the ecological challenges of the Anthropocene 
In the light of the recovery of Grisez’s thought on the environment and the rereading of his 
theological ethics proposed by this thesis, there is much scope for the application of a Grisez School 
analysis to other aspects of the ecological ‘elephant in the room’, including the collapse in 
biodiversity, distribution of water resources and the threat multiplier effect that links climate change 
to conflict. There is work to be done on an authentic Catholic construction of animal rights, given the 
weakness of Grisez’s position on this issue as highlighted in this project. The ethics of consumption 
from a Grisez School perspective proved fascinating whilst I was researching the connections 
between his ethics of work, nature and property, and this aspect of his work—much like his 
environmental ethics—seems underappreciated and tends not to be a feature of Grisez School 
engagement in public discourse. A project of this magnitude and scope would benefit from a 
collaborative approach, inviting established experts on the various topics pertaining to the ecological 
crisis to reflect on their own research interests in the light of Grisez’s ethics. A sequel to Nigel Biggar 
and Rufus Black’s edited volume of essays might be a possible outcome of such a project, deepening 
theological engagement with Grisez’s thought on the environment beyond the glimmerings of hope 
for such an enterprise that briefly seemed to spark in that volume, notwithstanding Michael 
Northcott’s—in my view—unfairly negative appraisal of the potential for ecological engagement 
with Grisez School ethics.   
Reflection and action on Laudato Si’ 
Pope Francis’s new environmental encyclical, Laudato Si’, provides a profoundly hopeful vision of 
ecological conversion at every level in society and stresses that each of us has a role to play in the 
transition to climate security. The threefold challenge for theologians is firstly to reflect on the 
content of the encyclical through the window of our individual expertise and perspective, secondly 
to build up a more comprehensive appreciation of Laudato Si’ through sharing our insights and 
reflecting on the contributions of others and, thirdly, to extend Pope Francis’s invitation to engage in 
an inclusive conversation about the ecological challenges facing our world to others in our parishes 
and social networks, facilitating the connections that will enable practical responses to the 
challenge. 
CAFOD have produced an introductory DVD on the encyclical for use in parishes which includes input 
from a number of theologians. However, given the breadth of material covered in Laudato Si’, there 
is a need for a deeper, more sustained reflection that systematically mines the treasures of the 
encyclical, focusing on different issues and theological perspectives. My proposal is to invite 
colleagues to contribute to a project that assembles a series of short reflections, much like the TED 
talks series, that could be used as the basis of a parish-based course with some similarities to the 
ALPHA model that has been successful in Evangelical contexts, but with a view to identifying 
ecological projects and activities that participants have the enthusiasm to take forward. As Anthony 
Giddens remarks, ‘one hundred books on one hundred ways to reduce your carbon footprint will 
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have less effect than just one that is geared to what people are positively motivated to do.’655 In 
order to write that book, we need to ‘do theology’ as a community, reflecting on the ecological crisis 
and building parish-specific community projects that reflect local expertise and enthusiasm. 
Different churches might have a vision for quite different transition initiatives, but building bridges 
to secular sustainability projects and sharing best practice and success stories can help enthuse 
others and facilitate new ways of actualising the ecological vision of Laudato Si’.        
Ecumenical perspectives on integral ecology: towards an Anglican ecological theology 
According to Malcolm Brown, Director of Mission and Public Affairs for the Archbishop’s Council of 
the Church of England, ‘a number of trends seem to be coming together, in the Church and in the 
academy, which suggest a need for (and perhaps a desire to see) a theological foundation for the 
Church’s social witness formulated in terms that work for the Church and Society of today’.656 Brown 
predicts that—despite some academic protestations of plurality and informality as characteristic of 
Anglican social theology—the Church of England is moving closer to the Catholic model of producing 
official documents657 (the recent statement ‘Who is my neighbour’ produced in the run-up to the 
general Election on May 7th 2015 is a case in point658). In view of this trend, Anna Rowlands suggests 
that the need for a serious consideration of the relationship between the fraternal traditions of 
Anglican and Catholic social thought is pressing.659 However treatment of ecological issues as a 
category is overlooked in Brown’s edited volume Anglican Social Theology. Bringing together 
Evangelical and Anglican thinking in ecotheology and relating it to Catholic social teaching would 
constitute a useful contribution to a relatively new but promising field of research. 
Energy futures  
The ethics of future fuels is a fascinating and complex field of study, with the links between bio-fuel 
production and food security a particularly troubling nexus. Given the proportion of total global fuel 
consumption required to keep the commercial air fleet flying and the likely recessionary impact of 
restrictions on global mobility, it seems inevitable that a carbon-free alternative for jet fuel will need 
to be part of the solution to our climate and energy resource challenges. The question is how to 
design a regulatory framework and incentives to bring new fuels to market within the required 
timeframe without adversely affecting food security for the global poor in a food for fuel switch. 
There is an urgent need for theological reflection on this and other aspects of the fuel revolution 
from a perspective that holds together the human and ecological dimensions of the problems we 
face.  
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Transition theology 
In Transition Movement for Churches,660 Timothy Gorringe and Rosie Beckham argue for a closer 
collaboration between the Church and ‘transition town’ projects that aim to engage ordinary 
concerned citizens in the shift towards sustainable consumption and renewable energy systems. Yet 
in ‘Come with me into the fields: inspiring creation ministry among faith communities’ Erin Lothes 
Biviano argues that ‘the central symbols of Christian faith are not yet consciously intertwined with 
the reality of climate change in the ways needed to summon strong action.’661 It would seem that 
there is much work to be done in translating high level theology into projects for community 
participation, and reflecting on transition projects as a way of doing theology democratically in the 
community.       
A network for reflection on climate change adaptation 
There is a need to build an ecumenical network for theologians interested in different aspects of the 
ecological challenge, and those working in climate vulnerable communities whose experiences might 
form the contextual origin for theological reflection. At the same time, such a network would be a 
source of local knowledge about the needs of climate refugees and other vulnerable communities to 
enable Churches to partner effectively with organisations and individuals imperilled by climate 
change and an opportunity for sharing best practice in adaptation strategy to build resilience.  
General Conclusion 
This thesis began with my personal story about climate change and my concern for vulnerable 
people in Zimbabwe. At the time of going to press the ‘hunger season’ has begun and aid agencies 
are warning that the 2015 El Niño event, super-charged by climate change, threatens food security 
across Africa and beyond.662 There have been conflicting reports concerning Government plans for 
permanent settlement of the Tokwe-Mukosi flood victims and some sources claim that food rations 
for the refugees have been terminated, with tragic consequences for children who drop out of 
school to help forage for food and especially for teenage girls whose families often sell them for 
marriage in order to survive.663 The Italian engineers involved in the construction of the Tokwe-
Mukosi dam have downed tools in a dispute with the government over non-payment for their work, 
and without private investment which the government has yet to secure there seems no prospect of 
the dam being completed. In an already extremely arid area made more inhospitable by global 
warming and increasingly erratic rainfall in a changing climate, irrigation and hydro-electricity from 
the dam held out the possibility of an agricultural renaissance in Masvingo and was a central plank in 
Zimbabwe’s climate change adaptation strategy. It is hard to hold on to hope for the future.  
                                                          
660
 Tim Gorringe and Rosie Beckham, Transition Movement for Churches (London: Canterbury Press, 2013).  
661
 Erin Lothes Biviano, ‘Come with me into the fields: inspiring creation ministry among faith communities’, 
New Theology Review, 26: 2, (2014), pp. 33–42. http://newtheologyreview.org/index.php/ntr/article/view/998 
[accessed 21 October 2015]. 
662
 Oxfam Media Briefing, 1 October 2015: Entering Uncharted Waters: El Nino and the threat to food security. 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/mb-el-nino-uncharted-waters_1.pdf 
[accessed 9 November 2015]. 
663
 Regerai Pepukai, ‘Zimbabwe girls sold for marriage as hunger bites’, 2 November 2015. 
http://cajnewsafrica.com/2015/10/30/exclusive-zimbabwean-girls-sold-for-marriage-as-hunger-bites/ 
[accessed 9 November 2015]. 
 155 
In this situation of great grief and tragedy, Grisez’s theology and environmental ethics provides a 
framework for constructive reflection and action. His stress on the tradition of the universal 
destination of goods, the absolute Christian duty to feed the hungry and the special responsibility we 
have towards those adversely affected by the actions of our own community, speaks of the need to 
assist the climate refugees as an immediate response of solidarity and compassion. Many of the 
non-governmental organisations with disaster management expertise have withdrawn from the 
Masvingo area, citing difficult and dangerous operating conditions, but we have established links 
with Action Aid Zimbabwe who are able to work through partners on the ground to set up a child 
sponsorship scheme and facilitate donations of food, medical supplies and school equipment. This is 
just one example of a small church community attempting to live consistently with the Catholic 
principles Grisez articulates, in circumstances in which a personal connection enables a direct 
response to a situation of desperate need. The larger challenge for aid agencies is to facilitate many 
such connections so that every parish is enabled to respond in solidarity to instances of global 
climate injustice.  
In the Catholic context, Grisez’s theology encapsulates a radical conservativism that in no way 
waters down the challenge of living consistently with traditional Catholic principles, but stresses the 
obligation in strict justice to use one’s wealth to meet others’ needs. The traditional concept of the 
universal destination of goods is the foundation stone of Grisez’s thought on property, in the light of 
which property is held for the common good, to be used to meet one’s own reasonable needs as 
well as those of dependants and others including destitute strangers, to whom a strict duty to 
provide emergency food-aid is owed. Warning against a tendency to rationalise evasions of this 
responsibility, Grisez comments:  
For an individual to fulfil this obligation will neither change the world nor solve the problem of poverty, 
but it will make a difference to each person he or she helps—a real person whose real misery really will 
be mitigated. Even though the mass of human misery will be reduced only infinitesimally, that will be of 
immeasurable value because of the immeasurable dignity of each person whose need is met […] 
Christians who use their wealth to meet other’s needs bear credible witness to the gospel—witness 
which might contribute to effective political action to implement plans for the economic justice which 
the Church’s social doctrine calls for. 
664
  
The radical implications of Grisez’s conservativism are evident throughout his treatment of property 
which stands as an indictment of wasteful consumerism and flatly contradicts the individualist idea 
of absolute property rights now endemic in our culture. Grisez goes so far as to justify state 
expropriation of property where it is abused by private owners to the detriment of the common 
good. Challenging the prevailing culture of waste, Christians should acquire only such property as is 
needful for their pursuit of flourishing in the context of their vocation. Owners have a duty to care 
for and conserve their property and to ensure that their capital investments are ethical.  In order to 
live consistently with the tradition, guided by Grisez’s exposition of its principles, Christian 
communities need to develop a counter-culture of simple living and build networks of lending and 
sharing. In so doing we will strengthen the bonds of community and enable the church to reach out 
to others and care for the environment. 
As we have seen, Grisez’s detractors find his ethics to entail an ecologically malignant 
anthropocentrism, but for Grisez there is no incompatibility between a concern for human well-
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being and the recognition of and care for the intrinsic value of the non-human world. Despite his 
opposition to animal rights, which leaves him without a philosophical basis for objecting to cruelty to 
other animals in the pursuit of human interests, overall Grisez’s creation theology provides 
encouragement to those who seek to raise standards of animal welfare and work for the protection 
of endangered species. Although his rejection of the idea that animals have rights entails, for Grisez, 
that they may be killed, harmed or caused pain to the extent necessary for any good human use, he 
condemns cruelty, negligence and irresponsible ownership and derives extensive duties of 
protection, kindness and care towards animals. His sympathetic treatment of the need to reduce 
meat consumption is important in a climate constrained world in which vegetarianism can be a 
legitimate Christian response to climate change and food security issues as well as animal welfare 
considerations. 
At the time of writing, world leaders are gathering in Paris for the crucial COP21 climate conference. 
Grisez’s thoughts on fair burden-sharing and historic responsibility and the duty to aid others 
adversely affected by actions of one’s own community provide us with an ethical framework for our 
climate justice advocacy. However it should be noted that he does not provide a rationale for 
apportioning the remaining carbon budget on an equal per-capita shares basis, which for some is the 
benchmark for climate justice. The ‘solution space’ available for a reasonable chance of complying 
with the two degree guardrail lies somewhere between what Peters and co-authors call the ‘inertia 
curve’ and the ‘equity curve’ which are two extremes on the spectrum of concepts of climate 
justice.665 Posner and Weisbach’s idea of a forward-looking parallel abatement model that disregards 
historic responsibility and differentiated capacity tracks the inertia curve, with models such as 
Aubrey Meyer’s Contraction and Convergence666 and the Greenhouse Development Rights 
Framework667 falling somewhere between the two curves—in the latter case depending on the 
choice of indices for capacity and responsibility. It is well known that the ‘Paris pledges’ made by 
governments fall outside the solution space and some mechanism both for ratcheting up the level of 
ambition in the future and for compensating the most vulnerable nations will be needed to design a 
workable agreement that is both fair and adequate to the task. It may be that in the United States at 
least, where his work is very influential, a Grisez School framework for climate justice might 
motivate both an increase in ambition and a renewed sense of solidarity with the vulnerable global 
poor. In addition, his support for global institutions and governance structures, alongside that of 
Pope Francis in Laudato Si’, might temper a strong sense of absolute national sovereignty amongst 
American Catholics. Overall, Grisez’s important work on environmental ethics which this thesis has 
sought to recover may act as a corrective to the widespread view that environmentalism is not a 
conservative Catholic issue and help to bring a new and constructive perspective to bear in 
conversations concerning Christian ecological responsibility as we seek to read the signs of the times 
and respond in faith to the challenges of the Anthropocene. 
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